dissenting.
The majority’s opinion, though dispassionately phrased, is at bottom emotional, stating in essence that “the plaintiff received too much money; therefore, something must have gone wrong.” I seek not to be guided by emotions but by well-established and time-honored principles of law, the most important one in this context being expressed as follows:
“Before the verdict will be set aside on the ground that it is excessive, where there is no direct proof of prejudice or bias, the amount thereof, when considered in connection with all the facts, must shock the moral sense, appear ‘exorbitant,’ ‘flagrantly outrageous,’ and ‘extravagant.’ ‘It must be monstrous indeed and such as all mankind must be ready to exclaim against at first blush.’ It must carry its death warrant upon its face.” [Cits.] [Seaboard System Railroad v. Taylor, 176 Ga. App. 847, 849 (2) (338 SE2d 23) (1985).]
Since I believe this verdict is neither “monstrous,” nor that it “carrfies] its death warrant upon its face,” I must respectfully dissent and offer the following reasons.
1. Cases of this type are fact-sensitive, and on appeal we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. Pendley v. Pendley, 251 Ga. 30 (1) (302 SE2d 554) (1983). The jury was authorized to find that appellee was injured during the course of his employment and that his injuries were caused by his employer’s *689negligence. The jury was further authorized to find that appellee suffered an injury to his back, neck and shoulders that required surgical procedures to his shoulder on two occasions and to his neck on one occasion; a myelogram; a diskogram; three electromyelograms; three cortisone injections; a score or more of physical therapy treatments; and over 50 visits to the doctor. One of the surgical procedures involved an incision in the front of appellee’s neck so that a disk could be removed from the cervical area of his spinal column. That procedure was followed by the removal of bone from his hip to use in fusing his cervical spine. These medical procedures cost over $32,218.82 and resulted in appellee losing $27,090 in wages during his absence from work over 258 days.
The jury was also authorized to find that appellee endured protracted pain and suffering and that the pain and suffering will continue for an unknown amount of time; that appellee must rely on regular medication in order to function; that he will develop degenerative changes in his spine; that he has suffered a change in personality; that he will be limited in his activities both at work and away from work; and that he will require medical treatment in the future.
The jury in its wisdom awarded appellee $875,000 for his injuries, medical expenses, lost wages and pain and suffering. I submit that, under the evidence in this case, that award is within the range of the evidence and the enlightened conscience of the jury.
In CSX Transp. v. Darling, 189 Ga. App. 719 (377 SE2d 217) (1988), a case strikingly similar to the present case, the Court of Appeals considered the issue of excessiveness and decided, with only one judge dissenting, that the award of a jury should not be disturbed because the requirements hereinabove mentioned were not met. I contend that if the verdict in this case is wrong, then the verdict in Darling was wrong. However, since this court denied the petition for certiorari in Darling, it must have felt that Darling was right.
2. The majority opinion also concludes that appellee’s counsel improperly argued for and received punitive damages in violation of an order limiting appellee’s closing remarks. However, not only was there no objection to the argument, but no curative instructions were requested by appellant. In cases too numerous to mention, we have repeatedly held that “ ‘[a] party cannot during the trial ignore what he thinks to be an injustice, taking his chance on a favorable verdict, and complain later. [Cits.]’ ” Bolden v. Carroll, 239 Ga. 188 (1) (236 SE2d 270) (1977).
In addition, we must observe that appellant filed a motion for new trial which was argued vigorously by appellant and then denied by the trial judge who heard the evidence, saw the witnesses and heard the closing argument. Furthermore, another appellate court has performed its duty to make a detailed appraisal of the evidence bear*690ing on damages. The majority, in effect, is second-guessing 12 jurors, one trial court judge, and another appellate court.
Decided December 4, 1990 — Reconsideration denied December 20, 1990. Hatcher, Stubbs, Land, Hollis & Rothschild, Richard Y. Bradley, Robert C. Martin, Jr., for appellant. Butler, Wooten, Overby & Cheeley, James E. Butler, Jr., C. Frederick Overby, for appellee.Believing the position taken by the majority will visit harm of an enormous magnitude on well-established and time-honored principles of law, I must dissent to an opinion which amounts to a judicial wind-shear that will be sudden in its onset and devastating in its result.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Smith joins in this dissent.