This case involves the interrelation of two provisions in Idaho’s Claims for Wages Statute. Appellant Mike Lawless was employed by respondent Davis & Hendren Logging. At the time of the termination of Lawless’ employment, Davis & Hendren owed Lawless $540 in back wages. Lawless filed suit in district court to collect his back wages and at trial the district court found that Davis & Hendren failed to pay Lawless after he had requested payment. The district court found further that Davis & Hendren did not tender payment until after Lawless brought suit seeking recovery under I.C. § 45-606 and I.C. § 45-615(4) at which time tender was made to the court.
Idaho Code § 45-606 in relevant part reads as follows:
“Whenever any employer of labor shall hereafter discharge or lay off his or its employees without first paying them the amount of any wages or salary then due them * * * each of his or its employees may charge and collect wages in the sum agreed upon in the contract of employment for each day his employer is in default until he is paid in full, without rendering any service therefor: provided, however, he shall cease to draw such wages or salary thirty days after such default.”
Idaho Code § 45-615(4) reads:
“Any judgment for the plaintiff in a proceeding pursuant to this act shall include all costs reasonably incurred in connection with the proceedings and the plaintiff, or the director in his behalf, shall be entitled to recover from the defendant as damages, three (3) times the amount of unpaid wages found due and owing.”
Pursuant to I.C. § 45-615(4), the district court awarded Lawless the $540 that was owed to him at the termination of his employment and trebled that amount in accordance with the terms of the statute. However, the court denied Lawless’ right to recover also under I.C. § 45-606 and to treble that recovery under I.C. § 45-615(4). Lawless appeals, maintaining that it was error for the district court to deny recovery under I.C. § 45-606. Lawless also contends that any recovery under I.C. § 45-606 should be trebled under I.C. § 45-615(4). The validity of the district court’s order awarding appellant the $540 outstanding wages and trebling the same is not challenged.
There is no case authority addressed to the issues Lawless raises on appeal. The Court will therefore have to be guided by general principles of statutory construction and a common sense appraisal of what the legislature intended. Viewing the Claims *177for Wages Statute as a whole we conclude that the legislature intended I.C. § 45-606 and § 45-615(4) to be mutually exclusive. They are alternative remedies. A plaintiff can sue for his back wages along with thirty days additional wages under I.C. § 45-606. If he files suit under I.C. § 45-606, however, he must forego treble damages. In the alternative, he can bring suit under I.C. § 45-615(4) for a treble recovery on his back wages. But he cannot avail himself of both remedies.
The legislature did not clearly indicate that I.C. § 45-606 and § 45-615(4) were intended as alternative remedies. The statutory provisions are silent as to whether the remedies should be cumulative or mutually exclusive. But a reasonable construction of the Claims for Wages Statute militates against applying them cumulatively.
Idaho Code § 45-606 was originally enacted in 1911 as part of Idaho’s Claims for Wages Statute. It penalizes an employer who discharges an employee without paying him his back wages. In addition to his back wages, the section allows the employee to collect without working, the amount of his daily wage for each day that his employer allows to pass without settling the outstanding wage claim. The section allows a maximum recovery of thirty days additional wages.
Idaho Code § 45-615(4) was enacted in 1967. The compiler’s note to I.C. § 45-609 states that I.C. §§ 45-609 — 45-615 were intended to amend Idaho’s Claims for Wages Statute. As originally enacted, the Idaho Claims for Wages Statute had two deficiencies. First, the burden of filing suit was on the employee. Even given the fact that an additional recovery of thirty days wages was possible under the statute, placing the litigative burden on the employee made the statute less effective. Second, if the outstanding wages were of a substantial amount the threat of the employee filing suit to extract an additional thirty days wages from the employer often would not be sufficient to induce the employer to settle his account amicably. The amendments rectified these defects.
As amended, the Idaho Claims for Wages Statute provided a comprehensive recovery scheme. First, by authorizing the prosecution of claims by the Department of Labor, the amendments made the enforcement of the statute more likely. And second, as we interpret the statute, the legislature provided an aggrieved employee with alternative remedies to meet the circumstances of his particular case. Which statutory provision will better serve the employee will depend upon the amount of the outstanding wages. If the amount of outstanding wages is nominal, the employee will be better served by seeking recovery under I.C. § 45-606. In addition to the amount of outstanding wages, he could receive up to a maximum of thirty days additional wages. If the amount of outstanding wages is larger, however, it will behoove the employee to seek a treble recovery under I.C. § 45— 615(4).
The construction urged by Lawless, that the remedies can be used cumulatively, would impose extreme results. As the trial judge pointed out in his memorandum opinion, applying the two statutes together would give Lawless a recovery equivalent to fourteen times the amount of his withheld wages. It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that the consequences of a proposed interpretation of a statute can be considered when the statute is capable of more than one construction. When choosing between alternative constructions, courts should presume that a statute was not enacted to work a hardship or to effect an oppressive result. Constructions that would render the statute productive of unnecessarily harsh consequences are to be avoided. Accordingly, any ambiguity in a statute should be resolved in favor of a reasonable operation of the law. 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 258.
Individually, I.C. § 45-606 and I.C. § 45-615(4) are unambiguous. Lawless argues that statutory consequences should therefore not be considered in construing the statutes. Appellant’s theory, however, ignores the fact that provisions introduced by an amendatory act must be read in uni*178son with the provisions of the original act that were left unaffected by the amendments. 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 343. An obvious ambiguity appears when I.C. § 45-606 and I.C. § 45-615(4) are considered together. The legislature has not indicated whether it intended the remedies to be available cumulatively or alternatively. We therefore are at liberty to consider the practical consequences of both interpretations. And in so considering those consequences, we conclude that the legislature must have intended that the remedies be alternative. Construing I.C. § 45-606 and § 45-615(4) as applying alternatively effectuates the underlying legislative intention of encouraging employers to settle their accounts with discharged employees, but does not lead to windfall recoveries by aggrieved employees.
Affirmed. Costs to respondents.
McFADDEN, C. J., and SHEPARD, J., concur.