Plaintiff appellant Bill Nebeker brought an action, both for himself and as guardian ad litem for his three minor children, for the wrongful death of his wife, Evelyn Nebeker. The district court dismissed that portion of Nebeker’s claim as guardian ad litem for the three minor children on the ground that they were not proper parties plaintiff in the wrongful death action. Nebeker appeals the decision of the district court dismissing his claim as guardian ad litem for the three minor children.
Evelyn Nebeker died in a plane crash on August 17, 1980. The aircraft, a Piper Arrow which had been rented from respondent Queen Bee Air Specialties by Mr. Nebeker, crashed on the return leg of a trip the Nebekers took from Idaho Falls to Jackson, Wyoming. Mr. Nebeker, who was piloting the aircraft, survived, as did all three children who were on board the aircraft at the time of the accident. Mrs. Nebeker died in the crash. The district court dismissed the claim by Nebeker, as guardian ad litem for the children, based on our decision in Schiess v. Bates, 107 Idaho 794, 693 P.2d 440 (1984).
Appellant recognizes, as did the district court, that our recent decision in Schiess v. Bates, supra, is directly on point and controls the result in this case. Schiess held that a surviving spouse is the sole intestate “heir,” to the exclusion of surviving children, where the entire estate of the deceased spouse is community property and, accordingly, the surviving spouse is the only proper party plaintiff in an action for wrongful death of the deceased spouse. Nevertheless, appellant challenges the soundness of the Schiess decision on grounds that: (1) it improperly characterized prior Idaho case law interpreting our wrongful death statute; (2) it failed to give proper recognition to the legislative intent with regard to the wrongful death statute; and (3) its holding violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution when applied to appellants in this case. Finding all three reasons urged in support of overruling Schiess to be without merit, we affirm the district court’s decision.
I.
The wrongful death statute in effect at the time of Mrs. Nebeker’s death in 1980 provides that a decedent's “heirs or personal representatives may maintain an action for damages against the person” whose “wrongful act or neglect” brought about the decedent’s death. I.C. § 5-311. The 1980 version, however, did not define the term “heirs.” In 1913 this Court held that the term “heirs” was not to be defined with some common law definition of “heirs”; rather, this Court held that the term referred to “statutory heirs” as defined in the statute providing for intestate succession. Whitley v. Spokane & Inland Empire R.R., 23 Idaho 642, 662, 132 P. 121, 127 (1913), aff'd 237 U.S. 487, 35 S.Ct. 655, 59 L.Ed. 1060 (1915). Justice Ailshie, writing for a unanimous court in Whitley, specifically held that for purposes of the wrongful death statute, “heirs” were to be determined by reference to the statutes of *611descent and distribution in effect at the time of decedent’s death. “An heir is ‘one who on the death of another becomes entitled by operation of law to succeed to the deceased person’s estate, as an estate of inheritance____’ Our [intestate succession] statute [Revised Code § 5702] defines who shall inherit the property of a deceased person.” Id. at 662, 132 P. at 127. From the Court’s 1913 decision in Whitley, continuing to the present day, this court has consistently held that the term “heirs” as used in the wrongful death statute is to be defined to mean those who would take under the intestate provisions of the probate code in effect at the time of the decedent’s death. Schiess v. Bates, supra; Everett v. Trunnell, 105 Idaho 787, 673 P.2d 387 (1983); Hogan v. Hermann, 101 Idaho 893, 623 P.2d 900 (1980).
Less than two years ago, in Schiess v. Bates, supra, we reaffirmed this long established rule. In Schiess, the decedent’s spouse and her children filed a wrongful death action. The defendant moved for dismissal of the children on the grounds that they were not “heirs” of the decedent and therefore not proper parties plaintiff under the wrongful death statute. On appeal this Court unanimously held that the Schiess children were not proper parties and directed the district court to dismiss them from the action. The rationale for our decision was in keeping with the long established rule as stated above.
