Under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, a judge of the superior court of this state may enforce the “duty of support” as defined in Part 1, Sec*212tion 2, Paragraph 6 of said Act (Ga. L. 1958, pp. 34, 35; Code Ann. § 99-903a) as follows: “ ‘Duty of support’ includes any duty of support imposed or imposable by law, or by any court order, decree or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce, judicial (legal) separation, separate maintenance, or otherwise, . . .” Accordingly, where, as in the present case, a judge of the superior court in this state, on the ground that he had no authority under the statute to enter it, revoked a previous order entered by him requiring payment of support by a resident of this state to a former wife, resident of another state, which previous order was based upon a divorce decree providing support for said former wife rendered in this state, such a revocation was error. The fact that she was no longer his wife is immaterial under these circumstances.
Felton, C. J., and Frankum, J., concur. Argued November 8, 1966 Decided January 11, 1967 Rehearing denied February 14, 1967—Cert. applied for. Albert B. Wallace, Solicitor General, for appellant. George •<& George, William V. George, for appellee.Judgment reversed.