dissenting.
It has been said that attorneys are the operators of the expensive toll bridges which everyone who seeks justice and critical changes through the law must cross. Unfortunately, too few people are able to afford the toll. Through the plurality opinion and the special concurrence, a majority of this Court today insures that even fewer Georgians who have lent their backbones to the building of this great state, and who in doing so have suffered the pain and frustration of employment discrimination, will have access to the attorneys needed to vindicate their rights. Today the majority insures that the number of *306competent counsel standing ready to use our courts to eliminate discrimination from today’s workplace will be significantly diminished. Today the majority’s decision effectively denies many Georgians the key to the courthouse door and needlessly sows the seeds of future discontent. Today I feel much regret.
I, therefore, dissent.
1. In determining the interplay between the reasonable attorney fee provisions of OCGA § 45-19-38 (c) and the actual damages provision of § 45-19-38 (d), the plurality has completely ignored OCGA § 45-19-21. OCGA § 45-19-21 (a) (1) directs that the General Assembly enacted FEPA
to provide for execution within public employment in the state of the policies embodied in Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (78 Stat. 241), as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (86 Stat. 103).
Thus, the General Assembly has directed that it enacted subsections (c) and (d) of § 45-19-38 to provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII. As § 45-19-38 (c) and (d) relate to the remedies available for unlawful discriminatory practices and to awards of reasonable attorney fees, let us examine the policies of the corresponding provisions of Title VII.
The legislative history of Title VII shows that the policy behind the remedies for an employers’ unlawful discrimination itself was to make complainants whole by restoring them to the position in which they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination and not to punish the wrongdoer. See Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Education, 585 F2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978). Thus, when our General Assembly enacted FEPA, federal courts had held that punitive and compensatory damages were not available under Title VII. Harrington, supra.
Moreover, the “reasonable attorney fees” provision of Title VII was designed, not only as a remedy to restore a complainant to the position he or she would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination, but for the wholly distinct purpose of facilitating the bringing of claims for such discrimination by awards of expenses of litigation. See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, 488 F2d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 1974). In this regard, federal courts have consistently held that the attorney fees provision of Title VII and similar civil rights statutes is not primarily to make the claimant whole but is to give complainants “ ‘effective access to the judicial process,’ ” Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U. S. 87, 95 (109 SC 939, 103 LE2d 67) (1989), and “to facilitate the bringing of discrimination complaints,” New York Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 U. S. 54, 63 (100 SC 2024, 64 LE2d 723) *307(1980). Because of this policy, federal courts have rejected the proposition that attorney fee awards should be limited to the costs actually incurred by the claimant. Blanchard, supra, 489 U. S.; Blum v. Stenson, 465 U. S. 886, 892-895 (104 SC 1541, 79 LE2d 891) (1984). In Blanchard, supra, 489 U. S. at 90-97, the Court held that a client who had entered into a contingent fee contract with an attorney on a civil rights claim under 42 USC § 1983 should not be limited in a fee award to the amount represented by the contingent fee agreement, but instead was entitled to an amount representing reasonable attorney fees for services rendered in vindicating a plaintiff’s civil rights.3 Moreover, in Blum, the Court held that a client who was represented without a fee by a private non-profit legal organization was entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees. 465 U. S. at 892-895.
Subsection (d) of § 45-19-38 unquestionably tracks the policies of Title VII regarding the remedies for the unlawful discrimination itself — to limit those remedies to ones designed to make the complainant whole with regard to his or her employment and to prohibit remedies designed to punish the employer. Moreover, to construe § 45-19-38 (d) to limit attorney fees to those actually incurred unquestionably defeats the policies of the reasonable attorney fee provisions of § 45-19-38 (c). Limiting attorneys to recover only those fees actually paid would grant complainants either no access to the judicial process or less effective access than would a rule permitting complainants to recover reasonable attorney fees at prevailing market rates. The reason is clear — such a rule would diminish the number of counsel ready and able to represent claimants in FEPA cases. As demonstrated by the instant case, FEPA cases can be difficult and a claimant faces an adversary with vastly superior resources. It is thus reasonable to assume that if attorneys hired by the administrator are not permitted to seek reasonable fees at the prevailing rate for proceedings before the special master, the enforcement of FEPA will be diminished because the administrator will not be able to attract and obtain the services of skilled employment discrimination attorneys. This difficulty in attracting competent counsel will also be encountered by FEPA complainants who desire to choose their own attorney. Undoubtedly, many such complainants must rely on contingent-fee arrangements. However, as a complainant’s monetary damages under FEPA will generally relate to back pay only, see § 45-19-38 (c) (1), many attorneys will refuse FEPA cases if they are precluded from seeking reasonable attorney fees at prevailing rates if their client *308prevails.