“To be proper parties plaintiff for the wrongful death of Mr. Schiess, I.C. § 5-311 requires the children to be ‘heirs’ of Mr. Schiess. We have defined the word ‘heirs’ in the context of § 5-311 as referring to ‘persons who are entitled to inherit the property of an intestate, according to the laws of intestate succession in effect as of the date of death.’ Everett v. Trunnell, 105 Idaho 787, 789, 673 P.2d 387, 389 (1983).” Schiess v. Bates, 107 Idaho at 796, 693 P.2d at 442 (emphasis in original).
The court then went on to hold that under I.C. §§ 15-2-102 and 15-2-103, the intestate provision in effect as of the date of death of Mr. Schiess, the Schiess children would not be considered “heirs” of Mr. Schiess unless he had left separate property “with a value in excess of $50,000.” Id. Since in that case there were no allegations of Mr. Schiess leaving that amount of separate property, we held that the Schiess children were indeed improper parties to the action. The surviving spouse, in Schiess, was the only proper party to maintain the wrongful death action.
The Schiess case directly controls the result in this case. As in Schiess, the intestate provision in effect at the time of Mrs. Nebeker’s death is I.C. § 15-2-103 and, as in Schiess, there are no allegations that Mrs. Nebeker died leaving separate property valued in excess of $50,000. Therefore, only the surviving spouse, Bill Nebeker, is “entitled to inherit the property of [the] intestate” spouse. Schiess v. Bates, supra at 796, 693 P.2d at 442. The Nebeker children, as the Schiess children before them, are not proper parties plaintiff to any action for damages under the wrongful death statute.
Appellant nevertheless attacks the Schiess decision as being unsound, and creating a new rule of law previously unknown in this state. Appellant contends that children, until Schiess, had always been considered proper parties plaintiff to an action for the wrongful death of one of their parents. In some cases prior to Schiess, children, as plaintiffs, did recover damages under the wrongful death statute for the death of a parent. E.g., Hepp v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240, 130 P.2d 859 (1942); Lebak v. Nelson, 62 Idaho 96, 107 P.2d 1054 (1940); and Manion v. Waybright, 59 Idaho 643, 86 P.2d 181 (1938). However, in none of those cases were children permitted to recover damages under our wrongful death statute unless it was determined that they were “heirs” under the intestate provision of the probate code at the time of the death of their parent. Not one single case since the adoption of our wrongful death statute has held that children who did not qualify as “heirs” under the intestate succession law were, nevertheless, considered to be “heirs” for purposes of the wrongful death statute. While not every wrongful death case has addressed the is*612sue, every case that did has uniformly held that claimants (whether children, spouses, parents or other heirs) qualify or do not qualify as proper parties plaintiff solely on the strength of their qualification as “heirs” under the intestate succession provisions in effect at the time of the wrongful death of the deceased.
Indeed, appellant’s argument would be equally applicable where the challenging plaintiffs are the parents of the deceased, rather than the children. Yet, our decisions in the cases of Hogan v. Hermann, 101 Idaho 893, 623 P.2d 900 (1980), and Everett v. Trunnell, 105 Idaho 787, 673 P.2d 387 (1983), clearly demonstrate that only those who qualify as “heirs” under the intestate succession statute are proper parties plaintiff in wrongful death actions. In both Hogan and Everett the parents of the deceased sought to bring an action for wrongful death of their child. In Hogan the parents were held to be proper parties plaintiff, while in Everett they were not. The contrasting results reached in those two cases, which were decided within three years of each other, are entirely attributable to the existence of two different intestate succession statutes in effect at the time of the deaths. In Hogan, under I.C. § 14-103, the intestate succession statute in effect in April of 1972, the time of the wrongful death, the parents would have inherited a portion of the intestate estate of their child, and accordingly they were proper parties plaintiff in the wrongful death action. In Everett, under I.C. § 15-2-102 of the Uniform Probate Code in effect in 1979, the date of the wrongful death, the parents would not inherit any portion of the intestate estate of their child, and therefore they were held not to be proper parties plaintiff in a wrongful death action. If appellant’s theory regarding who constitutes proper parties plaintiff were accepted, not only would we be overruling our decision in Schiess v. Bates, supra, but also effectively overruling the holding in Everett, and the law announced in Hogan. In short, appellant’s proposed theory is directly contrary to our entire body of case law dealing with wrongful death actions. Appellant’s argument fails to recognize the rationale of this Court’s cases dealing with the issue beginning with the Whitley decision and continuing through our decision in 1984 in Schiess. The Schiess decision is entirely consistent with this unbroken line of cases based on the interpretation of the word “heirs” in the wrongful death statute, as first defined in the Whitley case in 1913, and we reaffirm it.
