dissenting.
The apparent philosophy behind the position taken by the majority opinion will constitute a severe limitation on law enforcement in Georgia. The actual decision restricts the use of the roadblock—a very valuable police tool in protecting the members of the public upon the highways of this state. But the underlying approach is even more far-reaching, and foreshadows the intention of this court to sit as a trial court when as many as five of our nine judges hold notions about law enforcement techniques which conflict with the lawful procedures of properly constituted law enforcement officers. This conclusion follows from the fact that the majority opinion, completely rejecting the authorized findings of the trial judge, has openly and avowedly passed upon the *237credibility of witnesses appearing at trial, and, entirely usurping the fact-finding function, has held that the police lied in their testimony on the purposes of the roadblock. This new principle of appellate fact-finding is in conflict with a host of decisions from both appellate courts. For example, "By the express terms of the Constitution of Georgia, the Supreme Court [and Court of Appeals] is a court for the correction of errors of law only. Art. 6, sec. 2, par. 5 (Code § 2-3005)[now Code Ann. § 2-3704]. We can not undertake to correct errors of fact. We are prohibited from so doing, and can only decide law questions. But no such limitation is placed on the judges of the superior court. . . Ours is the function merely to see that the law is followed. Theirs is the solemn responsibility to see to it that justice is administered according to the evidence as well as the law.” Mills v. State, 188 Ga. 616, 623 (4 SE2d 453).
The credibility of a witness is for the jury or the trial judge sitting without a jury. Code § 38-1805; Gwin v. Morgan, 225 Ga. 192 (1) (167 SE2d 393). The "credibility of the witnesses is for his [trial judge] determination.” Simmons v. State, 111 Ga. App. 553, 554 (142 SE2d 308). The trial judge has this right "to credit that evidence which commended itself to his judgment” and his judgment "is not subject to review by this court.” Goggans v. State, 14 Ga. App. 822 (82 SE 357). His judgment "should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support it.” Munn v. Kelliam, 228 Ga. 395, 398 (185 SE2d 763); Lester Colodny Const. Co. v. Allen, 129 Ga. App. 545 (199 SE2d 917). "Reviewing courts whose sole province is to correct errors of law should not enter the forum of facts...” Hunt v. State, 8 Ga. App. 374, 377 (69 SE 42).
1. The facts.—A rock festival was held on Jekyll Island during March, 1973, and during two days of heavy traffic into the festival area a conglomerate group of city and county law enforcement personnel conducted a roadblock so positioned on a four-lane highway that only traffic into Jekyll Island would be affected. The officials designated the roadblock as a check for drivers’ licenses, inspection stickers, car registrations and runaways.
Some 1,500 cars passed through this roadblock, *238including the 1971 VW van owned and driven by Michael Swift, appellant here. An officer later testified that while Swift was stopped and his papers were checked, he [the officer] had walked around Swift’s car, had seen green vegetation on the floormat, and identified it as marijuana. Officers then searched the car and in the glove compartment found a bag of marijuana. Swift was arrested and charged with marijuana possession.
At the hearing on his subsequent motion to suppress the marijuana Swift denied that the officer had seen any vegetation on the floormat, and said that entirely without permission two officers had opened his car and searched it after asking him to pull over and get out. Swift attacked the roadblock on grounds it was a mere ruse or subterfuge used to justify a general search of automobiles headed for the rock festival, and that there was no probable cause to search his car.
His motion to suppress was denied, and he appealed with a certificate.
2. The roadblock.—It has been uniformly held that a roadblock to check drivers’ licenses, inspection stickers, car registrations and driver intoxication does not amount to arrest or search and seizure when not done as a subterfuge. 7 AmJur2d 668, Automobiles, § 98 (1963). Cf. Anderson v. State, 123 Ga. App. 57 (179 SE2d 286). See generally, Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 Yale L. J. 1161, 1167. "The State can practice preventative therapy by reasonable road checks to ascertain whether man and machine meet the legislative determination of fitness. That this requires a momentary stopping of the traveling citizen is not fatal. Nor is it because the inspection may produce the irrefutable proof that the law has just been violated. The purpose of the check is to determine the present, not the past: is the car, is the driver now fit for further driving? In the accommodation of society’s needs to the basic right of citizens to be free from disruption of unrestricted travel by police officers stopping cars in the hopes of uncovering the evidence of nontraffic crimes,... the stopping for road checks is reasonable and therefore acceptable. Likewise, an arrest is proper if the check reveals a current violation which by its nature must have been taking place in the *239immediate past. State and Federal Courts, including this one, have uniformly sustained such checks and arrests when not done as a subterfuge or ruse.” Myricks v. United States, 370 F2d 901, 904 (5th Cir.).
It should be noted that one of the gravest problems before the public is the carnage upon the public highways of our state. In facing up to this responsibility, the judicial branch of government should not impair any reasonable means that are taken by the legislative and executive branches of government to insure that motor vehicles are properly licensed and inspected and that drivers are properly licensed and are not operating under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The remedy against extralegal police activity is to satisfy the reasonable demands of the police and the prosecutors for the interrogation of suspected persons.
