I concur in part and dissent in part. I agree with the majority opinion that Appellant was a private figure and that the directed verdict on the defamation action should be reversed.1 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s *485decision to “reinstate the jury’s verdict holding Newspaper liable for defamatory statements.” In my opinion, there is no jury verdict to reinstate, and I would therefore remand the case for a new trial on liability and damages.
As the majority observes, “the record contains no indication the trial judge initially submitted the case to jurors” for the purpose of rendering an advisory verdict. Further, the majority opinion correctly observes that Newspaper did not object to the trial judge’s submission of the case to the jury despite Newspaper’s having not yet presented a defense on liability. Because of this failure, Newspaper would ordinarily be bound by the jury’s factual determinations. Appellant herself, however, never objected to the trial court’s subsequent ruling that the jury’s factual determinations were merely advisory. The court and the parties proceeded under the ruling that the jury had not yet delivered a verdict on liability, and the court directed a verdict in favor of Newspaper before the case was properly submitted to the jury. Finding no jury verdict to “reinstate,” and finding the direction of a verdict improper, I would remand the case for a new trial on liability and damages.
. I agree with the majority opinion that the partial directed verdict regarding the language in the article about a guardian's relationship *485witli a man should be affirmed. I additionally agree with all other holdings in section IV of the majority opinion.