dissenting:
*225I must respectfully dissent. The Solicitor’s striking of a black juror in reliance on an Assistant Solicitor who participated in an earlier DUI “involvement” while seating a white juror with a DUI conviction created an inference that the racially neutral explanation was a mere pretext.
In State v. Oglesby, 298 S.C. 279, 379 S.E. (2d) 891 (1989), we held that even a facially neutral reason could be rejected as a sham or pretext where the reason is not applied in a neutral manner. In State v. Marble, — S.C. —, 426 S.E. (2d) 744 (1992), we held that where a Solicitor relies on a third person’s reason for striking a juror, the third person’s reason must be provided.
In the case at bar, the third person’s reasoning was provided in the record; however, this reasoning must be tested as if it were offered solely by the Solicitor. On the present facts, it is inconceivable that the peremptory strike of a black juror for a DUI “involvement” is not pretextual when a white juror is seated with a DUI conviction.
While I agree that State v. Johnson, 302 S.C. 243, 395 S.E. (2d) 167 (1990) stands for the proposition that a defendant must show that neutral reasons are pretextual, I cannot agree that the defendant has to show anything more than the seating of a white juror when the same reason was used to excuse a black juror. Here the majority places a requirement on a defendant to go much further. With the majority’s opinion today, a defendant now must also focus on which solicitor’s office handled a prosecution of a potential juror. Based on this record, the Solicitor’s dependence on the Assistant Solicitor’s opinion is meaningless in that there is nothing offered to distinguish the excused black juror with DUI involvement from the seated white juror with a DUI conviction. Accordingly, I would hold that the Solicitor’s exercise of the peremptory strike was a mere pretext, and reverse in accordance with our earlier decisions in State v. Oglesby, supra, and State v. Marble, supra.
Finney, J., concurs.