dissenting, with whom TAYLOR, Chief Justice, joins.
I respectfully dissent. The majority affirms the district court’s application of an incorrect legal standard and rejection of undisputed facts which mandate a different result. By implication, both courts reach the unprecedented conclusion that failure to pay child support to a primary physical custodian is in the best interest of a child.
The parties entered into a stipulation, incorporated into an order, which awarded the parties joint custody of their children. Pursuant to the order, the children were to reside with each parent for six months of any given year and, because of that, no child support would be paid by either parent. It is undisputed that the parties did not share physical custody as contemplated by the order but, at some point, agreed it was best for the children to remain in Father’s household year round. Based upon that obvious deviation from the joint custody arrangement, Father seeks a modification to reflect his permanent physical custody of the children and the payment of child support.
In Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52 (Wyo.1995), we discussed our adherence to the “substantial change of circumstances” test in traditional custody cases. We recognized that this standard is of central importance in circumstances where one parent has been designated as the primary nurturer because “a child is almost always harmed by a transfer from one parent to the other.” Gurney, at 54. However, we rejected the traditional standard in true “joint custody” arrangements where the order has not fixed one parent as the primary custodian. First, we stated:
When the reopening of a joint custody order is before the court, however, the stability-of-placement consideration that is central to our strict reopening standards in the primary custodial context appears to be of minimal importance because the joint custody order has not fixed one parent as the primary nurturer. We recognize a measure of instability is inherent in a joint custody order because it requires two parents, who are not residing together, to share custodial rights and responsibilities and resolve the logistics of caring for the child.
Id., at 54-55. As a second distinguishing element, we noted that a cooperative arrangement is mandatory for the successful continuance of a joint custody arrangement. “When the parents are unable to make this cooperative arrangement work, a change of circumstances justifying judicial reexamination of the original joint custody order is demonstrated.” Id., at 55.
The district court in this case found that since the parties had cooperatively agreed to allow the children to reside permanently with Father and since both parties knew that the children would be in school in Albin at the time of the divorce, the court had no authority to “retroactively impose the obligation” of child support. This conclusion not only ignores the fact that Mother and Father did not “cooperatively agree” to a child support arrangement in light of the children’s permanent residence with Father, but also fails to account for the “paramount consideration” in these proceedings — the best interests of the children. Matter of Paternity of IC., 941 P.2d 46, 51-52 (Wyo.1997); Ready v. Ready, 906 P.2d 382, 385 (Wyo.1995); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 895 P.2d 441, 443 (Wyo.1995); Gurney, at 55; Roberts v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293, 1293 (Wyo.1991); W.S. 20-2-113(a) (1997).
The majority affirms the district court’s decision by stating: “Even though they knew that the custody provision might not be followed exactly, the parties agreed to waive all child support obligations.” Maj. op. at 432. The majority implies this agreement because the children were attending school in Albin at the time of the divorce, the parents did not want the children commuting, and Father “acknowledged that he was not sure [at the time that] the divorce decree was entered whether ‘it [was] anticipated they would *434spend the other half of the year with their mother.’ ” Id., at 432. The record reflects otherwise. The decree specifically states that the deviation from child support guidelines is based on the children residing six months with Mother and six months with Father. The parties both testified that they anticipated they would each have the children for six months of any given year. The implication that Father admitted that this arrangement was uncertain is particularly unwarranted; the majority takes out of context one statement made by Father at the modification hearing. The complete interchange regarding the waiver of support is as follows:
[Father’s attorney] Q. Okay. At the time— Well, let me refer you to page 1. It says in the end of paragraph 3, subparagraph A, “The parties agree to waive child support from the other.” Did you agree to that at the time?
[Father] A. At that time, yes.
Q. Okay. What was the reason that you agreed to that at that time?
A. Because of what it said, that the children were to spend six months with each parent.
Q. In fact, the sentence just before the one I pointed out to you specifically provides that the children will reside one half of the year with you and one half of the year with your former spouse; is that correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Okay. This was entered in December of 1993. Where were the children living at that time?
A. They were living with me.
Q. Okay. And when was it anticipated they would spend the other half of the year with their mother?
A. I’m not sure about that.
Q. Were they attending school at that time?
A. Yes, they were.
Q. Did you both have the ability to have the children reside with you each half of the year?
A. I certainly did, and I assume that she did, also.
Q. Okay. This was something that — Let me change that question. Was this something that you both requested, or did one of you request of the other that the children be allowed to reside with each parent for half of the year?
A. It was drawn up in the decree and agreed upon there.
Q. Okay. So when you saw this decree and, as set out in paragraph 3, agreed to waive child support, you understood that this was going to be six months residence with the children with yourself and six months with their mother?
A. That was my understanding, yes.
Q. Did that ever actually happen?
A. No, it did not.
The most that can be inferred from this dialogue is that the parties did not ascertain at the time of the decree when the six-month increments would occur. Moreover, while nothing in the record indicates that the parties discussed whether the children would commute to school prior to the divorce, it is clear that the children did not reside with their mother even during summer months. Thus, a conclusion that Father waived child support in the event he became the primary physical custodian is not supported by the record. When a decree is entered ordering joint custody and without providing for support or a primary custodian, it represents that the parties will continue to cooperate in the best interests of the children. Such task requires the utmost in communication and accommodation, and we applaud those parents who are able to successfully accomplish this goal. However, in most instances, the uncertainties of the future render joint custody a court date continued; and when custody matters are again presented to the court by one of the parties, the only issue is the best interests of-the children. This court has never found that failure to provide child support by a non-custodial parent is in the best interests of the children.
Mother attempts to distinguish the circumstances of this case from those presented in Gurney by pointing to the fact that she did not invite the court to reconsider the original order. No doubt Mother thinks the joint *435custody is working perfectly. I speculate whether this rather hollow statement by a non-paying father would be met with the same acceptance as it was in this case. In any event, Mother clearly informed the court that the “joint custody ordered by that court has failed” when she admitted that it was in the best interests of the children to stay with Father rather than spend the six months ordered in her home. See Gurney, at 56. While the court’s commendation to Mother for her recognition of this benefit to the children is certainly worth echoing here, it does not excuse her child support obligations. A non-custodial parent has an obligation to the child to contribute to the support of that child. Smith v. Smith, 895 P.2d 37, 42 (Wyo.1995) (child support is a legal obligation parents owe to their children); Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo.1994) (child support is for the benefit of the children as a parent’s obligation to contribute to their upbringing); Matter of Adoption of GAR, 810 P.2d 113, 115 (Wyo.1991) (common law duty to provide for maintenance of one’s children); Warren v. Hart, 747 P.2d 511, 514 (Wyo.1987) (absence of decree provision providing for support does not eliminate intrinsic obligation); Kamp v. Kamp, 640 P.2d 48, 51 (Wyo.1982) (parents’ obligation to support children is a continuing one); Rose v. Rose, 576 P.2d 458, 461 (Wyo.1978) (support is a basic obligation recognized even in absence of a statute). I find that there has undeniably been a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of the decree to reflect the uncontested fact that father is the primary physical custodian and that the best interests of the child should be recognized by an order for child support consistent with the statutory guidelines. Consequently, I would reverse and remand this ease for consideration of the amount of child support owed by Mother since the date the petition for modification was filed.