concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, joins.
I agree with that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the buyer, appel-lee Bruce Webster, was entitled to a reasonable time to perform and did not breach his contract with the seller, appellant Linda Matney. However, I disagree with the result reached by the majority affirming termination of the contract based on appel-lee’s counterclaim.
A careful reading of the trial court’s judgment and decision letter reveals that it never made a specific finding as to why the contract should be terminated. Its judgment merely stated that the defendant/ap-pellee was entitled to a reasonable time in which to perform, that reasonable time was not accorded him, and that therefore he did not breach the contract.
The trial court’s judgment does state that the matter came before the court on the complaint of the plaintiff and the counterclaim of the defendant and that the court found generally in favor of the defendant. The majority adopts this finding, without analyzing it, to hold that “the contract is terminated and no longer of force or effect.” In view of its prejudicial effect in this case, this implicit result of the trial court’s decision deserves a more searching review than it was given by the majority.
Appellant’s complaint requested specific performance of the contract, or in the alternative, damages for breach. Appellee’s counterclaim requested that
[t]he Court * * * declare the aforesaid document [the contract] to be terminated, because a material condition of the document cannot be fulfilled.
The material condition which “could not be fulfilled” was that “the property does not meet the standards required for a WCDA loan” despite appellee’s having “in good faith applied for and attempted to comply with all requirements” to obtain that loan. Webster had the burden of proving any excuse for nonperformance of his contractual obligations. See Sturgeon v. Phifer, 390 P.2d 727, 729-30 (Wyo.1964).
Bruce Webster testified at trial that he was familiar with the heating system of the Matney property before he ever signed the contract to purchase it. He was aware, at the time he signed the agreement, that he was required to pay any repair costs required by WCDA or FHA. The plain language of the contract required him to do so. On the loan papers he signed, Webster listed an annual income of $25,000 and assets of $4,000 cash. He received various estimates for the required repairs, including one of $1,570 total cost for repairing the drainage system and heating system and bringing the house “up to code.”
I see no reason why Webster could not have paid to have the work done and then closed the loan according to his agreement. Webster’s testimony at trial certainly does not establish that it would be impossible for him to make the required repairs.
There was no material condition which could not be fulfilled by Webster. To allow rescission under these circumstances would be to allow him to take advantage of his own failure to perform his contractual duties to escape liability on the contract. This we should not allow. See Reed v. Wadsworth, 553 P.2d 1024, 1034 (Wyo.1976).
It is also possible that the majority accepts appellee’s argument that he was precluded from performing by appellant’s suit for specific performance. A party to a contract may be excused from performance by unwarranted interference from the other party. Concrete Specialties v. H.C. Smith Construction Co., 423 F.2d 670, 672 (10th Cir.1970). However, if the “interference” is caused by an act which is neither wrongful nor in excess of the interfering party’s rights, it does not provide an excuse for nonperformance. Whitt v. Godwin, 205 Va. 797, 139 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1965); 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 468 (1963).
*216I would hold that Matney’s suit here, while premature, was not wrongful or in excess of her rights under the contract. She was seeking to compel performance, not to interfere with it. The contract should not be terminated because of the suit's being filed.