¶ 90. (dissenting). This case involves the civil rights of individuals who were arrested and confined in the booking area of the Milwaukee County jail. These arrested persons (not convicted of any crime and presumed innocent) alleged (without direct contradiction) that they were held for more than 30 hours awaiting booking, crowded into cold cells without blankets, sitting up or lying down on cell floors splashed with bodily fluids, sleeping next to urinals, confined in an unsanitary and bug-infested space. The circuit court found that thousands of inmates were held in these conditions for more than two days. Hundreds were held for more than three days. Some were even held in excess of 100 hours.
¶ 91. You do not see these substandard and dangerous conditions on TV when booking is portrayed. But these conditions apparently existed right here in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.1
*124¶ 92. The Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Inc., representing these arrestees, sued the County and officials (collectively referred to as the County in the majority opinion and here) for maintaining such conditions. The circuit court for Milwaukee County entered an order, a Consent Decree, in which the County agreed to correct various conditions. Under the Consent Decree arrested persons could be kept in the booking area (without beds) for not more than 30 hours. At no time since the entry of the Consent Decree did the County seek relief from the decree because the requirements proved to be too onerous or impractical. Nevertheless the County violated the Consent Decree for nearly three years.
¶ 93. The circuit court found that the County intentionally violated the 30-hour provision of the court's Consent Decree on 16,662 occasions over nearly a three-year period, November 2001 to April 2004, keeping inmates in the booking area longer than 30 hours without assigning them to a bed.2 The County did not challenge this finding in the court of appeals or in this court.
*125¶ 94. After the Legal Aid Society sought discovery in April 2004 to prove violations of the Consent Decree, the County immediately remedied the conditions and began obeying the court order.3 In July 2005 the Legal Aid Society asked the circuit court to hold the County in contempt of court for intentionally failing to obey the court order. The circuit court so held.
¶ 95. The circuit court also held that even though the County intentionally violated the court order and was in contempt of court, the circuit court could not award monetary damages under chapter 785 of the statutes as a remedial sanction.
¶ 96. The issue before this court, stated in general terms, is the power of a circuit court to ensure compliance with its orders. More specifically, the issue before this court is the power of a circuit court to ensure compliance with its order by awarding monetary damages for a party's intentional violation of á court order that constitutes contempt of court.
¶ 97. The majority opinion holds that because a remedial sanction is statutorily defined as "a sanction imposed for purposes of terminating a continuing contempt of court," Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) (emphasis added), a circuit court is powerless to impose the sanction of compensatory damages provided in § 785.04(1) (a) "when breaches of the Consent Decree had ceased before the action for contempt was filed."4 In other words, under the majority opinion if the contempt of court lasts for *126nearly three years and ceases before the motion for contempt is filed, a court cannot require the contemnor to pay "a sum of money sufficient to compensate a party for loss or injury suffered by the party as the result of a contempt of court" as provided in Wis. Stat. § 785.04(l)(a). Thus in the present case, according to the majority opinion, the County can violate the circuit court order without penalty for two and one half years and may even be free to do so again so long as the County again stops the violations before a motion for contempt is filed.5
¶ 98. I write separately, agreeing with the court of appeals that monetary damages are permitted under the statute in the present case. I would remand the *127cause to the circuit court to determine the sum of money, if any, sufficient to compensate the persons held in violation of the Consent Decree for the loss or injury suffered.6
¶ 99. I reach this conclusion for several reasons. First, the majority opinion's interpretation of the phrase "remedial sanction" in chapter 785 of the statutes is erroneous as a matter of statutory interpretation. The interpretation of the statute is inconsistent with the text of chapter 785 of the statutes, represents a sharp break from the traditional law of contempt in Wisconsin, is contrary to the statutory and legislative history, and produces an absurd result. Two years ago, the court declared that "the intent behind the contempt statute ... is to provide the court with a mechanism, or toolbox, to effect compliance with court orders."7 Today, the court removes tools from the toolbox, tools that are needed to effect compliance with court orders, and eviscerates the function of the contempt statute and the circuit court's authority to enforce its own orders.
¶ 100. Second, the interpretation contravenes Frisch v. Henrichs, 2007 WI 102, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 N.W.2d 85, a case decided a mere two years ago.
¶ 101. Third, if chapter 785 is to be interpreted to create a void in a court's power to enforce an order through contempt, I conclude that a circuit court may award compensatory damages under its inherent powers over contempt in a case that falls into the statutory void.
