dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, as it is my view that genuine issues of material fact remain as to Autozone’s constructive knowledge of the oil slick that was in the handicapped parking space of its store. By saying otherwise, I believe the majority (1) unduly discounts evidence that an Autozone employee actually examined the hazard area just before Connie Johnson’s fall, and (2) erroneously concludes (as a matter of law) that Autozone exercised ordinary care in preparing and making ready a reasonably safe environment for its customers. OCGA § 51-3-1; Thompson v. Regency Mall Assoc., 209 Ga. App. 1, 2 (1) (432 SE2d 230); Burke v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 115, 116 (441 SE2d 429). I believe that the majority’s holding, absent proof of Autozone’s compliance with a routine safety inspection plan on the day of Johnson’s injury, is nothing more than another inroad into the jury’s province under circumstances where the issue of due care is not so “plain and palpable [so as to authorize a finding that] ‘reasonable minds cannot differ as to the conclusion to be reached.’ [Pound v. Augusta National, 158 Ga. App. 166, 167 (279 SE2d 342).]” Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 493 (2) (405 SE2d 474).
1. “Constructive knowledge by an owner or occupier of the foreign substance can be established in one of two ways. First, ‘(c)onstructive knowledge may be inferred where there is evidence that an employee of the owner was in the immediate vicinity of the dangerous condition and could easily have noticed and removed the hazard.’ Food Giant v. Cooke, 186 Ga. App. 253, 254 (366 SE2d 781) (1988); see also Sain v. K-Mart Corp., 190 Ga. App. 751, 752 (380 SE2d 299) (1989).” Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, 199 Ga. App. 808, 809 (406 SE2d 234).
In the case sub judice, Teresa Cox not only testified that she accompanied Connie Johnson to the Autozone store where Connie Johnson parked next to the store’s handicapped parking space (which was obviously close to the store entrance), Cox explained that, before Johnson exited the car, she (Cox) observed a man walk through the parking lot, stop next to the car and inspect the ground near where the oil slick was later discovered. Although Cox could not identify this man by name, she testified that the man was not walking from an area of the parking lot nearest the store’s entrance (as would a cus*396tomer), but that he was walking away from the area of a blue truck that was parked at the rear of the store. She also testified that the man was carrying a “coke” and a restaurant-type “bag” into the auto parts store; that “[h]e had a little black moustache and . . . black hair” and that he was wearing either a “blue” or a “red” shirt.
Autozone employee Joseph Samuel Lee deposed that all Autozone salesmen are required to wear “red” shirts and that both he and Douglas A. Hoven (the only other Autozone employee on duty) were wearing such “red” shirts on the night Connie Johnson fell. And while both Lee and Hoven deposed that they did not see the oil slick before Johnson’s fall, neither man denied that he was the person Teresa Cox saw examining the ground near the oil slick. Further, neither deponent denied matching the physical description of the man Cox saw on the night of the fall. Under these circumstances, I do not believe Autozone conclusively negated Connie Johnson’s claim (as well as her proof) that an Autozone employee examined the parking area near where she fell, but failed to exercise reasonable care in carrying out the inspection. See Baldwin County Hosp. Auth. v. Coney, 188 Ga. App. 339 (1) (373 SE2d 252). Consequently, I believe that genuine issues of material fact remain under the first prong of the constructive knowledge test, i.e., a jury must decide whether the “red” or “blue” shirted man was an Autozone employee (on his way back to work with dinner), and thus whether Autozone had constructive knowledge of the oil slick in the handicapped zone.
2. “The second basis for liability based on constructive knowledge is that the owner failed to exercise reasonable care in inspecting the premises. ‘To sustain a cause of action in the latter type case the plaintiff must show that the foreign substance was on the floor for a length of time sufficient for knowledge of it to be imputed to the defendant. (Cit.)’ Alterman Foods[ v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 623 (272 SE2d 327)]; see also Food Giant[ v. Cooke], supra; Mitchell v. Rainey, 187 Ga. App. 510 (370 SE2d 673) (1988); Fulton-DeKalb County Hosp. Auth. v. Estes, 187 Ga. App. 120 (369 SE2d 262) (1988). This part of the test focuses on whether the foreign substance was on the premises long enough that the owner should have known of it.” Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, 199 Ga. App. 808, 809, supra. And to negate any such imputed knowledge upon summary adjudication, this Court has held that the proprietor must produce conclusive proof that a customary inspection and cleaning program was in place and was being employed on the specific day of the injury. See Mallory v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 200 Ga. App. 428, 430 (1) (408 SE2d 443). But “in the absence of any evidence that [the proprietor] conducted a reasonable inspection of the premises prior to the fall, [this Court has just as firmly held that the customer is] not required to establish how long the spill remained on the [premises]. Jackson v. Wal-Mart Stores, *397206 Ga. App. 165, 169 (424 SE2d 845) (1992).” Burke v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 115, 117, supra.