With regard to contingent-fee agreements, there is additional adverse consequence of precluding an award of reasonable attorney fees at prevailing rates. If contingent-fee agreements served as an absolute limit to the amount of attorney fees, attorneys employed under such agreements might focus their energies on monetary damages to the detriment of important non-monetary remedies, § 45-19-38 (c) (1-7), that might benefit not only the claimant but society at large. See generally Blanchard, supra, 489 U. S. at 95-96. The ceiling on attorney fees imposed by the agreement would thus serve as a tempting incentive for lawyers to work the system, not make the system work.
Given the policy considerations outlined above, it is unreasonable to conclude, as does the plurality, that our General Assembly enacted a reasonable attorney fee provision under § 45-19-38 (c), with the stated purpose of effectuating the policy of Title VII, § 45-19-21 (a) (1), and then enacted § 45-19-38 (d) to defeat the very policy behind the grant of attorney fees. The only reasonable construction is that the General Assembly enacted § 45-19-38 (d) to effectuate the policy of Title VII of limiting the remedies for the unlawful discrimination itself to those designed to make the complainant whole with regard to the complainant’s employment.
2. Furthermore, this construction is consistent with § 45-19-21 (a) (3) and (b). Those provisions, also ignored by the plurality, provide that
(a) The general purposes of this article are:
(3) To promote the elimination of discrimination against all individuals in public employment because of such individuals’ race, color, religion, national origin, sex, handicap, or age ... .
(b) This article shall be broadly construed to further the general purposes stated in this Code section and the special purposes of the particular provision involved.
For the reasons given in Div. 1 of this dissent, permitting attorneys to recover attorney fees at prevailing rates will promote the elimination of discrimination in public employment. The plurality’s construction is completely inconsistent with the mandate to construe FEPA broadly to promote that purpose.
3. Moreover, I think the special concurrence also overlooks the clear direction given to this Court by the General Assembly to construe FEPA broadly to further the purposes thereof. First, although Finney chose to have her attorney appointed by the administrator, the attorney clearly represents Finney and not the administrator. OCGA § 45-19-27 (3). Moreover, there is simply nothing in §§ 45-19-*30927 (3) or 45-19-37 (i) that states that a complainant who elects to be represented by an attorney appointed by the administrator may not thereafter seek attorney fees under § 45-19-38 (c). For these reasons and for those given in Divs. 1 and 2 of this dissent, I would construe FEPA to permit reasonable attorney fees for such complainants.
Decided July 15, 1993. Stroup & Coleman, Robert H. Stroup, for appellant. Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Daryl A. Robinson, Jef*310frey L. Milsteen, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Terry L. Long, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.*3094. Finally, I have several comments on Div. 2 of the plurality opinion, which remands the case to the Court of Appeals for it to address whether the appellant is entitled to recover attorney fees under OCGA § 45-19t39 (c) for the proceedings in superior court. First, although the plurality concludes that OCGA § 45-19-38 (d) limits the special master’s power to award attorney fees, that subsection should not be construed to limit the superior court’s power to award attorney fees under § 45-19-39 (c). As § 45-19-38 (d) is part of a Code section that sets forth the authority of a special master and does not deal with the authority of a superior court, I would construe § 45-19-38 (d) to be limited to “monetary awards ordered [by a special master] pursuant to this article.” Any other construction would be completely at odds with the mandate given the courts by § 45-19-21.
Moreover, construing § 45-19-38 (d) to limit the superior court’s authority to award attorney fees would place a further burden on the administrator’s ability to hire attorneys to represent complainants. Attorneys hired by the administrator are only paid by the administrator through the special master proceedings. OCGA § 45-19-27 (3). An attorney who succeeds before the administrator may have a client who cannot pay the hourly rate to have the attorney represent them on appeal to superior court. If the attorney may not seek market rates for his services on appeal to superior court, the attorney is faced with two prospects, either representing the complainant pro bono on the appeal, with no hope of being paid for that work, or abandoning defense of the appeal. These prospects for appellate work, combined with the fact that attorneys hired by the administrator may not seek market rates for the special master proceedings, would certainly discourage attorneys from agreeing to represent claimants through the administrator.
5. About 40 years ago the great poet Langston Hughes wrote: “What happens to a dream deferred? Does it dry up like a raisin in the sun ... Or does it explode?” Today I wonder.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice Benham joins in this dissent.
*310Amy M. Totenberg, Gary J. Leshaw, Elizabeth J. Appley, James M. Finley, Suzanne Wynn, Phillip Jackson, amici curiae.The Court in Blanchard held, among other things, that the fee should not be what the client agreed to pay but what is reasonable under the circumstances of the case and that what the client agreed to pay is but one factor to consider in determining a reasonable fee. Id. at 92-97.