*128I
¶ 102. Chapter 785 has to be interpreted in light of the texts of Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) and § 784.04(l)(a), the context and structure of the chapter, the statutory and legislative history of the chapter, contempt law in Wisconsin, and the purpose of the contempt statute.
¶ 103. Section 785.01(3) provides: " 'Remedial sanction' means a sanction imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court."
¶ 104. Section 785.04(1) (a) provides in relevant part: "A court may impose one or more of the following remedial sanctions: (a) Payment of a sum of money sufficient to compensate a party for a loss or injury suffered by the party as the result of a contempt of court."
¶ 105. A plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 785.04(l)(a) is that the circuit court may order contemnors to compensate others for losses or injuries suffered as a result of a contempt of court. Wisconsin Stat. § 785.04(l)(a) explicitly authorizes payment of money to compensate a victim "for a loss or injury suffered by the party as the result of a contempt of court" (emphasis added). The word "suffered" makes sense only if Wis. Stat. § 785.04(l)(a) applies to payment for losses or injuries that already have occurred and that resulted from past conduct.
¶ 106. Relying on the "clear language of the statute," Judge Fine wrote in his concurring opinion in the court of appeals decision in the present case: "Under Wis. Stat. § 785.04(l)(a)'s forthright and unambiguous directive, the plaintiffs are entitled to be compensated for the *129losses and injuries they suffered as a result of Milwaukee's clear and blatant contempt."8
¶ 107. The majority opinion recognizes the validity of this interpretation. It states that "[standing alone, [Wis. Stat. § 785.04(l)(a)] could be interpreted as allowing payment of a sum of money for a loss or injury suffered in the past... ."9
¶ 108. The majority opinion nevertheless concludes that Wis. Stat. § 785.04(l)(a) should not be interpreted according to its plain meaning, in light of Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3)'s definition of a remedial sanction as a sanction imposed for the purpose of terminating a "continuing" contempt.
¶ 109. The court therefore must determine the meaning of the statutory phrase "a continuing contempt." This phrase is not defined in the statute. The majority opinion concedes that the word "continuing" has many dictionary meanings and selects the meaning "to go on with a particular action."10 Of course, here the County did "go on with a particular action" for nearly three years.
¶ 110. In ordinary, plain English, the County's contempt was continuing for almost three years. Why therefore does this case not present a case of continuing *130contempt? Where in the statute does it say that the contempt has to continue after the motion for contempt has been filed? Ah, says the majority opinion, by statutory definition (Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3)) the remedial sanction has to "terminate a continuing contempt," and here the County "terminated" its own continuing contempt by obeying the court order.
¶ 111. The majority opinion's reading of Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) creates an unnecessary conflict between § 785.01(3) and § 785.04(l)(a); renders meaningless § 785.04(l)(a)'s specific grant of authority to a court to award compensatory damages to those who have suffered a loss or injury as a result of a party's contempt of court; and allows the contemnor to repeatedly violate a court order and to inflict harm without fear of being required to compensate its victims so long as the contemnor ceases violations before a motion for contempt is filed.
¶ 112. There is an alternative interpretation of the language in Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) defining a remedial sanction as a sanction "imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt": A contempt is a continuing one and is not terminated as long as the loss or injury to the victim of the contempt has not been compensated. This interpretation of the contempt statute harmonizes Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) and § 785.04(l)(a) and is consistent with the purposes of contempt.11
*131¶ 113. One purpose of a remedial sanction in a civil contempt proceeding is to enforce an individual litigant's rights by ensuring a remedy for the litigant.12 Monetary damages in a contempt action may serve two purposes: (1) to compensate the individuals for loss or injury suffered, and (2) to deter the disobedient party from engaging in similar illegal conduct in the future. Thus monetary damages are consistent with the purpose of remedial contempt sanctions which, as the *132majority opinion acknowledges, Eire imposed for the benefit of the litigant and to procure present and future compliance with court orders.13
¶ 114. Although the majority opinion acknowledges the conflict between § 785.04(l)(a)'s plain language authorizing compensation as a remedial sanction and the statutory definition of "continuing contempt," it strangely declares that "the definition of'remedial seuiction' is clear on its face." Majority op., ¶ 77.