In the case sub judice, Autozone presented no proof regarding inspection procedures at its store. Nonetheless, a majority of this Court now says it does not matter. According to the majority, all that is necessary to negate the possibility that the proprietor did not exercise reasonable ordinary care in preparing and making ready a reasonably safe environment for its customers is the production of an affidavit, wherein an employee deposes that he ranged in an outward vicinity of the hazard area (while assisting another customer) 15 to 20 minutes before the alleged injury and did not then see the hazard which allegedly caused the plaintiffs fall. This ultra light burden on summary judgment granted by the majority not only ignores unanswered questions regarding the circumstances and perspective of the employee’s observations, I believe it effectively destroys any incentive for proprietors to carry out routine inspections so as to satisfy their burden to prepare and make ready a reasonably safe environment for customers. See OCGA § 51-3-1; Burke v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 115, 116, supra. In fact, the majority’s reasoning appears to be in direct conflict with Judge Blackburn’s recent decision in Thompson v. Regency Mall Assoc., 209 Ga. App. 1, 2 (1), supra.
In Thompson, that plaintiff alleged that those defendants failed to inspect their premises to discover an alleged defective condition prior to her fall. This theory, as is the theory in the case sub judice, was “ ‘premised upon defendant(s’) failure to exercise reasonable care in inspecting and keeping the premises in a safe condition. The issue thus [became] whether the affidavit(s) executed by defendant(s) [negated] recovery of that theory.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Flood v. Camp Oil, 201 Ga. App. at 453. [Just as Autozone did in the case sub judice, the] affidavits presented on behalf of the defendants [in Thompson], [did] not allege any practice to inspect the premises at all, let alone to inspect on a routine basis that would allow for the discovery of defective conditions.” Id. at 2 (1), 3, supra. As a consequence, this Court found that those defendants failed to negate the possibility that they had not exercised reasonable care in inspecting the premises and therefore held that the burden never shifted to plaintiff to produce evidence that the defective condition had been present for a period of time sufficient to have been discovered by a reasonable inspection procedure. Id. For the same reasons, I would reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in the case sub judice.
“An owner/occupier of premises has a duty to keep those premises safe for its invitees. OCGA § 51-3-1; Thompson v. Regency Mall Assoc., 209 Ga. App. 1 (432 SE2d 230) (1993). ‘An invitee enters upon the premises under an implied representation, or assurance, that the *398land has been prepared and made ready and safe for his reception. The invitee is entitled to expect the possessor will exercise reasonable care to make the land safe for his entry. (Cit.) It is this implied representation that is made to the public, by holding the land open to them, that it has been prepared for their reception, that it is safe, that is the basis for the possessor’s liability. (Cit.)’ Begin v. Ga. Championship Wrestling, 172 Ga. App. 293, 294 (322 SE2d 737) (1984).” Burke v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 115, 116, supra.
In the case sub judiee, the specific evidence the majority relies on in saying that Autozone conclusively proved that it exercised reasonable care in making its premises safe are affidavits from the only two employees on duty at the time Connie Johnson fell, Joseph Samuel Lee and Douglas A. Hoven. Hoven deposed that “I had gone out to the parking lot 15-20 minutes before this incident to measure some windshield wipers on a customer’s car[, and although] I could have seen the oil spill from where I was working at this customer’s car, I did not see any oil on the ground at that time.” And Lee deposed that “[a]t around 6:30 p.m. on December 31, 1992, [over an hour before Connie Johnson fell,] I had gone out to the parking lot to change the headlight bulbs on a customer’s car[, and that although] I could have seen the oil spill from where I was at this customer’s car, I did not see any oil on the ground at that time.” However, neither Hoven nor Lee explained the distance or clarity of the perspective to the area of the oil slick, and it appears to be undisputed that neither man was in the parking lot to execute a safety-inspection of the premises. Both men were occupied with customers.
On summary judgment, it is this Court’s duty to give the non-moving party the benefit of every doubt, indulging her with every inference which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Winn-Dixie of Greenville v. Ramey, 186 Ga. App. 257, 258 (1) (366 SE2d 785). From this perspective, I believe the circumstances in the case sub judiee would authorize a jury’s finding that Autozone breached its implied representation to Connie Johnson that its store’s parking lot was prepared for her reception and that it was safe. See Burke v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 115, 116, supra. And a basis for such a conclusion may not only flow from proof regarding the lack of safety-inspection procedures at the Autozone store, but also from proof that Autozone provided only two employees to service a large auto parts store during the holiday season in Carrollton, Georgia. Under such circumstances, it would be easy to see how Joseph Samuel Lee and Douglas A. Hoven missed the person (presumably a customer) who set up shop in the store’s handicapped parking space, drained three to five quarts of oil (as estimated by Hoven) onto the pavement and replaced the oil with a fresh product that was presumably just purchased from the Autozone store.
*399Decided November 9, 1995 Reconsideration denied December 6, 1995 Jack F. Witcher, for appellant. Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Bradley S. Wolff, for appellee.