(Dissenting).
{32} I disagree with the decision of the majority which holds that a police officer who makes a valid stop of a motorist is precluded from asking any questions of the person detained if the inquiries go beyond those related to the purposes leading to the initial stop. Specifically, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that because Officer Nelson asked Defendant whether he had any guns, alcohol, or illegal drugs in his car, his inquiry tainted and rendered Defendant’s subsequent consent to search the vehicle unlawful.
{33} Both the United States Supreme Court, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and our Supreme Court, in State v. Werner, 117 N.M. 315, 317, 871 P.2d 971, 973 (1994), have held that an officer who makes a valid stop of an individual may not expand the scope of the detention beyond that which is reasonably related to the circumstances which justified the initial stop, unless the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that other criminal activity has been or may be occurring. I do not believe, however, that either Terry or Werner precludes a law enforcement officer from asking questions about possible illegal conduct if the initial stop of the individual is lawful and if the questioning does not materially extend the duration of the individual’s initial detention.
{34} When an officer has made a valid investigatory stop of a motorist, he is permitted to verify whether the driver is licensed and is operating a car that is properly registered and insured. See State v. Reynolds, 119 N.M. 383, 388, 890 P.2d 1315, 1320 (1995). The officer may also, under such circumstances, run a computer check to verify such information and determine if the individual stopped has any outstanding warrants or charges pending against him. See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348-49 (10th Cir.1998).
{35} Here, the questions posed to Defendant came while Officer Tiano was awaiting the results of the computer check following an initial lawful stop, and Defendant gave his consent to the search. Thus, neither the questions of Officer Nelson nor the search extended the duration of the initial detention. As observed by Justice Oman in State v. Bidegain, 88 N.M. 466, 469-70, 541 P.2d 971, 974-75 (1975): “There is nothing wrong with an officer asking for information or asking for permission to make a search.... A search authorized by consent is an exception to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause and is wholly valid.” (Citations omitted.)
{36} Both Terry and Werner primarily focused on the basis for detaining an individual who has been stopped based on reasonable suspicion for further investigation beyond the purposes of the initial stop. In the present case the detention was not extended by the questions asked by Officer Nelson. Additionally, the present case is distinguishable from City of Albuquerque v. Haywood, 1998-NMCA-029, 124 N.M. 661, 954 P.2d 93, because the inquiries here, and Defendant’s consent to search, occurred prior to completion of the check for outstanding wants and warrants.
{37} As pointed out by the court in Hunnicutt, a routine traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See 135 F.3d at 1348; see also Reynolds, 119 N.M. at 388, 890 P.2d at 1320 (detention during check of driver to determine validity of registration, driver’s license, and insurance records does not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico State Constitution). However, this type of stop has been found to be more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest. See Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d at 1348. Such stops are generally analyzed under principles involving investigative detentions articulated in Terry. See Hunnicutt; see also State v. Cohen, 103 N.M. 558, 561, 711 P.2d 3, 6 (1985); cf. State v. Estrada, 111 N.M. 798, 800, 810 P.2d 817, 819 (Ct.App.1991) (further detention of defendant after reason for valid stop expires is analogous to initial Terry stop). In assessing the reasonableness of an investigative detention, the courts make a two-part inquiry. First, the court ascertains whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and second, the court determines whether the investigative detention was reasonably related in scope to the reasons which prompted the stop in the first place. See Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d at 1348.
{38} The Hunnicutt court further notes: The investigative detention usually must “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,” and “[t]he scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).
Lengthening the detention. for further questioning beyond that related to the initial stop is permissible in two circumstances. First, the officer may detain the driver for questioning unrelated to the initial stop if he has an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion illegal activity has occurred or is occurring. See United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir.1993). Second, further questioning unrelated to the initial stop is permissible if the initial detention has become a consensual encounter. See [United States v.] Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d [1479,] at 1483 [ (10th Cir.1994) ].
135 F.3d at 1349.
{39} The mere fact that an individual has been detained, or even arrested, does not per se invalidate an otherwise voluntary consent to search. See State v. Blakely, 115 N.M. 466, 469, 853 P.2d 168, 171 (Ct.App.1993).
, {40} If there is a valid basis for the stop, it is permissible for the officers to ask permission to search the vehicle. See State v. Pallor, 1996-NMCA-083, ¶ 16, 122 N.M. 232, 923 P.2d 599; see also State v. Bolton, 111 N.M. 28, 42-43, 801 P.2d 98, 112-13 (Ct.App.1990). The test to determine the validity of consent is whether under the totality of the circumstances the consent was voluntary and no coercion, actual or threatened, was employed. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223-27, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Blakely, 115 N.M. at 469, 853 P.2d at 171.
{41} Under these circumstances, I am unable to agree with the majority that merely asking questions, which touch on subjects beyond the scope of the basis for the initial stop, and which do not materially lengthen the initial detention, automatically taints an individual’s subsequent consent. In such instance, the court should evaluate the validity of the consent under the totality of the circumstances. I would reverse and remand the case to the trial court for an express determination of whether Defendant’s consent was freely and voluntarily given so as to validate the basis for the search and seizure.