¶ 115. If Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) were clear on its face, Justice Prosser would not have needed to write two lengthy opinions in the course of two years attempting to explain what Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) means.14
¶ 116. The statutory and legislative history of chapter 785 helps resolve any perceived conflict between § 785.04(l)(a)'s express authorization of compensatory damages as a remedial sanction for contempt and 785.01(3)'s definition of remedial sanctions as a sanction imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt.
¶ 117. Before the 1979 repeEd and recreation of chapter 785 a court's authority to impose the sanction of compensatory damages in a civil15 contempt proceed*133ing did not depend upon whether the sanction served the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court. Every version of the Wisconsin Statutes from 1849 through 1977 stated that the sanction of compensatory damages could be imposed in a civil contempt proceeding.16 No version of the contempt statutes limited a court to using the sanction of compensatory damages as a means of terminating a continuing contempt of court. Indeed, in 1906 this court stated that the statutes relating to civil contempt proceedings sought "to indemnify parties to the action for their actual loss or injury" as well as "to compel the performance of duties still within the contemnor's power."17
*134¶ 118. The pre-1979 contempt statutes were consistent with the law of other jurisdictions, which seem uniformly to recognize that contempt sanctions in a civil contempt proceeding may be imposed either for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt or for the purpose of compensating a party for losses resulting from a contempt of court. The United States Supreme Court, for example, has stated that in civil contempt proceedings, sanctions "may, in a proper case, be employed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court's order, and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained,"18 Numerous state supreme courts follow the United States Supreme Court's approach.19
*135¶ 119. The County correctly acknowledges that prior to 1979, "a [Wisconsin] court had the power to *136order that damages be paid to indemnify a party for an injury resulting from a contempt of court" and that the pre-1979 versions of the contempt statute did not require "that the contempt be continuing for such damages to be available."20 The County argues that the 1979 legislature intended to impose a new limit on a court's power to impose the contempt sanction of compensatory damages by requiring that the sanction not be imposed except for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court.21
¶ 120. The legislative history tells a different story about the legislature's intent.
¶ 121. The 1979 contempt statutes were enacted in their present form as a result of the work of the Contempt and Extraordinary Remedies Committee of the Judicial Council22 The Judicial Council's notes appear as explanatory notes to chapter 257, § 11, Laws of 1979.
¶ 122. The Judicial Council Notes, available to the legislature as part of the bill during enactment of *137the bill, advised the legislature that in repealing and recreating Chapter 785, the legislature was not changing the substantive law relating to contempt sanctions. The Notes explain that the 1979 contempt statute's definitions of "remedial" and "punitive" contempt reflect no "intent... to change the basic law of contempt."23 The Notes also state that "[t]he sanctions listed in this section [785.04] are essentially the same as under prior law"24 and identify a "remedial sanction" as the type of contempt sanction that traditionally could be imposed in a civil proceeding.25 The Notes generally suggest that the 1979 contempt statute preserves the substantive law of the past rather than abolishing it.26
*138¶ 123. The statutory and legislative history does not support the County's view, accepted by the majority, that Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) reflects the legislature's intent to diminish the courts' authority to impose compensation as a contempt sanction. Rather, the history appears to show that the Judicial Council understood the 1979 contempt statute as leaving the courts' traditional powers intact. According to the statutory and legislative history, Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) must not be read as limiting Wis. Stat. § 784.04(l)(a)'s provision authorizing compensation as a remedial contempt sanction.
¶ 124. In sum, as interpreted by the majority opinion, Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) leaves the Wisconsin courts unable to impose the remedial contempt sanction of compensation except for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court and "terminating *139a continuing contempt" is narrowly interpreted. This limitation on a court's contempt authority did not exist between 1849 and 1979 in Wisconsin and does not appear to exist in other jurisdictions. Moreover, the legislature apparently did not intend to change the substantive law of contempt sanctions when it repealed and recreated Chapter 785 in 1979. The interpretation of chapter 785 adopted by the majority opinion produces absurd results limiting the contempt power of a court. For all these reasons, I conclude that the majority opinion's interpretation of the statute is erroneous.
II
¶ 125. Regardless of the correct interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3), I agree with the court of appeals that the County's flagrant violations of the court order represent "a continuing contempt" under Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) as the statute was interpreted and applied by this court in Frisch v. Henrichs, 2007 WI 102, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 N.W.2d 85.27 The majority opinion significantly undercuts the Frisch decision.
