concurring specially.
I concur because by their very nature, claims of slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress are excluded from coverage under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The right to workers’ compensation for injuries proximately caused by such tortious acts is not within the purview of the Act because these types of injuries fall outside the definition of “injury” or “personal injury” as used in the Act. OCGA § 34-9-1 (4). None of the injuries resulting from such acts would be physical, and the Act does not cover occurrences which re-suit in exclusively non-physical injury. W. W. Fowler Oil Co. v. Hamby, 192 Ga. App. 422 (385 SE2d 106) (1989). Although there might be some psychic disability resulting from the purely psychological injury when slander or intentional infliction of emotional distress occurs, this is outside the confines of the Act. Williams v. ARA Environmental Svcs., 175 Ga. App. 661 (334 SE2d 192) (1985). As in the employee versus employer malicious prosecution case of Bi-Lo, Inc. v. *705McConnell, 199 Ga. App. 154 (404 SE2d 327) (1991), the Workers Compensation Act is simply not involved. Bryant v. Wal-Mart Stores, 203 Ga. App. 770 (417 SE2d 688) (1992), involved false imprisonment as the cause of action, which two judges of the court held came within the purview of the Act, so that even the employee’s nonphysical injuries could not be redressed by a tort action. The judge who concurred specially viewed a claim of false imprisonment which involves only non-physical injuries as not being barred by the Act. As he pointed out, “to prevail on a false imprisonment claim, one does not have to show either physical or mental harm but only wrongful detention.” Id. at 774. He quotes Larson, with whom I agree:
Decided July 2, 1993 — Reconsideration denied July 28, 1993 — Joe H. Thalgott, for appellant. Anderson, Walker & Reichert, Robert A. B. Reichert, for appellees.“ ‘If the essence of the tort, in law, is non-physical, and if the injuries are of the usual non-physical sort, with physical injury being at most added to the list of injuries as a makeweight, the suit should not be barred. But if the essence of the action is recovery for physical injury or death, the action should be barred even if it can be cast in the form of a normally non-physical tort.’ 2A Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, § 68.34 (a), at 13-117 (1990). See also id. at § 68.31.” Bryant, supra at 775. Plaintiff’s claim in Bryant involved physical injury and death as well as deprivation of liberty, so the concurring judge agreed that the suit was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
In this case, the nature of the claims involve only non-physical injury, and plaintiff of course alleges such, so her causes of action are not barred by the Act.
I note that the majority opinion refers to chest pains. I find no evidence of such, but if there is any, they would be regarded not as physical injury but rather as originating in psychic causes. See Williams, supra.