dissenting. Much emphasis is placed upon the fact that the defendant admitted having intercourse with the prosecutrix, and that identity was not in issue, and that the issue was whether the prosecutrix was raped or consented to such intercourse.
In McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633, 637 (187 SE2d 271), it was held: "The evidence was 'admissible on his trial for the purpose of identifying him as the guilty party and for the purpose of showing motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, and course of conduct.’ Anderson v. State, 222 Ga. 561 (3) (150 SE2d 638); Gunter v. State, 223 Ga. 290 (4) (154 SE2d 608).
"The relevancy between the two rapes would not be eradicated by the passage of two years and ten months between the two attacks. See Taylor v. State, 174 Ga. 52, 63 (162 SE 504); Fuller v. State, 197 Ga. 714 (1) (30 SE2d 608); Biegun v. State, 206 Ga. 618 (1) (58 SE2d 149); Lyles v. State, 215 Ga. 229 (2) (109 SE2d 785).”
The language quoted makes the evidence admissible for more than identification. It makes it admissible to show "plan,” "scheme,” "bent of mind” and "course of conduct.”
Evidence of other crimes is admissible in only very limited circumstances, and properly so for the defendant is on trial for the offense charged and no other. Evidence of other crimes having been committed is always harmful *425to a defendant, and it would always be helpful to a defendant to find a method of excluding it. The majority opinion points the way.
By admitting the factum of intercourse the defendant may thus eliminate the elements of "plan,” "scheme,” "bent of mind” and "course of conduct,” and make the issue solely a matter of his word versus that of the prosecutrix as to whether the intercourse was rape or with consent.
The majority opinion holds that the "only” point of similarity in the two crimes was that the victim was approached from the rear and overpowered by the attacker by choking the victim with his hands. The attacker in each case, the defendant, attacked a person who knew him, did not seek to hide his identity, but apparently relied upon the victim’s fear of him to prevent prosecution.
I believe the evidence was admissible and that the conviction should be affirmed.