¶ 126. The Frisch decision teaches that when a party is in contempt of the circuit court's order to perform actions by a specified time, the party cannot terminate its contempt by performing the required *140actions too late to undo its intentional violation of the circuit court's command respecting timeliness. The Frisch lesson applies in the present case, and under the reasoning of Frisch, this case therefore falls within chapter 785's provisions relating to remedial contempt.
¶ 127. In Frisch, a circuit court order required an ex-husband to provide his ex-wife with certain tax information by May 12 of each year. At the time of the contempt hearing, the ex-husband had complied with the circuit court's order insofar as it required him to provide the tax information to his ex-wife but had not complied (and no longer could comply) with the court's order insofar as it required him to provide the information timely. Furthermore, the ex-husband's failure to provide the tax information timely had harmed the ex-wife in a way that the ex-husband could not cure by providing the information too late to comply with the circuit court order. Because of the ex-husband's conduct, the ex-wife had missed opportunities to seek timely modification of a child support order in her favor and likely had not received the full amount of child support to which she was entitled.
¶ 128. This court concluded, with Justice Prosser writing for the majority, that the ex-husband's contempt was continuing at the time of the contempt hearing because the husband could not undo his violation of the circuit court's order respecting timeliness and was in continuing violation of that portion of the order. The Frisch court stated that "[t]he timely provision of information was an essential element of the [circuit] court's order."28 Furthermore, the husband's "[f]ailure to timely produce income information 'as required' was really the essence of [his] contempt *141because it shielded him from exposure to regular, contemporary court-ordered modifications of child-support."29 Due to the ex-hushand's contempt of the circuit court's order respecting timeliness, "full compliance with the court's order [was] impossible."30 The Frisch court explained that the husband "could not and did not turn back time when he produced the required information too late to be acted on[.]"31
¶ 129. The contempt in the present case, like the contempt in Frisch, consists of an intentional failure to perform actions timely as required by the circuit court's order. The Consent Decree required the County to implement the 30-hour rule "[a]s of 3121/01, and thereafter[.]"32 At the time of the contempt hearing, the County had complied with the Consent Decree insofar as it required the County to implement the 30-hour rule but had not complied (and no longer could comply) with the Consent Decree insofar as it required the County to implement the 30-rule timely. Furthermore, the County's failure to implement the 30-hour rule timely harmed members of the plaintiff class in a way that the County could not cure by implementing the 30-hour rule too late to comply with the Consent Decree. Because of the County's conduct, many members of the plaintiff class were forced to spend more than 30 hours in the County jail without a bed, contrary to the Consent Decree's explicit mandate.
*142¶ 130. The Frisch court's reasoning applies cleanly and clearly to the facts of the present case. The County cannot undo its violation of the Consent Decree's provision respecting timelines and is in continuing violation of that portion of the Consent Decree. Timely implementation of the 30-hour rule unquestionably was an essential element of the Consent Decree. Due to the County's contempt of the circuit court's order respecting timeliness, full compliance with the Consent Decree now is impossible. The County could not and did not turn back time when it implemented the 30-hour rule too late to benefit the many inmates who spent more than 30 hours in the County jail without a bed, contrary to the Consent Decree.
¶ 131. The only obvious difference between Frisch and the present case that might seem to matter under the majority opinion relates to when the contumacious conduct stopped relative to when the motion for contempt sanctions was filed. In Frisch the contemnor began complying with the court order after the motion for contempt was filed (but before a finding of contempt). In the present case the contemnor began complying with the court order about three years after the order but months before a motion for contempt was filed. The timing issue, however, was not even mentioned in Frisch and certainly was not determinative.
¶ 132. The majority opinion seems to distinguish Frisch by declaring that "[t]his is not a case where a contempt of court causes irreparable harm by depriving a victim of her 'ability to utilize traditional remedies in the law.' "33 Majority op., ¶ 76 (quoting Frisch, 304 *143Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 47). Frisch, however, imposed no requirement that a contempt must deprive a plaintiff of any existing remedy under the law in order to be "continuing" and to trigger the possibility of compensatory sanctions. Frisch did not hold that all other potential avenues of relief must be exhausted before contempt sanctions are used. Indeed, the Frisch court stated that remedial contempt was properly employed although the ex-wife potentially could have been entitled to relief under Wis. Stat. § 806.07.34
¶ 133. The contempt statute offers no textual basis for the position that whether a contempt is "continuing" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 783.01(3) depends on whether other remedies are available to the victim of contempt. The majority should not be distinguishing Frisch by rewriting the contempt statute, engrafting a requirement onto Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) that is extrinsic to the statute and unsupported by the statute's text.
