OPINION
COMPTON, Justice.The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) awarded disability benefits to Damon Crouch. His employer, Pan Alaska Trucking, Inc., and its insurance carrier, Alaska National Insurance Company (collectively referred to herein as “Pan Alaska”) appealed the award to the superi- or court, which affirmed. Pan Alaska appeals.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In February 1981 Damon Crouch was injured while driving a truck for Pan Alaska Trucking. In January 1983 he filed an *948Application for Adjustment of Claim with the Board. Two days later, Pan Alaska controverted the claim.
In August 1985 Crouch filed a second application and requested a hearing on his claim. Pan Alaska petitioned the Board to dismiss Crouch’s claim on the ground that he had failed to request a hearing within two years of the date of controversion. The petition was denied.
A hearing was held before the Board on October 7, 1986. In a written decision, the Board found that Crouch was permanently totally disabled as a result of his employment and awarded him disability benefits, costs, and attorney’s fees. Pan Alaska filed a notice of appeal in superior court and requested that the court stay enforcement of the award pending appeal. The superior court denied this request, and Pan Alaska paid past benefits to Crouch. Pan Alaska then sought a stay of that portion of the Board’s order awarding Crouch costs and attorney’s fees. That motion too was denied.
The superior court affirmed the Board's decision and awarded Crouch additional attorney’s fees.
II. DISCUSSION
The Board Erred in Failing to Apply AS 23.30.110(c) to Crouch’s Claim
Pan Alaska contends that the Board should have denied Crouch’s claim pursuant to AS 23.30.110(c). Section 110(c), as amended July 1,1982, provides in part: “If a claim is controverted by the employer and the employee does not request a hearing for a period of two years following the date of controversion, the claim is denied.”
Crouch does not deny that more than two years passed between Pan Alaska’s contr-oversion of his claim and his request for a hearing. Instead Crouch contends that because he was injured prior to the effective date of the amendment grafting the two-year limit onto AS 23.30.110(c), the limit does not apply to his claim.1
The sequence of relevant events is as follows:
February 1981: Crouch suffers heart attack at Prudhoe Bay.
July 1982: Amendment takes effect, requiring claimants to request a hearing within two years of controversion.
January 1983: Crouch files claim and two days later the claim is controverted.
August 1985: Crouch requests a hearing on his claim.
Because the facts are not in dispute and the issue to be resolved is one of statutory interpretation, and because deference to agency expertise is not appropriate here, the court will apply its independent judgment to this issue. Hood v. State, Workmen’s Compensation Board, 574 P.2d 811, 813 (Alaska 1978).
As a general rule, statutes are presumed to operate prospectively only, and will not be applied to causes of action arising prior to their enactment unless a contrary legislative intent appears by express terms or necessary implication. See Hood v. State, 574 P.2d at 813-814. This court has held, however, that the presumption against retroactive application does not apply to procedural statutes. Matanuska Maid, Inc. v. State, 620 P.2d 182, 187 (Alaska 1980). Because procedural statutes often alter only the legal effects of events occurring during the legal process, courts have treated as irrelevant the date of the events giving rise to the cause of action:
[Procedural statutes may become operative when and if the procedure or remedy is invoked, and if the trial postdates the enactment, the statute operates in the future regardless of the time of the occurrence of the events giving rise to the cause of action.
Matanuska Maid, 620 P.2d at 187 (quoting Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Industri*949al Accident Commission, 30 Cal.2d 388, 182 P.2d 159, 161 (1947)).
Alaska Statute 23.30.110, entitled “Procedure on Claims,” does not grant or define a substantive right, but instead sets up the legal machinery through which a right is processed. There can be little doubt that it usually would be described as a “procedural” statute. Applied in this case, the amendment could fairly be said to operate only prospectively: it merely directs the claimant to take certain action following controversion — here, controversion occurred after enactment.
This court has recognized that some “procedural” statutes demand special treatment: Where a change in a procedural statute significantly alters the legal consequences of the events giving rise to a cause of action, it is treated as substantive in character. See Matanuska Maid, 620 P.2d at 187. Crouch argues here that because the change in AS 23.30.110(c) “results in the absence of any effective remedy to enforce a substantive right,” the change should be treated as substantive. But in deciding whether a change is substantive in character, it will hardly suffice that a new rule has proved dispositive in a particular case: if ignored, nearly any procedural rule can play a role in the disposition of a case. Rather, a change in a procedural rule is substantive in character where the change makes it appear to one just starting down the road to vindication of his cause that the road has become more difficult to travel or the goal less to be desired. For example, a change in the burden of proof to be borne by a party, though clearly a change in procedure, may make it less likely from the outset that the party will arrive at a favorable resolution of his claim. The same clearly cannot be said of the amendment in this case. It is only in retrospect that the obstacle posed by the two-year limit appears imposing. This claim has faltered on the two-year limit not because it was a significant obstacle, but because Crouch failed to pay it any heed.
The amendment to AS 23.30.-110(c) merely effects a change in procedure and does not alter the legal consequences of events giving rise to the cause of action. Therefore, the presumption against re-troactivity has no application in this case. The Board erred in failing to apply AS 23.30.110(c) to Crouch’s claim.2
III. CONCLUSION
Crouch’s claim is barred by AS 23.30.-110(c). The holding of the superior court is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. Prior to July 1, 1982, AS 23.30.110(c) provided in part:
The board shall ... upon application of an interested party ... order a hearing on [the claim].... If no hearing is ordered within 20 áis after [the board has notified the employer that a claim has been filed], the board shall by order reject the claim or make an award with respect to it.
. Pan Alaska also contends that the superior court erred in denying its motion for a stay of the Board’s compensation order pending appeal. Pan Alaska’s payment of compensation and attorney’s fees has rendered this issue moot. The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine is limited to issues of “grave public concern" which are capable of repetition, yet evade review. Etheredge v. Bradley, 502 P.2d 146, 153 (Alaska 1972). Because the issue raised is not one of grave public concern, we do not reach it.