(dissenting).
i
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the defendants had sufficient jurisdiction over the sidewalks to support plaintiffs’ cause of action. The majority concludes:
After analyzing this issue, we agree with the special panel in Williams v Redford Twp [Williams II] [210 Mich App 60; 533 NW2d 10 (1995)], which adopted the holding and reasoning of Williams v Bedford Twp [Williams 7] [207 Mich App 801; 524 NW2d 458 (1994)], and held that townships have jurisdiction over public sidewalks located along county roads within the township sufficient to support a cause of action against the township under the highway exception for failure to maintain them in reasonable repair. [Ante at 681-682.]
I dissent.
The highway exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1), provides in relevant part:
Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency. . . . The duty of the state and the county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks, or *697any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. [Emphasis added.]
Specifically, this statute imposes on governmental agencies liability for maintaining highways within their “juiisdiction[s].” A township is obviously a governmental agency, and a sidewalk can be a highway. In fact, MCL 691.1401(e); MSA 3.996(101)(e) provides a definition for the term highway.
“Highway” means every public highway, road, and street which is open for public travel and shall include bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks, and culverts on any highway. The term highway does not include alleys, trees, and utility poles. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, the question becomes whether defendants had “jurisdiction” over the sidewalks. Unfortunately, the term “jurisdiction” is not defined within the statute. Generally, when a term is not defined, its plain and ordinary meaning is applied. Consumers Power Co v Lansing Bd of Water & Light, 200 Mich App 73, 76; 503 NW2d 680 (1993). Such meaning can be found by consulting the dictionary. Nalepa v Plymouth-Canton Community School Dist, 207 Mich App 580, 586; 525 NW2d 897 (1994). An examination of the Random House Dictionary of the English Language: Second Unabridged Edition reveals that “jurisdiction” is defined as:
1. the right, power, or authority to administer justice by hearing and determining controversies. 2. power; authority; control ....
Furthermore, this Court has defined jurisdiction as “the power to act.” State Hwy Comm’r v Gulf Oil *698Corp, 377 Mich 309, 312; 140 NW2d 500 (1966). All these definitions lead to one conclusion, “jurisdiction” connotes some form of control.
The question then becomes whether defendants had sufficient control over these sidewalks to establish the requisite “jurisdiction.” Part of the answer to this query can be found by looking at the language contained in MCL 41.288a(3); MSA 9.585(4)(3).
If the board determines that the construction, repair, or maintenance of sidewalks is necessary, it may construct, repair, or maintain the sidewalks and assess the costs to the property involved, payable over a 5-year period, or permit the owners of the property involved to have the sidewalks constructed, repaired, or maintained according to township specifications at their own expenses. Sidewalks constructed, repaired, or maintained under this section on the right-of-way of state highways or county roads must have the approval of the state or county highway authority having jurisdiction over the highway or road. [Emphasis added.]
Right of way is then defined in MCL 324.82101(1); MSA 13A.82101(1) as “that portion of a highway or street less the roadway and any shoulder.” Here, the sidewalks butted up against the county roads and were contained within the right of way. Consequently, any construction, repair, or maintenance on the sidewalks performed by defendants or anyone would have to be approved by the county. “In support of this allegation, defendant submitted the affidavit of Tom Casari, the engineer for Canton Township.” Listanski v Canton Twp, 206 Mich App 356, 358; 523 NW2d 229 (1994). Casari stated:
Canton Township may not construct, repair or maintain any sidewalk within its geographical boundaries without *699first obtaining a permit from the Wayne County Office of Public Services, if along a county road, or from the Michigan Department of Transportation, if along a state highway.
It is this blanket of authority vested in the county that demonstrates that the county, and not the townships, has control and jurisdiction over the sidewalks.
In order to support this conclusion, I look to a recent Court of Appeals case, Markillie v Livingston Co Rd Comm’rs, 210 Mich App 16; 532 NW2d 878 (1995). In Markillie, an automobile accident occurred at the intersection of Latson Road (a county road) and M-59 (a state highway).1 The plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint against the county, claiming negligence in the design, construction, inspection, and maintenance of the intersection. The Court of Appeals found for the defendant because it did not have any control over this intersection. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court of Appeals examined the highway exception to governmental immunity and noted that the term “jurisdiction” connoted some form of control.
In light of the above definitions, we believe that the trial court properly equated “jurisdiction” with “control.” This definition is consistent with the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the highway exception to governmental immunity. The Legislature’s goal was to keep public highways “reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.” MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1). That objective will be served by limiting liability for a defective highway to the entity with the authority to construct, maintain, and repair it. We therefore hold that the word “jurisdiction” in MCL *700691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1) is synonymous with “control.” [Id. at 21-22.]
The county, however, did not possess this type of control because it had to go to the Department of Transportation for approval to pave Latson Road. Specifically, the defendant had to obtain a permit before it could begin the construction.
In order to perform construction on the intersection in the course of paving Latson Road, defendant had to obtain a permit from the MDOT. Defendant submitted its work plans for the MDOt’s approval. In 1992 (after the accident involving Carrie Anne Markillie), the MDOT rebuilt the intersection of M-59 and Latson Road without seeking the permission of any other entity. . . . Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition. [Id. at 22.]
In the present case, a similar situation is presented. Like the defendant in Markillie, defendants in the instant matter were required to seek the approval of a higher authority before beginning construction or modification on any of the sidewalks involved in the injuries. Consequently, they likewise did not possess the requisite level of control over the sidewalks to establish their jurisdiction.2
Plaintiffs, however, argue that this Court should instead look to an older Court of Appeals case. In Jones v Ypsilanti, 26 Mich App 574; 182 NW2d 795 (1970), the plaintiff was injured when she tripped on an allegedly defective sidewalk that adjoined Michi*701gan Avenue, a state trunkline highway, in the City of Ypsilanti. The Court of Appeals found that the defendant was indeed responsible for the maintenance of the sidewalk and, as a result, was liable to the plaintiff.
Defendant City of Ypsilanti on November 22, 1966, was responsible for the maintenance of the sidewalk in question and liable to plaintiff for the negligent failure to maintain sidewalk. [Id. at 581.]
The facts of that case are similar to those presented in the instant case. However, I believe that the Court in Jones came to the wrong conclusion. Merely having the duty to maintain a sidewalk does not necessarily establish the requisite level of “jurisdiction.” As a result, I would overrule Jones.
n
The majority reaches the wrong conclusion by finding that defendants had sufficient jurisdiction over these sidewalks. In my opinion, this jurisdiction cannot be established because defendants simply did not have the requisite level of control. Without such control, the defendants did not have jurisdiction. Thus, they cannot be held liable under the highway exception to governmental immunity.
I would remand these cases to the trial courts for entering or reinstating the proper orders of summary disposition.
On August 16, 1990, a seventeen-year-old girl was traveling north on Latson Road when she ran a stop sign at its intersection with M-59 and her car was struck. The impact was so severe that the girl was killed.
The townships may have the burden of maintaining the sidewalks, but the county in Markillie paved the intersection and still did not have control. Merely fixing the sidewalk or performing the work does not necessarily demonstrate control.