concurring specially. I concur in the judgment of affirmance but not with all that is said in the majority opinion.
Division 3 of the majority opinion holds that the failure to accord a defendant a commitment hearing will not, after indictment and conviction, be construed as reversible error. It is my position that if an accused sought a commitment hearing, was denied a commitment hearing, and did not waive a commitment hearing, then his conviction is erroneous and can be set aside because of failure on the part of the state to accord him procedural due process of law. See my dissenting opinion in Phillips v. Stynchcombe, 231 Ga. 430 (202 SE2d 26).
Having examined the record in the convicting court in this case I am satisfied that there was a knowing and voluntary waiver of a commitment hearing, by appellant and his attorney.
I am authorized to state that Justice Ingram concurs in this concurrence.