After falling in an unlit stairwell, James A. McCullough brought a personal injury action against his landlord, Briarcliff Summit, L. P. II, and its general partners, Edward E. Lee III, and Robert A. Crowder. McCullough appeals the summary judgment.
The underlying lawsuit arose after an extended power blackout at Briarcliff Summit Apartments (“Summit”), a high-rise HUD housing project marketed to the elderly and infirm. During the first days of October 1995, a severe storm swept through Atlanta causing some scattered power outages.
When McCullough returned to his sixth floor apartment on the evening of October 4, he discovered the complex still lacked electricity. The next morning, between 10:30 and 11:00 a.m., when McCullough left his apartment to do some volunteer work, his apartment building still lacked electricity as well as any emergency lighting due to a total failure of the apartment’s back-up generator. This failure meant that the elevators were inoperable and that the emergency *631fire alarms and emergency lighting and exit lighting were not functional. McCullough used the stairwell closest to his sixth floor apartment, the only stairwell he had ever used. While descending the unlit interior stairwell, McCullough suddenly lost his footing on the fourth floor and fell in the dark. He fractured six ribs and suffered a deep head gash.
The undisputed evidence showed that Summit’s emergency back-up generator worked very briefly, if at all, before breaking down. Lt. Kenneth Thomas, a fire inspector from the City of Atlanta Fire Department, conducted an investigation after a tenant complained about the lack of emergency power lights at Summit. Lt. Thomas confirmed that the fire alarm system was not working and that all exit lights were out. Lt. Thomas testified that he advised Summit’s management that “emergency power is required by law in this building and if emergency power could not be restored, then a ‘fire watch’ would be required.” Lt. Thomas told Summit that it would “need some means of lighting for the tenant’s [sic] egress.” Three residents including McCullough testified that they did not observe any “fire watch.” It is undisputed that Summit did not install any alternate type of lighting during the power outage period.
Finding that McCullough had equal knowledge of the defective condition and that the stairwell in question was not the only means of access to McCullough’s apartment, the trial court granted summary judgment. McCullough appeals. Held:
1. McCullough contends that material disputed factual questions precluded summary judgment.
By law, a landlord has a duty to keep its premises in repair and is liable “for damages arising from the failure to keep the premises in repair.” OCGA §§ 44-7-13, 44-7-14. A landlord must maintain the common area in a reasonably safe condition. Oliver v. Complements, Ltd., 190 Ga. App. 30, 32 (378 SE2d 154) (1989). Nor can a landlord waive or avoid any duties set by statute or by ordinances adopted pursuant to Code Section 36-61-11. OCGA § 44-7-2 (b) (1)-(3).
Generally, whether a landlord has exercised the requisite degree of ordinary care in keeping its premises in repair necessitates jury resolution. Oliver, 190 Ga. App. at 32. Here, whether Summit acted negligently after learning that its back-up generator was irreparable is controverted.1 McDonald v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, 220 Ga. App. 567-568 (469 SE2d 805) (1996). No evidence showed that Summit supplied temporary lighting to its tenants, most of whom were elderly. Without question, Summit knew that its exterior stairwell had *632windows and was not pitch black. McCullough testified that he did not share that knowledge. According to McCullough, Summit did not warn him not to use the stairs closest to his apartment and did not advise him to use its exterior stairwell. No evidence showed otherwise. Thus, whether in these circumstances, Summit breached its statutory duties as a landlord or violated local ordinances or housing codes must be resolved by a jury. See Thompson v. Crownover, 259 Ga. 126, 129 (4) (381 SE2d 283) (1989); McDonald, 220 Ga. App. at 567-568.
2. McCullough contends that a jury must determine whether he failed to exercise reasonable care for his own safety and assumed the risk of injury.
Where the dangerous area is the tenant’s only access or only safe and reasonable access to his home, the tenant’s equal knowledge of the danger does not excuse the landlord from liability for damages caused by a failure to keep the premises in repair. Carey v. Bradford, 218 Ga. App. 325, 326 (2) (461 SE2d 290) (1995). Although Summit claims that by using its unlit stairs, McCullough voluntarily thrust himself into an unsafe activity, McCullough testified that he used the only stairs he had ever used and did not know that an exterior stairwell at the far end of the hall had windows. The diagram of his floor suggests that to reach the other stairwell with which he had no familiarity, McCullough would have had to grope his way down a dark hallway past other apartments to find the stairwell door which lacked a lighted exit sign. To hold as a matter of law that McCullough cannot recover because he assumed the risk of going down the dark stairs which Summit failed to illuminate or that McCullough should have used a more distant stairwell which he had never traversed would eviscerate the landlord’s statutory duty to keep the premises in repair. Carey v. Bradford, 226 Ga. App. 360 (486 SE2d 623) (1997) (physical precedent only). This we decline to do. See Richardson v. Palmour Court Apts., 170 Ga. App. 204, 207 (316 SE2d 770) (1984). A jury must determine whether McCullough exercised reasonable care for his own safety. Hull v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 142 Ga. App. 269, 270 (235 SE2d 601) (1977); see Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 743 (1) (493 SE2d 403) (1997).
Judgment reversed.
Ruffin, J., concurs. Andrews, J., concurs specially.Although Summit claimed that its generator was well-maintained, McCullough offered evidence that Summit had carelessly located that generator in an area which sustained chronic flooding during rains.