concurring specially.
I agree with the majority’s application and interpretation of the PKPA and that in this matter the Georgia trial court is limited from exercising its jurisdiction to modify the Alabama custody decree “if Alabama has continuing jurisdiction to modify its original child custody decree under [its enactment of the UCCJA] and has not declined to exercise that jurisdiction.” I write separately to identify problems with the reasoning of the majority opinion and because I believe that the law of Alabama, which we are constrained to follow here, conflicts with the intent and purpose, if not the express language, of the PKPA and UCCJA.
28 USC § 1738A (d) provides:
The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody determination consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c) (1) of this section continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant.
Subsection (c) (1) requires that the court have jurisdiction under its own state law. Accordingly, a court has continuing jurisdiction to modify its child custody orders if it has jurisdiction over the child custody matter under the law of that state and the child or any contestant continues to reside in that state.
Under § 30-3-23 of Alabama’s enactment of the UCCJA, Alabama courts have jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if Alabama is the child’s “home state” or had been the child’s “home state” within six months before commencement of the custody proceedings, § 30-3-23 (1), the child is physically present in Alabama, § 30-3-23 (3), no other state has jurisdiction under similar jurisdictional prerequisites, § 30-3-23 (4), or
It is in the best interest of the child that a court of [Alabama] assume jurisdiction because:
*361a. The child and his parents or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with [Alabama]; and
b. There is available in [Alabama] substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships.
§ 30-3-23 (2).
In this case, the only basis for finding jurisdiction in the Alabama court pursuant to § 30-3-23 is subsection (2), as it is undisputed that the child resides in Georgia and Georgia is the child’s “home state” as defined by the PKPA. See 28 USC § 1738A (b) (4). The majority recognizes this limitation then, relying on foreign authority, assumes that under Alabama’s interpretation of subsection (2) a significant connection exists between Alabama and the child and at least one contestant and there is available in Alabama substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or future care, protection and training, “so long as one parent remains an Alabama resident and has continued to exercise child visitation rights in that state.”
I have found no authority and the majority cites to no Alabama authority for the proposition that under Alabama law the jurisdiction of that state’s court continues because the exercise of child visitation rights in that state results in a “significant connection” to Alabama. Nor has there been any finding in this case by either the courts of Georgia or Alabama that there exists in Alabama “substantial evidence” as to whether those child visitation rights should be modified. I concur specially, however, because notwithstanding the statutory bases of jurisdiction provided in the UCCJA, Alabama courts have held that an Alabama court has jurisdiction to modify its own child custody order if the court had proper jurisdiction over the initial custody determination and either the child or a contestant continues to reside in Alabama. See, e.g., Lyon v. Lyon, 618 S2d 127, 129 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992); Russo v. Myers, 588 S2d 887 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); Cole v. Cooley, 547 S2d 1187, 1188 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989); Blankenship v. Blankenship, 534 S2d 320, 321 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988). Because the Alabama trial court had jurisdiction over the initial child custody determination and Dr. Garrett continues to reside in Alabama, I agree that the Georgia trial court properly dismissed Ms. Garrett’s Georgia child custody action.
Although required to follow the law of Alabama regarding the jurisdiction of its courts, I believe Alabama cases holding that courts of that state have continuing jurisdiction to modify a child custody order as long as the child or a contestant continues to reside in the *362state are inconsistent with the PKPA and Alabama’s enactment of the UCCJA. Section 30-3-21 of the Alabama Code states the intent of the Alabama legislature in enacting Article 30, including its intent to
(2) Promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the interest of the child; [and]
(3) Assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and personal relationships is most readily available, and that courts of this state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer connection with another state.
Similarly, the PKPA grants continuing jurisdiction to a court that has jurisdiction under its own state law and the child or a contestant continues to live in that state. Contrary to the holdings of Lyon and other Alabama cases, nothing in the PKPA or Alabama’s UCCJA intimates that the court entering the initial custody decree has continuing jurisdiction as long as the court had proper jurisdiction at the time the initial custody decree was entered and the child or a contestant continues to reside in the state.1 Compare Russo, supra at 888; Cole, supra at 1188 and Moore v. Perez, 428 S2d 113, 115 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983), all of which ignore the requirement of § 1738A (d) that a court continue to have jurisdiction over the child custody dispute and instead confer continuing jurisdiction if the court entering the initial decree had proper jurisdiction at the time the initial decree was entered, with Wilson v. Gouse, 263 Ga. 887 (3) (441 SE2d 57) (1994); In re Biscoe, 443 NW2d 221, 225 (Minn. App. 1989); In re Jesus A., 546 NYS2d 284, 286-287 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989); In re Leyda, 398 NW2d 815 (Iowa 1987); Fielder v. Thorn, 525 A2d 576, 580-581 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1987); and Dennis v. Dennis, 366 NW2d 474, 476-477 (N.D. 1985), which hold that a court has continuing jurisdiction under § 1738A (d) of the PKPA if the court has jurisdiction under its state jurisdictional law at the time the subsequent action is filed and one contestant continues to reside in that state.
Under the rationale applied in Lyon, an Alabama court has *363exclusive continuing jurisdiction to modify a child custody order even if the child and one parent move out of state, have no contact with the state or the other parent and no visitation occurs in the state, as long as the other parent continues to reside in Alabama. See Lyon, supra at 129 (reversing trial court’s finding of no jurisdiction over child custody dispute although child had lived in another state for at least a year); Russo, supra at 888 (Alabama had continuing jurisdiction because father resided in Alabama despite one and a half-year absence of child from state); Robertson v. Robertson, 532 S2d 1014, 1016 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988) (continuing jurisdiction in Alabama court despite child’s four-year absence from state); Moore, supra at 115 (continuing jurisdiction in Alabama court although children moved from Alabama and had no contact with Alabama for at least two years). Such a result is contrary to both the UCCJA’s stated purpose of assuring that child custody disputes are decided in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and where significant evidence exists concerning the welfare of the child and the express language of the PKPA conferring continuing jurisdiction not to a court which had jurisdiction but to a court which continues to have jurisdiction under its own state law.
Decided October 15, 1996 Reconsideration denied December 5, 1996. Weekes & Candler, Terri A. Candler, Margaret C. Courtright, for appellant. Lawler & Tanner, Nancy F. Lawler, Stephen E. Boswell, for appellee.Although the physical presence of the child or the child and one contestant is not sufficient under Alabama law to confer jurisdiction on a court to make a child custody determination, § 30-3-23 (b), Alabama courts appear to have determined that the residence of one contestant is sufficient to confer jurisdiction regardless of the presence or absence of a “significant connection” between that state and the child.