Ill
¶ 134. If the majority opinion's statutory interpretation is accepted, the result is that a circuit court has no power to impose remedial compensatory damages to sanction a contumacious party for intentionally *144violating a court order for nearly three years, a clear contempt of court, so long as the party ceases its contumacious behavior before a motion for contempt sanctions is filed. Thus there is a void in the statute relating to a circuit court's power to protect enforcement of its orders. Under such circumstances, the circuit court may use its inherent power to fill the void in the contempt statutes.35 Filling in a void in the statute does not contravene the statute.
¶ 135. "A court's power to use contempt stems from the inherent authority of the court" and a court's contempt power may not be "rendered ineffectual" by statute.36 A court's power of contempt exists independently of and outside the statutes; courts have retained their inherent contempt power in addition to the statutory power prescribed by the legislature.37 When the procedures and penalties for contempt are prescribed by statute, the statute controls as long as the statute does not render the court's power impotent or meaningless.38 To the extent that the legislature unreason*145ably burdens or substantially interferes with the contempt power of the judiciary, such interference with the courts' power to enforce their orders violates the separation of powers doctrine.39
¶ 136. "The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order injudicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice."40 A court has an "inherent power to protect its own decrees and the private rights attendant on those decrees."41 Intentional defiance of a court's judgment or order cannot be condoned. A party must be able to employ civil contempt proceedings to enforce its adjudicated rights. I therefore conclude that when a contempt has terminated and no remedial sanction is available under chapter 785, a court may exercise its inherent power to award compensatory damages to effectuate its order.42
*146¶ 137. For the reasons set forth, I write separately in dissent.
¶ 138. I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this opinion.
The circuit court found the government officials in contempt for a "staggering" pattern of confining thousands of *124people in the jail's booking area in "unacceptable, if not appalling" conditions for extended periods in direct violation of the explicit terms of the consent decrees.
Majority op., ¶ 35: "The circuit court found that the 'staggering number of violations and extended period of time during which the violations occurred were clear evidence that the violations were 'intentional.'"
Neither the court of appeals nor this court has been asked to review the circuit court's determination that the County was in contempt of the consent decree. Relevant to the present case, the contempt statute defines "[c]ontempt of court" to mean "intentional... [disobedience, resistance or obstruction of the authority, process or order of a court." Wis. Stat. § 785.01(l)(in-tro) & (l)(b). The court of appeals has stated that "[a] finding of *125contempt rests on the trial court's factual findings. The critical findings are that the party was able to comply with the order and that the refusal to comply was willful and with intent to avoid compliance." Evans v. Luebke, 2003 WI App 207, ¶ 24 n.12, 267 Wis. 2d 596, 671 N.W.2d 304.
Majority op., ¶¶ 30, 35.
Majority op., ¶ 4. See also id., ¶¶ 74, 75.
Without deciding the issue, the majority opinion suggests that although the County was able to terminate its contempt of court (and preclude the use of remedial sanctions) by ceasing its repeated violations of the court order before a motion for contempt was filed, the County might be unable to do the same thing a second time. See majority op., ¶ 74 n.16 ("[R]epeated violations of a court order after a finding of contempt may constitute a continuing contempt...."). In other words, the majority opinion suggests that under the contempt statute a contemnor has one freebie opportunity — but "may" not have two freebie opportunities — to repeatedly violate a court order with impunity prior to a motion for contempt.
The majority opinion also seems to imply that if the County resumes violating the court order and again ceases its violations before a motion for contempt is filed, the circuit court may exercise its authority under Wis. Stat. § 785.04(l)(d) "to issue an 'order designed to ensure compliance with a prior order of the court.'" Majority op., ¶ 74 n.16 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 785.04(l)(d)). Section 785.04(l)(d), however, is a remedial sanction and under the majority opinion's reasoning may not he used except for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court.
The circuit court concluded as a matter of law that remedial sanctions were not available under the circumstances of the present case. The circuit court therefore, never determined what sum of money, if any, would be sufficient compensation.
Frisch, 2007 WI 102, ¶ 82, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 N.W.2d 85.