II.
Next, appellant asserts that even if Schiess properly followed prior case law on the issue, it failed to correctly ascertain and follow legislative intent with regard to who may properly bring a wrongful death action in this state. This assertion is premised on appellant’s interpretation of legislative action: (1) adopting the intestacy provisions of the Uniform Probate Code in 1971; and (2) amending of the wrongful death statute in 1984.
A.
In 1971 the Idaho legislature extensively revised Idaho’s statutes relating to descent and distribution on death. For the most part,' such prior statutes were repealed in toto and replaced by provisions of the Uniform Probate Code. 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. Ill, p. 233. It was at this point in time that the intestate succession laws changed, and the “separate property in excess of $50,000 in value” requirement became part of the intestate succession provisions relating to children or “issue” of the decedent.1 Appellant argues that when *613the legislature enacted the Uniform Probate Code, it never intended thereby to preclude children from bringing wrongful death actions. As support for this interpretation of legislative intent, appellant cites I.C. § 15-1-102. That section provides as follows:
“15-1-102. Purposes — Rule of construction. — (a) This code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.
(b) The underlying purposes and policies of this code are:
(1) to simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors and incapacitated persons;
(2) to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property;
(3) to promote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution to his successors;
(4) to facilitate use and enforcement of certain trusts;
(5) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.”
Since, appellant argues, this section makes no reference to any intent to affect the right of children to bring wrongful death actions, the legislature intended such á right to continue as before. This argument, in reality, supports the opposite result.
First, as discussed in part I, the right of children to bring wrongful death actions before the adoption in 1971 of the Uniform Probate Code was based on their right to succeed to the decedent’s estate under the laws of intestate succession in effect as of the date of death. The legislature did intend that the wrongful death statute be applied in the same manner as it always had been, vis. “heirs” would be determined by reference to the intestate succession provision in effect at the time of death. For three quarters of a century, this Court has consistently and continuously held that whether or not a person qualifies as a proper party plaintiff under the wrongful death statute (as an “heir” of the decedent) depends on whether such a person would be considered an “heir” under the intestate succession provision in effect as of the date of death. In enacting the new Uniform Probate Code intestate provisions defining a decedent’s intestate successors, the legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of our consistent interpretation of “heirs” in the wrongful death statute, I.C. § 5-311. See Wilder v. Redd, 111 Idaho 141, 143, 721 P.2d 1240, 1241, 1242 (1986); C. Forsman Real Estate Co., Inc. v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 511, 515, 547 P.2d 1116, 1120 (1976); Oregon Short Line RR. Co. v. Pfost, 53 Idaho 559, 576, 27 P.2d 877, 883 (1933).
Second, appellant has failed to recognize that in enacting the provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, the Idaho legislature at the same time made substantial revisions of other non-probate sections of the Idaho Code, to bring them into conformity with the new Uniform Probate Code. See 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 111, p. 236 (Title of Act language referring to amendments made to other sections of the Idaho Code to bring into conformity with probate provisions, i.e., sections affected by adoption of the Uniform Probate Code, e.g., laws regarding: partition of real estate, liens, foreign corporations doing business in Idaho, commitment of insane, etc.). The legislature, while making these numerous other express changes to other sections affected by adoption of the Uniform Probate Code, did not amend the wrongful death statute, *614a statute which, like those it did amend, would also be affected by adoption of the Uniform Probate Code. In Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986), this Court held that where the legislature expressly states one thing it is deemed to have excluded another, expressio unis est exclusio alterius. Id. at 224, 723 P.2d at 763, n. 7. Having failed to amend the wrongful death statute, while at the same time amending other statutes affected by the new Uniform Probate Code, it must be presumed that the legislature intended that this Court continue its practice of looking to the intestacy provisions to determine heirship for purposes of the wrongful death statute.
B.
