concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in all divisions except 2 and 3.
1. In ruling on Massachusetts Bay’s motion for judgment n.o.v. or for new trial, the trial court reaffirmed its ruling granting the Halls’ motion for directed verdict on the waiver issue; it also adopted as additional grounds that the evidence showed that Massachusetts Bay had the “necessary information” to assert its defense prior to sending the non-renewal notice, and that it failed to make a decision whether to deny the Halls’ claim prior to the filing of the instant suit and despite the allegations of a void policy in a prior declaratory judgment action filed in federal court. Massachusetts Bay argues on appeal that the trial court “has confused the basic difference between the bare receipt of information, and knowledge in the larger context of knowing what it means.”
Notwithstanding Massachusetts Bay’s protestations that it had not sufficiently “appreciated the facts to conclusively refute the Halls’ assertions,” this court has held that “ ‘ “[t]he demand for payment in full of a future premium subsequently to the breach of a condition *358which would have entitled the insurer to insist upon a forfeiture of the contract will be held to be a waiver of the forfeiture, and be treated as an acknowledgment that the delinquent policy-holder is still entitled to the benefits conferred by his contract.” [Cit.]’ [Cits.]” State Farm Fire &c. Co. v. Jenkins, 167 Ga. App. 4, 6 (1) (305 SE2d 801) (1983). We conclude that the sending of a non-renewal notice is likewise an acknowledgment that the contract remained in effect and entitled the Halls to the benefits conferred thereunder. Massachusetts Bay admitted that when it sent the notice it knew of “some” of the alleged false representations, and that is all that is required. “If a party to a contract seeks to avoid it on the ground of fraud or mistake he must, upon discovery of the facts, at once announce his purpose and adhere to it. Otherwise he cannot avoid or rescind such contract.” Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 673 (5) (132 SE 442) (1925).
Decided June 25, 1990 Rehearing denied July 13, 1990 — Cert, applied for. Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Clayton H. Farnham, Barbara Jo Call, for appellant. Gorby, Reeves, Moraitakis & Whiteman, Nicholas C. Moraitakis, *359Eve A. Appelbaum, Robert E. Richardson, for appellees.*358Moreover, Massachusetts Bay has failed to show how it was harmed by this ruling since it was allowed to present evidence concerning the alleged false statements to the jury. Out of some 2,000 items claimed in a 70-page Proof of Loss document submitted by Justin Hall, Massachusetts Bay disputed no more than 23 items, and the jury clearly did not believe that the Halls made false statements since it awarded all the plaintiffs requested except for $12,000 out of the $300,000 in available contents coverage. If any error occurred it was harmless, and harmless error does not constitute reversible error. Goss v. Mathis, 188 Ga. App. 702 (373 SE2d 807) (1988).
2. Massachusetts Bay also complains that the trial court erred in ruling that its failure to return the Halls’ premium effected a waiver of its right to void the policy for fraud and misrepresentation. Not only was the trial court’s ruling correct under the holding in Jenkins that inconsistent acts result in a waiver of the forfeiture, there is controlling authority that in order to declare a policy void for misrepresentations, the insurer must tender the premium back to the insured. See Loeb v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 162 Ga. App. 561 (292 SE2d 409) (1982); Haugseth v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 192 Ga. App. 853 (386 SE2d 725) (1989).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Presiding Judge Banke join in this opinion.