(dissenting) :
Disagreeing with the majority opinion, I dissent.
. Eudora Jolley sued Gene Jolly and obtained a default judgment. The defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment was granted and the plaintiff appeals. ■.
The issue before us is whether the lower court abused its discretion in holding the defendant’s failure to answer the summons within twenty days constituted excusable neglect. I conclude the lower court abused its discretion and would reverse its order.
In April, 1974, the defendant was 'personally served with a summons, complaint not served, at his residence in Rutherfordton, North Carolina. He promptly secured North Carolina counsel. Counsel informed defendant he was not familiar with the law of South Carolina, but in North Carolina the summons without service of a complaint would be meaningless. Further, he advised defendant not to file any papers or enter any appearance because either might result in a waiver of certain rights.
In November, 1974, default judgment was entered. When defendant was notified of the judgment, he refused payment, employed South Carolina counsel, and moved to vacate the judgment. In granting the motion, the lower court found the defendant had a meritorious defense and his failure to answer was the result of a mistake.
*601■ South Carolina Code Section 10-1213: authorizes a court, in its discretion, to vacate default judgments when the defendant has a meritorious defense and demonstrates the failure to timely answer was due to excusable neglect. The deJ fendant sought to have the judgment vacated because he had. received erroneous legal advice from a'North Carolina attorney. Thus, he was asserting a mistake of law and not a mistake of fact as a basis for vacating the jüdgment. Ordinarily mistakes' of law are not within-the purview of the statute. Savage v. Cannon, 204 S. C 473, 30 S. E. (2d) 70 (1943).
Under very limited circumstances, we have held Section 10-1213 may be applied to vacate default judgments occa-; sioned by errors of law. When the defendant has used due diligence" in employing counsel and counsel takes prompt steps to resist the complaint, but default is entered due to counsel’s misunderstanding of procedure,'we have- permitted judgment to be vacated. Savage v. Cannon, supra; Johnson v. Finger, 102 S. C. 354, 86 S. E. 673 (1915). In. these cases relief has been granted because default was due to ex-cus'able fault of the áttorney. Lee v. Peek, 240 S. C. 203, 125 S. E. (2d) 353 (1962).
Every mistake of counsel is not excusable and the mere fact default was occasioned by erroneous advice of counsel ordinarily affords no basis for vacating the judgment. Lee v. Peek, supra. The inadvertence of counsel is imputed to the defendant. Strickland v. Rabon, 234 S. C. 218, 107 S. E. (2d) 344 (1959). “Neglect of the attorney is the neglect of the client, and that no mistake, inadvertence or neglect attributable to an attorney can be successfully used as- a ground for relief, unless it would have been excusable if attributable to the client. The acts and omissions of the attorney in such case are those of the client.” Simon v. Flowers, 231 S. C. 545, 551, 99 S. E. (2d) 391, 394 (1957); Lee v. Peek, supra.
In discussing the failure of out of state counsel to answer due to ignorance of South Carolina procedure, this Court *602has said: “Obviously counsel for the defendant should have employed South Carolina counsel immediately upon receipt of the summons. The lack of knowledge on the part of (out of state counsel) as to South Carolina procedure did not justify their failure to further pursue the matter.” Rochester v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 253 S. C. 147, 154, 169 S. E. (2d) 387, 390 (1969). We concluded the mistake of counsel was not excusable and reverse the trial court.
The trial court is invested with broad discretion in vacating judgments, however, in granting this motion it was controlled by an error of law. It did not find the neglect of the attorney was excusable; rather it concluded the defendant was excused due to his reliance on the attorney’s advice. When the trial court’s discretion is controlled by an error of law, this Court may review its decision. Edwards v. Ferguson, 254 S. C. 278, 175 S. E. (2d) 224 (1970); Brown v. Weathers, 251 S. C. 67, 160 S. E. (2d) 133 (1968).
A cogent argument may be advanced to open default judgments ¡ controversies should be decided on their merits. This argument is particularly appealing if the defendant has relied on advice of counsel. When the plaintiff has process served and secures a judgment, his rights must be accorded just treatment. He has complied with the stautory requirements and is entitled to timely adjudication of his claim. The plaintiff’s right to have the judgment upheld outweighs the right of the defendant, who Unnecessarily delayed this action-, to have his day in court.
T would reverse.
Lewis, C. J., concurs.