dissenting.
The question posed here is whether our 200-year-old legal system is flexible enough to accommodate modern-day medical technology. Unlike the majority, who answers this question in the negative by holding that this state will not recognize a cause of action for wrongful birth, I would answer in the affirmative and hold that such a cause of action exists within the framework of our traditional law of torts.
One of the beauties of American jurisprudence is its ability to accommodate new ideas, new approaches and novel concepts. A brief review of this court’s decisions in the past few years leads inexorably to this conclusion. See, e.g., Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278 (393 SE2d 436) (1990) (DNA); State of Ga. v. McAfee, 259 Ga. 579 (385 SE2d 651) (1989) (disconnecting life support); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441 (314 SE2d 653) (1984) (wrongful pregnancy). If we are to maintain the proper balance between law and medicine, we cannot allow the law to be determined in the laboratory; but we would be derelict in our duty if we failed to take into consideration developments in the laboratory.
In support of its disinclination to provide a remedy in this case, the majority contends that this is a matter better left to the legislature. While I agree that some matters can be better addressed by the legislature, and that some involvement by the legislature may be necessary with regard to the tort of wrongful birth, I do not agree that the legislative route is the only route available or that it is the appropriate route in this case. This court decided Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, supra, in 1984 and the legislature has yet to act in that arena. This court must be willing to address the legitimate complaints of citizens as was the Court of Appeals. It tackled the issues in this case in an admirable fashion, and we should do no less.
Turning to the majority’s analysis of the failure of traditional tort principles to provide a cause of action in this case, I must point out two major conceptual fallacies adopted by the majority. When addressing the “third prong” of that analysis, an injury to the plaintiff, the majority incorrectly holds that “[i]n order to satisfy that prong, *724we must recognize the life of the child as the injury which has been inflicted upon plaintiff's by the defendants.” The injury is not that the plaintiffs have had a child, but that they have had imposed on them the extraordinary expenses of raising a severely impaired child. Unlike the case in wrongful pregnancy, the plaintiffs here expected to have a child. They did not expect to have a child with severe impairments, and but for the alleged negligence of defendants, would not have had the extraordinary expenses of raising an impaired child.
The second fallacy is in addressing the “fourth prong,” causation. The majority is correct in asserting that the defendants did not cause the child’s impairment. That is one reason why a child in the position of plaintiffs’ child cannot bring a suit under this cause of action. However, the plaintiffs here are the parents, and defendants’ alleged negligence can be said to be the cause of their injury, which was to have an impaired child rather than an unimpaired child.
We must not be deterred from decision here by the difficulty of framing appropriate remedies. While the question of damages is complex and is fraught with policy considerations, it is not an insurmountable problem. The Court of Appeals, in both the majority and Judge Beasley’s dissent, undertook to address these issues. I would advocate a road between those two opinions. While I agree with the majority below that the extraordinary expenses of raising the child are recoverable, I agree with Judge Beasley that those expenses would be recoverable only up to the majority of the child. From that point, the plaintiffs’ obligation to the child is moral rather than legal, and we must put some reliance on their good faith and on the social service mechanisms we have in place.
The majority’s concern about the misuse of the money intended for the child’s support is equally misplaced. We do not deny recovery of child support payments, even sizeable arrearages on the ground that the custodial parent might not be responsible to the child for whose support the money was paid. Again, there are mechanisms in place to provide protection to those who need it.
In reviewing the case law, we find only two states who have taken a stance similar to the majority.12 As the majority has noted, most of the states who have addressed the issue have found the existence of a cause of action for wrongful birth. Those states who have recognized the cause of action13 have done so by realizing that in applying traditional tort concepts, there is nothing particularly innovative or un*725usual about this cause of action other than its nomenclature.
Decided December 5, 1990 — Reconsideration denied December 20, 1990. Alston & Bird, Judson Graves, Bryan A. Vroon, Holly B. Barnett, Robert P. Constantine, Jr., for appellants. Don C. Keenan, David S. Bills, for appellees. Jones, Brown & Brennan, Taylor W. Jones, Myles E. Eastwood, Kennedy & Kennedy, Reid W. Kennedy, William Q. Bird, Love & Willingham, Daryll Love, Allen S. Willingham, Robert P Monyak, Thomas W. Malone, Foy R. Devine, Williams & Henry, Philip C. Henry, Middleton & Anderson, Robert H. Benfield, Jr., Elizabeth J. Appley, amici curiae.The judiciary has historically performed a meaningful role in addressing citizen complaints in a timely and adequate fashion. We must remain willing to answer the age-old questions: If not us, then who; if not now, then when; if not here, then where? With regard to this case, I believe the answer is that the crucial issues should be decided by this court, here and now. What I urge this court to do is not to retreat from the position it took in Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, supra, but to add further clarification to the matter. By doing so, we will provide a disciplined framework for dealing with recurring problems such as this.
See Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 SE2d 528 (N.C. 1985); and Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 SW2d 741 (Mo. 1988).
See, e.g., Smith v. Cote, 513 A2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 394 NYS2d 933 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P2d 1202 (Colo. 1988); Proffitt v. Bartolo, 412 NW2d 232 (Mich. App. 1987).