Christensen v. Sullivan, 2008 WI App 18, ¶ 25, 307 Wis. 2d 754, 746 N.W.2d 553 (Fine, J., concurring).
Majority op., ¶ 58.
Majority op., ¶ 60.
"[Rjesort to a dictionary can be, as Justice Scalia has written of the use of legislative history, 'the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends.' "Noffke v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶ 60, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (quoting Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511 (1993)).
Contrary to the majority opinion's assertion at ¶ 77 n.18, this interpretation preserves the distinction between remedial and punitive sanctions. Punitive sanctions are imposed for the purpose of punishment, do not involve compensation to a victim, and may be imposed whether or not any harm to the victim has been remedied. See Wis. Stat. § 785.01(2) (defining "punitive sanction" as a sanction "imposed to punish a past *131contempt of court for the purpose of upholding the authority of the court"); Wis. Stat. § 785.04(2) (listing only fines and imprisonment as the sanctions that a court may use for a punitive purpose).
Nor does this interpretation eliminate a court's discretion to impose remedial sanctions. Nothing in chapter 785 requires a court to impose a sanction in every instance that a party is in contempt of court. Section 785.02 states that "[a] court of record may impose a remedial or punitive sanction for contempt of court under this chapter" (emphasis added).
See Schroeder v. Schroeder, 100 Wis. 2d 625, 637, 302 N.W.2d 475 (1981) (stating that a contempt sanction "seek[ing] to enforce a private right of one of the parties in an action is a civil [rather than criminal or punitive] contempt" sanction (quoting State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 129, 262 N.W.2d 80 (1978))); Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994) ("[A] contempt sanction is considered civil if it is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant." (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
See also Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 345, 345 (2000) ("Courts use contempt citations to compensate injured parties, [and to] coerce reluctant defendants and witnesses ...."); Dan B. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 183, 235 (1971) ("If the contempt proceeding is a civil one, its purpose is remedial — that is, its purpose is to compel obedience to the court's order, or, failing that, to get some substitute relief for the benefit of the opposing party." (footnote omitted)).
Majority op., ¶ 55.
For the other decision interpreting Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3), see Frisch v. Henrichs, 2007 WI 102, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 N.W.2d 85, which I discuss in Part II of this dissent.
A court may determine whether to impose a "remedial" contempt sanction in an ordinary civil proceeding. In contrast, when determining whether to impose a "punitive" contempt sanction, a court ordinarily must comply with the statutes governing criminal procedure. Compare Wis. Stat. § 785.03(l)(a) (stating that a court may impose a remedial contempt sanction upon a motion from a party and after notice and a hearing) with Wis. Stat. § 785.03(l)(b) (stating that when a punitive sanction is *133sought, the district attorney, attorney general, or a special prosecutor must issue a complaint charging the alleged contemnor with contempt of court and that such complaint "shall be processed under chs. 967 to 973 [pertaining to matters of criminal procedure]").
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. ch. 115, § 21 (1849) ("If an actual loss or injury has been produced to any party by the misconduct alleged, the court shall order a sufficient sum to be paid by the defendant to such party, to indemnify him and to satisfy his costs and expenses ...."); Wis. Stat. § 295.02(1)(a) (1977) ("If an actual loss or injury has been produced to any party by the misconduct of the contemnor, which it is not efficacious to remedy by execution or garnishment, the court may order the defendant to pay such party a sum sufficient to compensate the party for losses, costs and expenses ....").
In 1979, prior to enacting the current contempt statute, the legislature renumbered chapter 295 of the statutes as chapter 785. See § 62, ch. 32, Laws of 1979.
Emerson v. Huss, 127 Wis. 215, 224-25, 106 N.W. 518 (1906), overruled on other grounds by State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 262 N.W.2d 80 (1978).
King overruled the Emerson decision to the extent that Emerson permitted "imposition of punitive sanctions in civil contempt which have no remedial or coercive attributes." King *13482 Wis. 2d at 134. The sanction of compensatory damages is not a "punitive" sanction. Chapter 785 includes the sanction of compensatory damages in its list of "remedial" sanctions and omits it from the list of "punitive" sanctions. See Wis. Stat. § 785.04(l)-(2). See also Doug Rendleman, Compensatory Contempt: Plaintiffs Remedy When a Defendant Violates an Injunction, U. Ill. L.F. 971, 972 (1980) ("Courts utilize compensatory contempt to restore the plaintiff as nearly as possible to his original position. The remedy is not penal, but rather remedial.").