Swift contends that a finding is demanded that the roadblock was a subterfuge used to conduct general searches because (1) the roster of personnel manning the roadblock including the City Police and the Chief of Police, the Glynn County Drug Abuse Squad, and Assistant District Attorney, an officer of the Naval Intelligence Service, the County Police, and a dog trained to sniff marijuana; and (2) that the officer who stopped him was a member of the Glynn County Drug Abuse Squad. However, when all the facts are viewed in their totality, it cannot be said that they did not authorize the trial court to find that a legal roadblock was in existence.
The record shows that during the two days in which the roadblock existed approximately 1,500 cars passed through the roadblock, traffic violations were charged against various drivers, but only 40 to 50 of these cars were subjected to interior searches, resulting in some 65 drug arrests. This fact alone rebuts the contention that the roadblock was for the purpose of making a general exploratory search for drugs. There is testimony that the officers at the roadblock were checking cars for violations, inspection stickers and for named runaways the officers had on a list compiled from calls by parents who believed their children might be going to the rock festival. While this defendant was stopped at the roadblock by an officer of the Glynn County Drug Abuse *240Squad, there is testimony that the officer asked to see his driver’s license, the officer examined the license, checked the window for the inspection sticker and walked around the car. The officer testified that during the visual check of the car from outside the vehicle he saw traces of green vegetation on the floor of the car that appeared to him to be marijuana. He testified to facts ample to show his ability and experience in differentiating marijuana from other substances. He then searched the car and found a bag of marijuana in the glove compartment. The dog trained to detect marijuana was present at the roadblock but was not used in reference to this defendant. An officer testified that as some cars approached the roadblock occupants threw marijuana out of the windows, and the dog was used to locate it beside the road.
"Where there is a conflict in the evidence on the motion to suppress, the ruling of the trial court will be upheld where there is any evidence to authorize a finding in support of his order.” Brisendine v. State, 130 Ga. App. 249 (203 SE2d 308); Williams v. State, 119 Ga. App. 557 (167 SE2d 756); 22A CJS 645, Criminal Law, § 657(34) (1961). See Raines v. State, 123 Ga. App. 794 (182 SE2d 491); Harris v. State, 120 Ga. App. 359 (170 SE2d 743).
In my opinion there was evidence authorizing the trial court to find that the roadblock was not a subterfuge to conduct general searches.
3. Plain view.—Under the "plain view” doctrine, evidence discovered by mere observation of things in plain view of the officer does not constitute a search. Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 42 (84 SC 1623, 10 LE2d 726); Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234, 235 (88 SC 992,19 LE2d 1067). These decisions point out that in order for the doctrine to apply, the observer must have the right to be in the position to have that view and the seizure without a warrant must be based upon "exigent circumstances” justifying the failure to obtain a warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (91 SC 2022, 29 LE2d 564). While a plurality of the Supreme Court has said that the discovery must be "inadvertent,” id., there is no definitive holding on this point.
Because the roadblock here is a valid exercise of police power, testimony by the officer that he was *241checking the car at the roadblock from outside the vehicle when he saw traces of green vegetation on the floor of the car that appeared to him to be marijuana, would support a finding that he had the right to be in the position to have that view. The discovery of the contraband in the car plus a large number of vehicles lined up at the roadblock are exigent circumstances justifying the failure to obtain a warrant. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (45 SC 280, 69 LE 543, 39 ALR 790). See Harris v. United States, supra.
In ruling on the motion to suppress, the "burden of showing that probable cause exists is on the State.” Veasey v. State, 113 Ga. App. 187, 189 (147 SE2d 515). But, "While the prosecution must bear the burden of persuasion with regard to probable cause for a warrantless search, the government need not establish probable cause beyond a reasonable doubt... Nor must a finding of probable cause rest upon evidence which is legally competent in a criminal trial.” United States v. Rodgers, 442 F2d 902, 903 (5th Cir.).
In my opinion the trial court did not err in overruling the motion to suppress.
4. Conclusion.—Because in my opinion there was ample evidence to authorize the trial judge’s finding that the roadblock was designed for the lawful purpose of checking licenses, registrations, etc., I do not have to reach the question whether a roadblock near a rock festival, even if admittedly conducted for the purpose of investigating whether the drivers of automobiles were fit to drive or were under the influence of drugs, is a valid roadblock. However, I feel constrained to note my view that a law enforcement check on the fitness of the driver is at least as important as a check on the fitness of the automobile. It is important to remember that no one has a right—constitutional or otherwise—to drive a car under all circumstancés. There are requirements of fitness, both of automobile and driver, to be met as a condition precedent to that privilege. And yet, again without authority and without discussing its own underlying premise to this effect, the majority easily holds that the mere fact that the officers here were equipped to detect drug violation is reason enough to rule the *242entire roadblock illegal.
I reiterate that it is not necessary here to reach the question of the validity of a roadblock established to detect drugged drivers. But I fault the majority opinion for its casual equation of a search-for-drugged-drivers with the prohibited "general search,” because in my view, the two are entirely and without question different.
I would affirm.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Eberhardt and Judge Stolz concur in this dissent.