On October 28, 2002, Brandon Cooper pled guilty to armed robbery and aggravated assault, and on that same day was sentenced to two terms of ten years in prison, to be served concurrently. Subsequently, he filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was received by the Superior Court of Washington County on July 2, 2008. Warden Stephen Roberts answered the petition and filed a motion to dismiss it as untimely under OCGA § 9-14-42 (c) (1), as the petition was not filed on or before July 1, 2008, as this Code provision requires. The habeas court denied the motion, declaring that the “mailbox rule” set out in Massaline v. Williams, 274 Ga. 552 (554 SE2d 720) (2001), applied to Cooper’s petition, and it would thus be deemed filed when he properly delivered it to prison officials; the habeas court found that Cooper did so on June 27, 2008, *658before the statutory deadline of July 1, 2008. Roberts secured a certificate of immediate review from the habeas court and applied to this Court for interlocutory appeal. We granted the application to address whether the habeas court erred in applying the mailbox rule to an initial petition in the habeas court. Finding that Massaline applies only to the situation addressed therein, we reverse.
Under OCGA § 9-14-52,1 if a person being restrained by virtue of a sentence of a state court of record petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, is unsuccessful, and wishes to appeal, “he must file a written application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal with the clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 days from the entry of the order denying him relief”; he must “also file within the same period a notice of appeal with the clerk of the concerned superior court.” OCGA § 9-14-52 (b). In Massaline, this Court announced a rule of appellate procedure by which, when such a petitioner is proceeding pro se, “his application for certificate of probable cause to appeal and notice of appeal will be deemed filed on the date he delivers them to the prison authorities for forwarding to the clerks of this Court and *659the superior court, respectively.” Massaline, supra at 555 (3) (a).
After our 2001 decision in Massaline, the General Assembly, in 2004, amended OCGA § 9-14-42 to add subsection (c), which provides for a period of limitation in which a petitioner must file his initial petition for habeas relief. Under OCGA § 9-14-42 (c) (1), one who, like Cooper, was convicted of a felony before July 1, 2004, is required to file his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on or before July 1, 2008, absent exceptions not relevant here.2 In deciding that Massaline’s mailbox rule applied to OCGA § 9-14-42, the habeas court determined that the mailbox rule was to be applied to any pleading regarding habeas corpus. However, this is incorrect.
Since our decision in Massaline, we have emphasized that the mailbox rule announced therein is one of appellate procedure in the context of habeas corpus petitions for certificates of probable cause in this Court, not a rule of general application. In Riley v. State, 280 Ga. 267, 268 (626 SE2d 116) (2006), we stated:
Massaline, however, by its explicit terms applies only in the narrow context of habeas corpus appeals to permit a pro se *660prisoner’s notice of appeal to be deemed filed on the date delivered to prison authorities. Georgia’s prison mailbox rule mitigates “the considerable challenges presented to a pro se prisoner’s ability to pursue his constitutional right to habeas corpus . . . and limits the remedial nature of the rule to solely address “the unique circumstances faced by pro se prisoners who bring their habeas corpus petitions to this Court.” [Cit.]
(Emphasis supplied.) This attempt to focus judicial attention on the proper scope of the Massaline decision has borne some fruit. See Lewis v. State, 300 Ga. App. 586 (685 SE2d 485) (2009) (Mailbox rule does not apply to notice of appeal from a motion to declare a conviction and sentence null and void.); McCroskey v. State, 291 Ga. App. 15 (660 SE2d 735) (2008) (Mailbox rule does not apply to a notice of appeal from a conviction in a criminal case.). However, as this case demonstrates, it appears that reiteration regarding the scope of the mailbox rule is necessary.3 Thus, we take this opportunity to repeat that the mailbox rule stated in Massaline is to be applied only in the circumstances presented therein, that is, the attempted appeal of a pro se habeas petitioner operating under OCGA § 9-14-52.
Cooper contends that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, we should conclude that the General Assembly intended that the mailbox rule be extended to include initial habeas filings when it amended OCGA § 9-14-42 (c) in 2004. However, this argument misses the mark. Certainly “our legislature is presumed to enact statutes with full knowledge of existing law, including court decisions.” Dove v. Dove, 285 Ga. 647, 649 (4) (680 SE2d 839) (2009). But, when the General Assembly amended OCGA § 9-14-42 (c) in 2004, this Court’s then-existing precedent was Massaline, which adopted the mailbox rule only as to pro se prisoners in habeas corpus appeals. We will not assume that the General Assembly in 2004 anticipated some extension of the mailbox rule and tacitly approved of such an extension. Rather, it is plain that the General Assembly accepted what this Court said in Massaline-, namely, that the mailbox rule applies only to prisoners in habeas corpus appeals. Had the General Assembly desired to extend the mailbox rule, it could have done so, but it did not.