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 304 (1947) (emphasis added).
See also Int'l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 829, 838 (1994) ("A contempt fine ... is considered civil and remedial if it either 'coerce[s] the defendant into compliance with the court's order, [or].. . compensate^] the complainant for losses sustained.' ... Our holding... leaves unaltered the longstanding authority of judges ... to enter broad compensatory awards for all contempts through civil proceedings." (quoting Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303-304)).
See, e.g., In re Contempt of Dougherty, 413 N.W.2d 392, 398 (Mich. 1987) ("[T]here are two types of civil contempt sanctions, coercive and compensatory.. .. Thus, there are three *135sanctions which may be available to a court to remedy or redress contemptuous behavior: (1) criminal punishment to vindicate the court's authority; (2) coercion, to force compliance with the order; and (3) compensatory relief to the complainant."); Odom v. Langston, 213 S.W.2d 948, 951-52 (Mo. 1948) ("A proceeding for civil contempt has as its object remedial punishment by way of a coercive imprisonment, or a compensatory fine, payable to the complainant." (quotation marks and citation omitted)); City of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Dist. Council 51, 299 N.E.2d 686, 694 (Ohio 1973) ("It is ... well settled that 'judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may, in a proper case, be employed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court's order, and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained.'" (citing United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303)); DeMartino v. Monroe Little League, Inc., 471 A.2d 638, 642 (Conn. 1984) (same); Johnson v. Bednar, 573 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 1991) (same); Hawaii Pub. Employment Relations Bd. v. Hawaii State Teachers Ass'n, 520 P.2d 422, 427 (Haw. 1974) (same); Mahoney v. Commonwealth, 612 N.E.2d 1175, 1178-79 & n.9 (Mass. 1993) (same); Bata v. Central-Penn Nat'l Bank, 293 A.2d 343, 354 & n.21 (Penn. 1972) (same); School Comm. v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance, 221 A.2d 806, 813 (R.I. 1966) (same).
See also Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 345, 347, 351-52 (2000) ("Civil contempt serves to benefit the plaintiff to the action by providing compensation or coercion.... Remedial civil contempts serve to compensate plaintiffs for damages suffered because of the defendant's disobedience of a court order.... Remedial civil contempt is merely another form of compensatory damages[.]" (footnote omitted)); Robert J. Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 677, 701 (1981) ("The payment of money damages is one of the traditional types of sanctions used in civil contempt to enforce the rights of a litigant." (footnote omitted)); Doug Rendleman, Compensatory Contempt: Plaintiffs Remedy When a Defendant Violates an Injunction, U. Ill. L.F. 971, 971 (1980) *136("Compensatory contempt is a money award for the plaintiff when the defendant has injured the plaintiff by violating an injunction. Compensatory and coercive contempt are both civil sanctions.").
Reply Brief of Petitioners at 2.
Reply Brief of Petitioners at 3.
The Judicial Council is a body legislatively created in 1951. Wis. Stat. § 758.13. Its notes are a legitimate, admissible source of insight into the legislative intent behind the statute. "Generally... reports or comments of nonlegislative committees are considered a valid aid in interpreting a statute which originated from such committee." In re Haese's Estate, 80 Wis. 2d 285, 297, 259 N.W.2d 54 (1977). See also State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 69, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
Note 3 (Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3)), § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, at 1355.
Note (Wis. Stat. § 785.04), § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, at 1357.
See Note 2 (Wis. Stat. § 785.01), § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, at 1355 ("Traditionally, a remedial sanction was the type of sanction imposed for civil contempt.... That concept is continued here, even though without the civil contempt designation.").
At most, the Notes may show that the Judicial Council, while attempting to preserve the substantive law of contempt, misunderstood the purposes for which remedial sanctions historically had been imposed in civil contempt proceedings. The Notes state that traditionally, the purpose of a contempt sanction that could be imposed in a civil proceeding "was remedial in that [the sanction] was designed to force a person into complying with an order of the court and terminating a present contempt of court." Note 2 (Wis. Stat. § 785.01), § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, at 1355. This description of the purpose for which contempt sanctions could be imposed in a civil proceeding is incomplete. As the County's reply brief correctly concedes, Wisconsin courts historically have been able to impose compensation as a sanction in civil contempt proceedings regardless of whether a contempt was "continuing" or could be terminated in response to a sanction.