In 1984, after the deaths in both the Schiess case and the instant case, the Idaho legislature amended the wrongful death statute, I.C. § 5-311. In that amendment the legislature for the first time enacted a statutory definition of “heirs” as used in the wrongful death statute. As amended, I.C. § 5-311 provides that the term “heirs” includes, inter alia, “the decedent’s spouse, children, stepchildren, parents, and, when partly or wholly dependent on the decedent for support or services, any blood relative and adoptive brothers and sisters.” Appellant argues that by enacting this amendment, the legislature intended to demonstrate that its intent has always been that children are always proper parties plaintiff to a wrongful death action for damages resulting from a parent’s death. This argument is likewise seriously flawed.
It is the long standing rule in this state that when the legislature amends a statute it is deemed, absent an express indication to the contrary, to be indicative of changed legislative intent. Schafer v. Ada County Assessor, 111 Idaho 870, 728 P.2d 394 (1986); Lincoln County v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 102 Idaho 489, 632 P.2d 678 (1981); Totusek v. Dept. of Employment, 96 Idaho 699, 535 P.2d 672 (1975); Futura Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 92 Idaho 288, 442 P.2d 174 (1968); McKenney v. McNearney, 92 Idaho 1, 435 P.2d 358 (1967); Hawkins v. Chandler, 88 Idaho 20, 396 P.2d 123 (1964); Hopson v. North Am. Ins. Co., 71 Idaho 461, 233 P.2d 799 (1951); Stewart v. Common School Dist. No. 17 of Owyhee County, 66 Idaho 118, 156 P.2d 194 (1945). It is likewise the long standing rule of this jurisdiction that an amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express legislative statement to the contrary, be held to be retroactive in application. Johnson v. Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230, 526 P.2d 835 (1974); Edwards v. Walker, 95 Idaho 289, 507 P.2d 486 (1973); Peavy v. McComos, 26 Idaho 143, 140 P. 965 (1914). Acceptance of appellant’s argument would violate both these long standing rules and, therefore, the argument is rejected.
III.
Finally, appellant asserts that the holding in Schiess unconstitutionally creates a “suspect” classification based on wealth (rich family/poor family) which cannot withstand a “strict scrutiny” analysis. We disagree.
A.
First, we find no distinct wealth classification created by our holding in Schiess. Appellant asserts that, by limiting children as proper parties plaintiff in a wrongful death action only to those whose parents have left in excess of $50,000 in separate property, this Court has limited the right to recover under the wrongful death statute to children of wealthy parents. The assertion is flawed. For instance, it is possible that children of wealthy parents (e.g., $1,000,000 estate) may not be “heirs” under the intestate succession statute if the parents at the time of death have no separate property. In such a case the surviving children, though coming from a “wealthy family,” would not be proper parties plaintiff in a wrongful death action. Likewise, if the decedent parent left only separate property valued at $55,000, his children, though not coming from a “wealthy family,” would nonetheless be proper parties plaintiff in a wrongful death action. Thus, *615it appears that the statutory classification affirmed by Schiess is not one based upon wealth. Rather, the classification is that of “heirs” versus “nonheirs.”
Second, even if the holding in Schiess can be construed as creating a “wealth” classification, such a classification has never been held to be a “suspect” classification, thereby invoking strict scrutiny analysis. In San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), the United States Supreme Court unequivocally stated: “This court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny____” Id. at 28-29, 93 S.Ct at 1294 (emphasis added). Thus, appellant’s assertion that any supposed wealth classification created by Schiess must pass strict scrutiny analysis is erroneous.
B.
The holding of Schiess involved an interpretation of legislation dealing with social welfare and economics, i.e., the wrongful death statute. As such, the proper standard for equal protection analysis is the “rational basis” standard. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970), the Supreme Court held: “In the area of economics and social welfare, a state does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis’ it does not affect the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ ” Id. at 485-86, 90 S.Ct. at 1161-62.
In Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 99 S.Ct. 1742, 60 L.Ed.2d 269 (1979), the Supreme Court went further in holding “that a state has a legitimate interest in the maintenance of an accurate and efficient system for the disposition of property at death____ This same state interest ... is also present in the context of actions for wrongful death.” Id. at 357-58, 99 S.Ct. at 1748-49.
