John and Sue Maddox allegedly contracted to sell Morris and Betty Cash 15 acres of land. The trial court held there was a binding contract and ordered specific performance. The Maddoxes, appellants, contend the memorandum of the alleged contract of sale is too vague and indefinite to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. We agree and reverse the lower court.
Appellants and respondents are husband and wife respectively. The Cashes lived in Florida. They telephoned the' Maddoxes who lived in Georgia, and discussed the purchase of 15 acres of land owned by the Maddoxes. The only written evidence of the contract is a check mailed by the Cashes for Two Hundred ($200.00) Dollars as part payment. Written on the. check was “15 acres in Pickens, S. C, land binder, 30 days from date of check to June 3, 1970.” John Maddox endorsed and cashed the check. Subsequently, the Maddoxes advised the Cashes they did not wish to sell as it would cause trouble in the family and returned the Two Hundred ($200.00) Dollars which the Cashes refused. There was testimony the Maddoxes owned a 76 acre tract of land in Pickens County, of which 15.6 acres was south of the Pickens-Greenville highway, outside of the city limits of the town of Pickens.
*484The Statute of Frauds does not require any particular form of writing. It may be satisfied entirely by a written correspondence. Speed v. Speed, 213 S. C. 401, 49 S. E. (2d) 588 (1948). However, the writings must establish the essential terms of the contract without resort to parol evidence. Barr v. Lyle, 263 S. C. 426, 211 S. E. (2d) 232 (1975). One of the essential terms of a contract of sale of land is the identification of the land. A decree for specific performance operates as a deed. Haygood v. Duncan, 204 Ga. 540, 50 S. E. (2d) 214 (Ga. 1948). Hence, the land must be described so as to indicate with reasonable certainty what is to be conveyed. McMillan v. McMillan, 77 S. C. 511, 58 S. E. 431 (1907). Parol evidence cannot be relied upon to supplement a vague and uncertain description. Jackson v. Frier, 118 S. C. 449, 451, 110 S. E. 676 (1922); Barr v. Lyle, supra.
The burden of proof was upon the respondents to establish the contract “ ‘by competent and satisfactory proof, such as is clear, definite, and certain.’ * * * (T)he degree of certainty required is reasonable certainty, having regard to the subject-matter of the contract.’ ” Aust v. Beard, 230 S. C. 515, 521, 96 S. E. (2d) 558, 561 (1957).
For a contract to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, S. C. Code § 11-101, every essential element of the sale must be expressed therein.
The alleged contract gives no definite location or shape of the 15 acres. The writing does not indicate whether the subject matter of the contract was north or south' of the road, or in another area of the county. The fact 15.6 acres of the entire tract may be south of the road is not legally sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Parol evidence may be used to explain terms appearing in the description, but the description itself must clearly identify the particular parcel of land.
*485In the absence of equities removing the case from the operation of the Statute of Frauds, which do not here exist, we hold before a court will decree specific performance of a contract for a sale of land, the writing must contain the essential terms of the contract. They must be expressed with such definiteness, certainty and clarity that it may be understood without recourse to parol evidence to show the intention of the parties. The terms of the contract must be such that neither party can reasonably misunderstand them. It would be inequitable to carry a contract into effect where the court is left to ascertain the intention of the parties by mere guess and conjecture.
The respondents’ reliance upon Speed v. Speed, supra, is misplaced. The case specifically states, “the writings relied upon must in and of themselves furnish the evidence that the minds of the parties met as to the particular property which the one proposed to sell and the other agreed to buy; and, when such evidence is not found in the writings, it cannot be supplied by parol * * (Emphasis added). Page 410, 49 S. E. (2d) p. 592.
There was not a contract between these parties as would satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The land proposed to be sold was not described or designated as would enable a court to render a decree for its conveyance. The words in the check afford no means to adequately identify the property.
The parties should be restored to their original status.
Reversed.
Littlejohn, Rhodes and Gregory, JJ., concur. Lewis, C. J., dissents.