concurring specially.
I concur in the majority’s holding affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants. In City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26 (426 SE2d 861) (1993), the Supreme Court held that in a cause of action alleging a police department’s negligent failure to protect a victim from criminal assault by a third party, the police have a legal duty to protect the victim only “where there is a special relationship between the [victim] and the [police] which sets the [victim] apart from the general public and engenders a special duty owed to [the victim].” I agree that under this standard, the defendants were in no special relationship with Mrs. Feise, therefore the defendants *735had no special duty to protect her from Kramer’s attack.
Decided July 13, 1993 — Reconsideration denied July 29, 1993 — Gerard J. Lupa, for appellants. Drew, Eckl & Farnham, William T. Mitchell, Theodore Freeman, for appellees.This case was remanded to this court by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Rome, supra, in which the Supreme Court adopted three requirements for a special relationship: “(1) an explicit assurance by the [police department], through promises or actions, that it would act on behalf of the injured party; (2) knowledge on the part of the [police department] that inaction could lead to harm; and, (3) justifiable and detrimental reliance by the injured party on the [police department’s] affirmative undertaking.” Although I concur in the holding, I cannot agree with the majority’s rigid application of these requirements to the facts at hand.1
Mrs. Feise feared the anonymous threatening phone calls to her and her neighbors were made by Kramer, but she had no proof. She contacted the police with her suspicions, and indicated that the calls sounded as if they had been made from a pay phone. The police checked local public phones, but were unable to find the caller. The police were unable to detain or arrest Kramer because they had no proof he made the threats. Under requirement (1), the police took reasonable actions to investigate the threatening phone calls based on the information given them by Mrs. Feise. There was no explicit assurance to act on her behalf to protect her against Kramer because there was no evidence he made the threats. As to requirement (2), at best, the defendants knew there was a threat of harm, but they did not know who made the threats. Accordingly, there was no specific action they reasonably failed to take. In light of the facts pertaining to (1) and (2), there could have been no justifiable and detrimental reliance by Mrs. Feise on the defendants’ affirmative undertaking.
For a complete recitation of the facts, see Feise v. Cherokee County, 207 Ga. App. 17 (427 SE2d 294) (1992).