In Re Nadrich

EAGLESON, J., Concurring.

I begin by sharing the dissent’s concerns over the type of misconduct involved in this case. Petitioner has gone beyond breaching the fiduciary duties imposed upon him as an attorney, and has engaged in crimes against society. His possession and interstate distribution of large quantities of an illicit and dangerous drug is criminal conduct, the seriousness of which cannot be overstated. Petitioner’s two criminal convictions also represented only a small fraction of a concededly larger pattern of unlawful conduct involving other drug transactions.

Nonetheless, there is more to this case than drug-dealing for personal gain. While I do not in any way condone petitioner’s activities, he has painted a convincing picture of a once-productive individual whose lawful *281use of a prescriptive drug transformed him into an addict. He resorted to criminal conduct only after being abandoned by the medical profession.

Most telling, of course, is the overwhelming evidence of rehabilitation. Since the inception of his incarceration, petitioner has consistently acknowledged responsibility for his crimes, and has diligently sought to permanently rid himself of his addiction. He has actively and selflessly participated in various recovery programs, including those specifically designed to help solve the drug and alcohol problems of other members of the legal profession. Finally, petitioner’s abstention from drug use is well documented, his therapeutic prognosis is excellent, and his desire to contribute to the legal profession is strong.

Accordingly, our task is to balance these unique facts against the need to protect the public, bench, and bar from further injury. I believe that the majority has made the proper disciplinary choice. A probationary term enables the State Bar and this court to carefully monitor petitioner’s progress and ensure that his rehabilitation continues. The discipline ordered by the majority imposes a one-year period of actual suspension and four additional years of probation. In short, petitioner will be under our watchful eyes for the next five years.

In contrast, disbarment would not lead to such particularized supervision. As noted in the majority opinion, petitioner becomes eligible to apply for reinstatement in February 1988. Assuming his application—which would undoubtedly document his impressive rehabilitative effort—is granted, he would soon reenter the profession and be free of all probationary supervision.

Therefore, in light of the severity of petitioner’s misconduct and the need to ensure that his commendable reform efforts continue, I concur with the discipline imposed by the majority.

Arguelles, J., and Kaufman, J., concurred.