concurring in part and dissenting in part.
1. I agree with that portion of Division 1 which holds that Dr. Butler was not entitled to summary judgment on the record thus far developed with respect to plaintiffs’ claim of intentional interference with business relations. I respectfully dissent as to the remainder of the opinion.
2. Plaintiffs enumerate as error the denial of their motion to compel discovery. They sought certain information by interrogatories to each of the defendants plus questions at the depositions of two nurses, which they were precluded from obtaining. It related to the “concerns of . . . nurses” which was referenced in the letter of hospital administrator Sumlin reporting the resignation of Dr. Freeman to the State Board. It is undisputed that these unspecified “concerns” of unidentified persons, which were the heart of the negative implications about Dr. Freeman’s professional performance conveyed to the State Board, were never brought to the attention of the hospital’s Credentials Committee or any other review organization or medical review committee. Thus, the information sought is not subject to the confidentiality privilege of either OCGA § 31-7-133 (a) or OCGA § 31-7-143. The first section protects “the proceedings and records of *850a review organization.” The second section protects “[t]he proceedings and records of medical review committees.” Even when there are proceedings of either type group,2 the two statutes provide that information available from original sources is not immune.
Decided July 15, 1993 — Reconsiderations denied July 30, 1993 — Jerry B. Hatcher, for appellants. Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, Sidney F. Wheeler, M. B. Satcher III, for appellees.Here plaintiffs sought the sources and subject matter of the damaging statement in the hospital administrator’s letter, which letter erroneously relates that the information was reported to the Credentials Committee. There is nothing in the law which shields these facts from disclosure to the plaintiffs, who are affected by them. Cobb County Kennestone Hosp. Auth. v. Martin, 208 Ga. App. 326 (430 SE2d 604) (1993).
Eubanks v. Ferrier, 245 Ga. 763 (267 SE2d 230) (1980), does not preclude discovery of the information sought by plaintiffs’ interrogatories and deposition questions. It upheld the nondiscoverability of records and proceedings of hospital medical review committees. It also protected those who served on the committee from questioning about any matter that arose out of their service on the committee. That situation does not obtain here.
Emory Clinic v. Houston, supra, fn. 1, also does not apply, because it merely affirms that there is to be no discovery relative to medical or peer review proceedings.
The denial of discovery was error. That being so, summary judgment should also be reversed, to await the development of evidence which can affect the provability of plaintiffs’ claims.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Pope and Judge Smith join in this opinion.
See an explanation of the distinction in Emory Clinic v. Houston, 258 Ga. 434, 435 (1)0, fn.1 (369 SE2d 913) (1988).