Although Cooper advances various arguments for an extension *661of the mailbox rule to any filing by a habeas petitioner, at any level,4 we do not find them persuasive. There is no valid justification for this Court to broaden the mailbox rule. Rather, “[t]he Civil Practice Act, OCGA § 9-11-1 et seq., applies in habeas corpus proceedings with regard to questions of pleading and practice. [Cit.]” State v. Jaramillo, 279 Ga. 691, 693 (2) (620 SE2d 798) (2005). Under the Civil Practice Act, an action is initiated “by filing a complaint with the court.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9-11-3 (a). In Massaline, this Court certainly did not attempt to re-write that legislative specification. Rather, Massaline noted that this Court has, under its own Rule 13, interpreted what is meant by statutory references to filing with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia in the appellate arena. Supra at 554 (2); see OCGA § 9-14-52 (b). A ruling by this Court that Massaline’s mailbox rule should be extended beyond the narrow appellate situation it was created to address to any and all filings that come under the ambit of the Civil Practice Act would usurp the General Assembly’s legislative choice. Any such sweeping change is a matter for that body.
In summary, the mailbox rule does not apply to all pro se prisoner litigants. The rule pertains to appellate jurisdiction. See Ferguson v. Freeman, 282 Ga. 180, 182 (1) (646 SE2d 65) (2007). It does not aid those who are represented by counsel. It affords no relief to those who seek appeals in arenas other than habeas corpus. It is a judicially-created rule of accommodation. A pro se felony habeas petitioner has four years to prepare and submit his initial petition; after a denial of that petition, he has 30 days to prepare and submit his application for a certificate of probable cause in this Court, and to prepare and submit his notice of appeal in the habeas court. The difference between the length of the two periods appears to us to have import. We will continue to apply the mailbox rule only in the confines we have previously set forth; the pursuit of an appeal by one who falls under the requirements of OCGA § 9-14-52.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, C. J., and Benham and Thompson, JJ., who dissent.OCGA § 9-14-52 reads:
(a) Appeals in habeas corpus cases brought under this article shall be governed by Chapter 6 of Title 5 except that as to final orders of the court which are adverse to the petitioner no appeal shall be allowed unless the Supreme Court of this state issues a certificate of probable cause for the appeal.
(b) If an unsuccessful petitioner desires to appeal, he must file a written application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal with the clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 days from the entry of the order denying him relief. The petitioner shall also file within the same period a notice of appeal with the clerk of the concerned superior court. The Supreme Court shall either grant or deny the application within a reasonable time after filing. In order for the Supreme Court to consider fully the request for a certificate, the clerk of the concerned superior court shall forward, as in any other case, the record and transcript, if designated, to the clerk of the Supreme Court when a notice of appeal is filed. The clerk of the concerned superior court need not prepare and retain and the court reporter need not file a copy of the original record and a copy of the original transcript of proceedings. The clerk of the Supreme Court shall return the original record and transcript to the clerk of the concerned superior court upon completion of the appeal if the certificate is granted. If the Supreme Court denies the application for a certificate of probable cause, the clerk of the Supreme Court shall return the original record and transcript and shall notify the clerk of the concerned superior court and the parties to the proceedings below of the determination that probable cause does not exist for appeal.
(c) If the trial court finds in favor of the petitioner, no certificate of probable cause need be obtained by the respondent as a condition precedent to appeal. A notice of appeal filed by the respondent shall act as a supersedeas and shall stay the judgment of the superior court until there is a final adjudication by the Supreme Court; provided, however, that, while such case is on appeal, the petitioner may be released on hail as is provided in criminal cases except when the petitioner has been convicted of a crime which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider on direct appeal. The right to bail and the amount of bond shall he within the discretion of the judge of the superior court in which the sentence successfully challenged under this article was originally imposed.
OCGA § 9-14-42 reads:
(a) Any person imprisoned by virtue of a sentence imposed by a state court of record who asserts that in the proceedings which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United States or of this state may institute a proceeding under this article.
(b) The right to object to the composition of the grand or trial jury will be deemed waived under this Code section unless the person challenging the sentence shows in the petition and satisfies the court that cause exists for his being allowed to pursue the objection after the conviction and sentence have otherwise become final.
(c) Any action brought pursuant to this article shall be filed within one year in the case of a misdemeanor, except as otherwise provided in Code Section 40-13-33, or within four years in the case of a felony, other than one challenging a conviction for which a death sentence has been imposed or challenging a sentence of death, from:
(1) The judgment of conviction becoming final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; provided, however, that any person whose conviction has become final as of July 1, 2004, regardless of the date of conviction, shall have until July 1, 2005, in the case of a misdemeanor or until July 1, 2008, in the case of a felony to bring an action pursuant to this Code section;
(2) The date on which an impediment to filing a petition which was created by state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of this state is removed, if the petitioner was prevented from filing such state action;
(3) The date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Georgia, if that right was newly recognized by said courts and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) The date on which the facts supporting the claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(d) At the time of sentencing, the court shall inform the defendant of the periods of limitation set forth in subsection (c) of this Code section.
We note that in Taylor v. Williams, 528 F3d 847 (11th Cir. 2008), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded, incorrectly, that under the rule announced in Massaline, this Court would apply the rule to the filing of the initial petition by a pro se habeas petitioner.
Cooper asserts that pro se prisoners seeking to initiate their habeas petitions and habeas appellants face the same issues of access to the courts that this Court outlined in Massaline, regardless of the time available to them to gain that access. Cooper also notes that constitutional rights are being raised in initial habeas petitions, and, by contrast, there is no constitutional right to appeal a habeas court’s decision. See Fullwood u. Sivley, 271 Ga. 248, 252 (517 SE2d 511) (1999).