*138Retired Judge Gordon Myse, a member of the Contempt and Extraordinary Remedies Committee of the Judicial Council, and Professor Robert Martineau, a member of the Committee and Reporter for the Committee, filed a third-party brief with this court in support of the plaintiffs. See Non-Party Brief of Robert J. Martineau, Gordon G. Myse, David S. Schwartz, Vincent M. Nathan, and Pamela Susan Karlan.
I do not rely upon Judge Myse's or Professor Martineau's communications in the third-party brief as evidence of legislative intent. I agree with the County that after-the-fact statements by legislators and drafters of statutes should not be relied upon to interpret the meaning of a statute. Labor & Farm Party v. Elections Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 351, 356, 344 N.W.2d 117 (1984) ("It is inappropriate . .. for a court to rely on the statements of a member of the legislature as to what the legislature intended when enacting a statute."). I note, however, that the court has, in the past, relied upon private communications between a member of the legislative council staff and a single legislator as evidence of legislative intent. See Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, ¶¶ 77, 89, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866.
See Christensen v. Sullivan, 2008 WI App 18, ¶ 1, 307 Wis. 2d 754, 746 N.W.2d 553 ("When the trial court concluded that sanctions or compensation for continuing contempt were not available because Milwaukee County (County) had ceased violating the Consent Decree on which the trial court based its finding of contempt, it did not have the benefit of our supreme court's holdings in Frisch v. Henrichs, 2007 WI 102, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 N.W.2d 85, decided in July 2007, while this appeal was pending. We conclude that the remedy of sanctions under Wis. Stat. § 785.04 for continuing contempt, as described in Frisch, is applicable to the contempt found by the trial court here.").
Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 4.
*141See also id., ¶ 47 ("Producing documents was only part of the court's order. Producing documents on time... was an equal part of the order.").
Id.
Id., ¶ 62.
Id., ¶ 4.
Majority op., ¶ 16 (emphasis added; quoting the Consent Decree).
Without explanation, reasoning, or citation to authority, the majority cavalierly declares that the plaintiff class may be able to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for damages and that *143individual plaintiffs may file personal injury lawsuits. It is not clear that the individual members of the class may bring their own actions for damages. The majority opinion decides the issue without analyzing claim preclusion, the federal Prisoner Reform Litigation Act and its state progeny, or other practical barriers to such suits. As a practical matter and as a matter of judicial administration I do not think it a good idea for the majority opinion to encourage 16,662 individuals to file individual actions or to suggest personal liability for public officials in the present case.
See Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 27 n.12.
As the majority opinion explains: "The statutory scheme establishes two kinds of sanctions, each with specific criteria. There may be a void in this statutory scheme ...." Majority op., ¶ 58 n.10. The majority concludes without analysis that this void cannot be filled by judicial interpretation without doing violence to the statutes. Yet the majority recognizes that the statute does not deprive a court of its inherent powers to protect enforcement of its order.
Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 32.
In the Interest of D.L.D., 110 Wis. 2d 168, 178, 327 N.W.2d 682 (1983).
Evans v. Luebke, 2003 WI App 207, ¶ 17, 267 Wis. 2d 596, 671 N.W.2d 302; Douglas County v. Edwards, 137 Wis. 2d 65, 87-88, 403 N.W.2d 438 (1987); State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 136, 262 N.W.2d 80 (1972); State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Circuit *145Court for Eau Claire County, 97 Wis. 1, 8, 72 N.W. 193 (1887); Note, § 11, Laws of 1979, at 1355.
Kenosha County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jodi W., 2006 WI 93, ¶ 20, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845; State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 46, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982).
Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (U.S. 1873).
Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 22 Wis. 2d 7, 18, 125 N.W.2d 324 (1963).
Furthermore, Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 805.03 provides, without regard to remedial contempt, that a court in which an action is pending may make such orders as are just for any party's failure to obey any order of the court. A circuit court may determine that the compensation requested by the Legal Aid Society may be a just order against the County, which intentionally failed to comply with a court order for nearly three years. See Wis. Stat. § 805.03 ("[F]or failure of any party to *146comply with the statutes governing procedure in civil actions or to obey any order of court, the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, including but not limited to orders authorized under s. 804.12(2)(a)....").