concurring specially.
I concur fully with Divisions 2 through 5 of the majority opinion.
I concur specially with Division 1 of the majority opinion. Had the evidence supported that which defendant contended, but failed to prove, then reversal would be required of his conviction of driving with a suspended license. Defendant stated that he applied for reinstatement of his suspended license and it was issued on April 8, 1989, 115 days after suspension. The license was issued five days before he was eligible for reinstatement pursuant to OCGA § 40-5-70 (b) (1) (B) (now codified as OCGA § 40-5-63 (a) (2)).
Defendant was arrested on the subject incident approximately 16 months following receipt of his reissued license.
As the court properly stated, it was a jury question as to whether or not defendant’s license had been reinstated and his innocence or guilt of the charge of driving with license in suspension. The jury *784weighed the evidence, which did not require acquittal of the defendant and decided these issues against defendant.
Decided July 13, 1993 — Reconsideration denied July 30, 1993. John H. Bedford, for appellant. Gerald N. Blaney, Jr., Solicitor, Allison L. Thatcher, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.I specially concur to the extent that the majority opinion imports that defendant would have been guilty of driving with license in suspension, even if the evidence conclusively showed that he had otherwise properly applied for reinstatement of his license, albeit earlier than authorized by statute, and his license had been reissued by the State, with full knowledge of the facts, pursuant to Chapter 570-3 of the Rules of the Department of Public Safety. It is the opinion of this writer that the defendant would not be guilty of driving with license in suspension where he has been charged with such an offense more than 120 days following the original suspension where the license had been reinstated, regardless of the fact that the license was reinstated by the State five days prior to the statutorily authorized date. Under such circumstance, the defendant obviously had no intention to violate the law, and if he received his license five days early, such reissuance was done by the State with full knowledge of both the law and defendant’s status. This type of situation is very different from that in which a defendant whose license has been suspended, simply applies for a new driver’s license and does not reveal his status, and same is issued by the state without knowledge of the suspension, rather than applying for reinstatement with full disclosure. Indeed, upon proper evidence, acquittal would be demanded. Where, as here, the evidence was equivocal, the judge properly left this question of fact to the jury.