concurring specially.
I concur fully with Divisions 1 through 3 of the majority opinion.
1 concur specially with Division 4 of the majority opinion regarding the application of the rule set forth in Robinson v. State, 261 Ga. 698 (410 SE2d 116) (1991), governing when a jury charge on the law of circumstantial evidence is required. I concur fully with Division 4 of the majority opinion, but would add the following:
Based upon the evidence, almost all of which constituted direct evidence, the defendant requested a jury charge on the general law of circumstantial evidence as codified at OCGA § 24-4-6. That Code section provides that “ftJo warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” (Emphasis supplied.) This statute represents a codification of the rule requiring a charge on circumstantial evidence where the state’s case depends entirely upon circumstantial evidence, derived from Martin v. State, 38 Ga. 293 (1868); Carter v. State, 46 Ga. 637 (1872); and Simmons v. State, 85 Ga. 224 (11 SE 555) (1890), which were such cases.
Based upon the three cases from which OCGA § 24-4-6 and its predecessor statutes were derived, it was originally intended to apply only to those cases that were based entirely upon circumstantial evidence. Subject to certain exceptions, subsequent cases held that the general rule is that unless the evidence relied upon for the conviction is entirely circumstantial, a jury charge under OCGA § 24-4-6 is not required. “Where, as here, there is some direct evidence against the *636defendant, it is not error to fail to charge on circumstantial evidence.” Terrell v. State, 258 Ga. 722, 724 (373 SE2d 751) (1988).
However, this court has held that “if the only direct evidence comes from a witness who has been impeached, it is reversible error to fail to charge on circumstantial evidence upon request.” (Emphasis supplied.) Whittington v. State, 252 Ga. 168, 176 (313 SE2d 73) (1984); Horne v. State, 93 Ga. App. 345 (4) (91 SE2d 824) (1956). The theory underlying this rule was that where both direct and circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt are admitted, and the jury is authorized to find that all the direct evidence in the form of witness testimony has been impeached, the jury is left to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant based solely on the circumstantial evidence, and therefore must have some guidance on the quantum of circumstantial evidence which will authorize a conviction. See Green v. State, 167 Ga. App. 548 (306 SE2d 354) (1983).
The Supreme Court noted in Robinson v. State, supra, that it was impossible to determine whether the jury found the state’s witnesses had not been impeached and thus based its verdict on the direct evidence, or whether the jury found that the state’s witnesses had been impeached and thus based its verdict on circumstantial evidence (giving rise to a need for a jury charge on circumstantial evidence). To avoid such problems in the future, the Supreme Court devised the following rule: “[W]here the state’s case depends, in whole or in part, on circumstantial evidence, a charge on the law of circumstantial evidence must be given on request. This rule will apply whether or not the jury is authorized to find that the direct evidence presented by witness testimony has been impeached.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 699-700.
The questions which must be answered in applying Robinson, are: what is the meaning of the word “depends” as used therein, and what charge on circumstantial evidence must be given, where a charge is required? It is only where the state’s case “depends” upon circumstantial evidence that such a jury charge becomes necessary. The State’s case “depends” upon circumstantial evidence only where such evidence is necessary to prove one of the essential elements of the offense for which the defendant is on trial. See Rash v. State, 207 Ga. App. 585 (5) (428 SE2d 799) (1993).
Robinson by no means requires a jury charge on the law of circumstantial evidence in every case in which some circumstantial evidence is adduced. See, e.g., Berry v. State, 262 Ga. 614 (422 SE2d 861) (1992), wherein the Supreme Court, citing Robinson, found no error in the trial court’s refusal to give a requested jury charge on circumstantial evidence that was not properly adjusted to the evidence in the case.
Where the state depended upon a mixture of direct and circum*637stantial evidence to prove essential elements of the offense, no charge on circumstantial evidence would have been required absent a proper request to charge the law on circumstantial evidence adjusted to the facts of the case. There was no independent duty on the court to create and give a proper charge on circumstantial evidence, adjusted to the evidence of the case. It is only where the state relies wholly on circumstantial evidence that a charge on circumstantial evidence must be given without request. Gentry v. State, 208 Ga. 370 (66 SE2d 913) (1951); Campbell v. State, 202 Ga. 705 (44 SE2d 903) (1947). This rule has not been changed by Robinson.
Inasmuch as OCGA § 24-4-6, as written, applies only to cases in which the state depends entirely upon circumstantial evidence, and the subject case involves mix of direct and circumstantial evidence, it was not error for the court to refuse to charge said Code section. Indeed, to have done so, would have mislead the jury as OCGA § 24-4-6 provides, in part, “[t]o warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, . . .” (emphasis supplied) while the direct evidence in the instant case was sufficient to convict the defendant. Thus, the charge requested by the defendant was not adjusted to the evidence of this case (a mixture of direct and circumstantial evidence) and the court properly refused to give same. “If any portion of a requested charge is inapt, incorrect, misleading, confusing, not adequately adjusted or tailored, or not reasonably raised or authorized by the evidence, denial of the charge request is proper.” Harris v. State, 202 Ga. App. 618, 621 (414 SE2d 919) (1992); Hill v. State, 259 Ga. 557 (3b) (385 SE2d 404) (1989).
Where the direct evidence alone suffices to establish the charged offense, and any circumstantial evidence is merely cumulative, no jury charge on circumstantial evidence is required even under Robinson. Rash v. State, supra. The rule regarding a jury charge on circumstantial evidence set forth in Robinson v. State, supra, applies only where the state relies upon such evidence to prove one of the essential elements of the offense for which the defendant is on trial. The limited quantity of circumstantial evidence adduced in the instant case was not used or needed for that purpose, and the majority opinion appropriately affirms the defendant’s conviction on the basis that a jury charge on circumstantial evidence was not required under Robinson v. State, supra.
The current status of the law concerning charging the jury on circumstantial evidence can be stated as follows:
(a) Where the state relies wholly on circumstantial evidence to prove its case a charge on circumstantial evidence as provided by OCGA § 24-4-6 is required, without request from the defendant; (b) Where the state relies on a mixture of direct and circumstantial evidence to prove essential elements of the charged offense, a proper *638charge on circumstantial evidence adjusted to the fact of there being mixed direct and circumstantial evidence is required, upon proper request, without regard to whether or not the state’s witnesses may have been impeached.
Decided July 16, 1993. Steven W. Reighard, for appellant. Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Nancy A. Grace, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.Moreover, as this court noted in Rash v. State, supra at 587, “there is yet another reason for not reversing this case for failure to charge the law of circumstantial evidence. That is, no other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused has been suggested. Should the case be retried so a jury can hear those words when no other reasonable hypothesis has been offered? Our answer is in the negative.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)