concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment that defendants are entitled to summary judgment because Mr. Callaway assumed the risk of injury as a matter of law, but I do not concur in all that is written in explanation thereof.
1. First, as to the recitation of the undisputed facts in Division 2, the version given is more in keeping with the evidence of defendants, which differs from that of plaintiffs as demonstrated in Mr. Callaway’s deposition. On summary judgment, the court must take the evidence in favor of the non-movants, the Callaways. Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1 (126 SE2d 442) (1962). He testified that the presence of the electric wire was simply mentioned by one of the men (employer Momon, supervisor/co-worker Beach, or Callaway) before the two co-workers started the work of removing and replacing the gutter. They did not discuss it, and nothing more was said about *300it. Photographs filed with the deposition show the wire proximity to the roof. Callaway did not think it would be a hazard because they were not going near it themselves or with the gutter. They concerned themselves with unconnecting the gutter and getting it down off the roof without hitting cars or people. He did assume it was “hot” and knew it was dangerous.
Under this version, too, Mr. Callaway assumed the risk of injury as a matter of law. “Assumption of risk is ‘a matter of knowledge of the danger and intelligent acquiescence in it’ . . it was a risk in fact known to him. Wright v. The Concrete Co., 107 Ga. App. 190, 194 (2) (a) (129 SE2d 351) (1962). When the plaintiff “knows and appreciates” the risk of danger, he is precluded from recovery when injured by the source of that exposure to harm. Roberts v. King, 102 Ga. App. 518, 522 (1) (116 SE2d 885) (1960).
2. Division 3 holds that the City of Calhoun cannot be liable because it was not given notice prior to commencement of the work so that appropriate safety precautions could be taken. But “lack of such notification is a bar to recovery only where the lines are ‘otherwise properly located and maintained.’ [Cit.]” Malvarez v. Ga. Power Co., 250 Ga. 568, 569 (300 SE2d 145) (1983). In Carden v. Ga. Power Co., 231 Ga. 456 (202 SE2d 55) (1973), which established this caveat, the Supreme Court pointed out that there was no evidence that the maintenance of the line was negligent, so the lack of notice absolved the line’s owner, in that case, Georgia Power Company. In our subsequent case of Three Notch EMC v. Bush, 190 Ga. App. 858 (1) (380 SE2d 720) (1989), the burden was placed on the defendant who claimed the defense of no notification. The court ruled, “Since it has not been shown as a matter of law that the lines were properly located and maintained at the time of the accident, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Three Notch is absolved of liability even in the absence of the statutory notice.” Id. at 859.
This is because, as succinctly stated in Buckner v. Colquitt EMC, 206 Ga. App. 69, 70 (424 SE2d 299) (1992), “One maintaining high tension lines must maintain them in such a manner and at such a location as not to injure persons who might reasonably be expected to come in contact with them.” (Emphasis omitted.) The court cited Carden.
There is some evidence that the lines were not properly maintained in that the expert’s affidavit státes that there is a violation of the National Electric Safety Code, and that if the wire had been in compliance, the injury “most probably would not have occurred.” But even if the line was not properly maintained, and even if the line owner should reasonably have expected persons to come in contact with it directly or indirectly through a conductor (there was evidence that access to the roof was provided by way of a permanent squirrel *301cage ladder, plus evidence that another person had been injured by the wire several years earlier), the City’s liability like the other defendants’ liability is foreclosed by Mr. Callaway’s assumption of the risk.
Decided October 23, 1996. Starr & Daniel, Kenneth R. Starr, for appellants. Kinney, Kemp, Pickell, Sponcler & Joiner, Lemuel H. Kemp, Robert A. Cowan, for appellees.As to the “person[s]- responsible for the work,” who were required by law to notify the line owner at least 72 hours in advance of the work, the law imposes strict liability. OCGA §§ 46-3-32 (3); 46-3-34; 46-3-40 (b). But assumption of the risk is an available defense even in such instances. Deere & Co. v. Brooks, 250 Ga. 517, 519 (2) (299 SE2d 704) (1983).
3. Mention must be made of plaintiff’s argument that he was not required by the statute to give notice to the power owner. It is true that he was just a worker, an employee. He testified that he and his co-worker were the only employees of Calhoun Awning and Wrought Iron Company, and that his employer Sam Momon had instructed him when he was hired some ten months prior to this incident that his co-worker was his supervisor. His co-worker, who had worked about eight years for Momon, was in charge, and Callaway did as he was told. Momon showed them what to do, when they got to the job site. He was just a $5-per-hour helper, and he did not know what job they would be going to when he went to work that morning. Under the pre-1992 version of the High-voltage Safety Act, the appellate courts viewed the law as not requiring the employees as responsible for notifying the line owner but rather as the persons for whose protection the law was enacted. See, e.g., Johnson v. Richardson, 202 Ga. App. 470 (414 SE2d 698) (1992); Three Notch EMC, supra at 859; Carden, supra at 457; Savannah Elec. &c. Co. v. Holton, 127 Ga. App. 447, 449-452 (3) (193 SE2d 866) (1972). However, the law was amended in 1992 to include among those who are “person[s] responsible for the work,” and thus obligated to notify the line owner, “the person actually doing the work” as well as the employers. It is difficult to avoid these plain words.