This employment termination case comes to this Court as a result of a dissent in an unpublished decision in the Court of Appeals. The evidence in the record reflects that petitioner Walter Lee Hearne served as an “Animal Control Officer II” with the Chatham County Health Department until January 1995. Petitioner’s employment ended when respondent Wayne Sherman, director of the Chatham County Health Department, sought petitioner’s resignation as a result of adverse publicity arising out of allegations that petitioner euthanized a litter of puppies in an unauthorized manner.
The question presented for review is whether the final agency decision issued in this case was reached in accordance with petitioner’s due process right to a fair determination. Since a final agency decision rendered pursuant to the procedures set forth in N.C.G.S. § 126-37 does not constitute a violation of a petitioner’s due process rights, as we conclude was the case here, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
On 31 August 1995, petitioner filed a petition for a contested case hearing in the Office of Administrative Hearings alleging that respondent Sherman discharged him in January 1995 without just cause and without a hearing. However, in a letter to petitioner dated 2 August 1995, respondent Sherman wrote that it was the position of the Chatham County Health Department that petitioner voluntarily resigned from his job as Animal Control Officer II.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Fred Morrison, Jr. conducted a hearing on petitioner’s claim on 16-17 January 1996. In his recommended decision to the State Personnel Commission (SPC), the AU concluded that petitioner did not voluntarily resign his position as Animal Control Officer II and thus recommended petitioner’s rein*614statement. On 5 August 1996, the SPC adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, set out an additional finding of fact and additional conclusions of law, and recommended petitioner’s reinstatement. On 31 October 1996, Chatham County Health Director Wayne Sherman, acting as the “local appointing authority” pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 126-37(bl), issued the final agency decision declining to adopt the SPC decision and concluded that petitioner had voluntarily resigned.
Petitioner filed a petition for judicial review to the Superior Court, Chatham County, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 150B-43. In a 20 March 1997 order, the trial court found that the final agency’s conclusion that petitioner voluntarily resigned was not supported by substantial evidence in the whole record, and reversed the final agency’s decision. Accordingly, the trial court ordered petitioner’s reinstatement. Respondents filed notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, which held, in a split decision, that there was substantial evidence to support the conclusions of the final agency decision that petitioner voluntarily resigned. The Court of Appeals thus reversed and remanded the order to the trial court.
On 5 August 1998, petitioner filed a notice of appeal to this Court asserting substantial constitutional questions pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(1), which in essence queried whether petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the director of an agency renders the ultimate decision on an administrative appeal concerning his own employment decision. This Court entered an order on 3 December 1998 granting respondent’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s appeal of the constitutional questions. Our review of this case is therefore limited to the issue raised in the dissent below. Accordingly, we will not address the specific issue of whether a county health director is the proper person to serve as the “local appointing authority” under section 126-37(bl). The basis for the dissent in the decision below was that respondent Sherman issued a final agency decision wherein he evaluated factual issues involving his own testimony and credibility in violation of petitioner’s rights to due process.
The decisive issue in the final agency determination was whether petitioner voluntarily resigned or was discharged from his position of employment. In determining whether an agency decision is supported by sufficient evidence, a reviewing court must apply the “whole record test.” Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 233 S.E.2d 538 (1977). This standard of review limits the reviewing court to the agency’s findings of fact and does not allow the court to *615“ ‘replace the [agency’s] judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views.’ ” Powell v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 347 N.C. 614, 623, 499 S.E.2d 180, 185 (1998) (quoting Associated Mechanical Contractors v. Payne, 342 N.C. 825, 832, 467 S.E.2d 398, 401 (1996)) (alteration in original).
The determinative facts as to whether petitioner voluntarily resigned are not in dispute. During the administrative hearing, petitioner testified regarding his telephone conversation with respondent Sherman:
And he told me then, he started talking about due to all the news media attention and stuff and all the publicity, bad publicity we’re getting about the animal shelter, said, I’m asking you for your resignation. Said, I think it will be the best for the program if you would resign.
And he said something else. And I asked him to repeat it again. And he said, well, said, I am asking you for your resignation. And I said, you got it.
Additionally, the record reveals that petitioner’s wife listened in on that telephone conversation between petitioner and respondent Sherman. Mrs. Hearne testified:
Mr. Sherman said, well, I just think it would be in the best interest of the animal shelter if you would resign, Lee.
And Lee said — he was very verbal and said, well, this is not over unless you ask the other people for their resignations also. And Mr. Sherman didn’t respond at that. And Lee said, well, you’ve got it. And Mr. Sherman said, well, you’re not going to change your mind, now, are you?
Lee, as I said, was very hurt and angry too. He said that, y’all come on out here and get this truck off of my property and all of the county stuff off of my property.
While there is language in the final agency decision relating to the credibility of Mr. Hearne and Mr. Sherman, the fact is the parties do not dispute the foregoing testimony of petitioner and his wife or the *616material facts surrounding the termination of petitioner’s employment. This testimony from petitioner and his wife is substantial evidence that petitioner, while certainly and understandably not happy about it, did in fact resign his position. Consequently, respondent Sherman was not put in the position of having to weigh his own credibility with regard to this fact. We therefore cannot conclude that either the procedure followed in this case or the evidence considered as a result thereof violated petitioner’s right to due process.
Additionally, the Administrative Procedure Act provides a mechanism for a petitioner to seek to have a person rendering an agency decision recused:
If a party files in good faith a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias or other reason for disqualification of a member of the agency making the final decision, the agency shall determine the matter as a part of the record in the case, and the determination is subject to judicial review at the conclusion of the case.
N.C.G.S. § 150B-36(a) (1995). There is no evidence that petitioner exercised this statutory procedure to protect himself from any perceived bias on the part of or to challenge respondent Sherman. Finally, there is no provision in the Administrative Procedure Act requiring the final agency decision-maker to voluntarily recuse himself in a situation such as the one in the instant case.
The divergent judicial positions taken during the course of this case reflect a troubling and unfortunate set of circumstances involving fair and proper treatment and which seem to arisé from the tenuous reaction of a public official in an environment of unfavorable publicity. In this light, our conclusion may seem harsh; however, because there was no procedural violation of the requirements set out in chapter 126 of the General Statutes and because we do not find that, under the particular circumstances of this case, respondent Sherman’s participation as adjudicator violated petitioner’s due process right to a fair administrative determination, we must affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Justice Mitchell did not participate in the decision of this case. The remaining members of the Court being equally divided, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed without precedential value.