In Everett v. Trunnell, 105 Idaho 787, 673 P.2d 387 (1983), we were presented with a similar argument as that raised by Nebekers in this action. Appellants in Everett challenged the constitutionality of our wrongful death statute under the equal protection provisions of both the Idaho Constitution and the United States Constitution. In Everett we specifically upheld the statute, relying upon the United States Supreme Court decision in Parham, that the right to recover under our wrongful death statute was “not a fundamental right,” and that the “classification scheme imposed under a wrongful death statute must merely be shown to bear some rational relationship to a permissible state objective.” 2 Everett v. Trunnell, 105 Idaho at 790, 673 P.2d at 390.
As we stated in Everett v. Trunnell, supra, the state objective served by our wrongful death statute is to provide for those who are most likely to suffer a loss as a result of the wrongful death. The statutory scheme establishes a hierarchy which allows claims first by the surviving spouse, if any, then by children, then parents, then other relatives. The state legitimately seeks to provide for the spouse first because he or she is the person most directly affected by the death and will bear the burden of raising and supporting any surviving minor children. The objective served by the wrongful death statute dovetails with our probate, community property, and child support laws. Both the community property and probate laws of Idaho attempt to protect the vital and unified property interest which exists between husband and wife in the marital relationship. Indeed, the comments to the Uniform Probate Code provision dealing with the intestate share of a surviving spouse indicate that the objective served by those particular provisions was to promote the desire of most spouses to leave whatever property *616they have, or the majority of it, to the surviving spouse. The surviving spouse, in turn, is under a statutory obligation, I.C. § 32-1003, to provide for the needs of the minor children. Our interpretation in Schiess of the wrongful death statute serves this legitimate interest. The surviving spouse stands in greatest need of the resources left by the decedent. By limiting the number of persons permitted to bring a wrongful death action based on the definition of “heirs” in the intestate succession provisions, the legislature furthers the state’s legitimate objective in limiting the number of claims and claimants in wrongful death actions to primarily provide an action for the surviving spouse who suffers the greatest from the loss. This is particularly important in situations where the funds available to satisfy any judgment are limited.
The wrongful death statute was intended to avoid the harshness of the common law rule that no cause of action survived the death. Hughes v. Hudelson, 67 Idaho 10, 169 P.2d 712 (1946); Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944). The wrongful death statute created a new cause of action in favor of those who stand in greatest need of recovery, i.e., the decedent’s “heirs.” Under the intestate provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, that person is ordinarily the surviving spouse, the person who stands most in need of a recovery. This legislative limitation on the number of plaintiffs who may bring an action is a reasonable exercise of legislative authority and bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective and therefore is not violative of the equal protection provisions of either the Idaho or United States Constitutions.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. Costs to respondent.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DONALDSON, J., concur.. Since their initial enactment, the intestate succession laws have changed several times. As initially enacted in 1887, the intestate succession provisions relating to both community property and separate property (Rev.Stat. §§ 5713 and 5702 respectively) provided that to the extent a deceased parent left any property, community or separate, surviving children received a portion of that property absent a contrary testamentary disposition. Under this intestate succession regime, children would always be heirs, and thus proper parties plaintiff under the wrongful death statute. In 1911 the Idaho legislature amended § 5713 so as to preclude children from taking any community property in the absence of a testamentary disposition of *613such by the deceased parent. The intestate succession provisions governing separate property remained unchanged, however, until the legislature in 1971 adopted the Uniform Probate Code. The Uniform Probate Code provision limited the right of children to receive an intestate share of the separate property to those estates where the separate property exceeded $50,000 in value. Thus, since 1911, children of a deceased parent were not considered heirs under the intestate succession statutes unless the deceased parent’s estate contained some separate property. If the estate contained solely community property, children would take nothing under the intestate succession provisions in effect and thus would not be considered heirs. The legislature’s action in adopting the Uniform Probate Code in 1971 did nothing to change this result insofar as community property is concerned.
. In Everett, we also held that under the equal protection provisions of the Idaho Constitution, Art. 1, § 13, "there must be some reasonable ground or basis for the distinction between classes of persons imposed by a particular statutory scheme." 105 Idaho at 790, 673 P.2d at 390.