dissenting:
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the post-conviction relief (PCR) judge’s order because I find there is some evidence of probative value in the record to support his findings. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989).
The PCR judge found trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a Brady motion. Had such a motion been made, the State presumably would have revealed the fact that the witness who identified Porter in a photo line-up had been unable to identify him at the scene, a fact which would have had impeachment value had the witness testified at trial.
The first question is not whether the PCR court erred in finding counsel’s performance deficient in failing to make a Brady request, but rather there is any evidentiary support in the record for the finding.4 Cherry, supra. While I may not have reached the same conclusion as the PCR judge regarding counsel’s performance, I cannot say it lacks evidentiary support especially in light of trial counsel’s testimony that he did no independent investigation but instead relied solely on infor*388mation supplied by law enforcement and by the solicitor’s office.
The second question is whether the record contains any evidence of probative value to support the PCR judge’s finding that Porter established prejudice as the result of this deficient performance, that is, evidence that but for counsel’s deficient performance Porter would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. In my opinion, Porter’s testimony that he would not have pled had he had all relevant information is sufficient to uphold the PCR judge’s prejudice finding. E.g., Solomon v. State, 313 S.C. 526, 443 S.E.2d 540 (1994) (great appellate deference to PCR judge’s credibility findings required Court to uphold judge’s determination even where testimony at PCR hearing flatly contradicted by trial record).
While I may not have made the same findings as did the PCR judge on the failure to file a Brady motion claim, under our limited scope of review these findings should be upheld. Chen-y, supra. I therefore respectfully dissent, and would affirm the grant of PCR to Porter.
. Certainly had the PCR found counsel's performance not deficient because he reasonably relied upon the solicitor's open file policy, that finding would be upheld under Cherry. Nothing in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), however, precludes a finding that such reliance was not reasonable. This is especially so where, as here, the undisclosed evidence is not a document or other physical item, but rather something intangible, a witness’s non-identification.