dissenting.
In the court’s judgment it is recited: "The matter was heard at chambers in Americus, Georgia, on the 28th day of December, 1972, and after having heard evidence from all interested parties,” the court finds that "it will be to the best interest and welfare of the petitioner to change her name, as prayed,” and entered an order doing so.
In the stipulation of fact "entered into for the purposes of appeal,” it is recited that "Both matters [the applications of each of the two children] came on for hearing at chambers in Americus, Georgia, on December *39328, 1972 and after hearing evidence the court on March 29, 1973,” entered the orders or judgments appealed from. Here all parties agree that evidence was heard, but the stipulation fails to reveal what the evidence was.
No transcript of the evidence heard at the hearing on December 28, 1972, on which the judgments were made, is brought up in either case. The stipulation "for purposes of appeal” does not recite or purport to include or to amount to a brief of the evidence heard on that date.
A stipulation is, of course, binding upon the parties as to the matters included in it. But even if it had been made prior to the hearing it would not proscribe or prevent the introduction of other or additional evidence at the hearing so long as the evidence did not conflict with the stipulation, e.g., as to matters not stipulated. Obviously where fact A is stipulated it does not prevent presentation of fact B which is a different fact and as to some additional issue. If we had a transcript of the evidence heard by the trial judge the stipulation would not prevent our considering it for determining whether there was evidence showing it to be in the best interest of the children to have their names changed, though that does not appear from the stipulation, nor could the stipulation subsequently made change the evidence upon which the court relied in entering the judgment.
Upon failure of the appellant to bring up any evidence showing to the contrary we must conclude that the finding of the court that it was in the best interest of the children to change their names was correct. Allen v. Smith, 223 Ga. 265, 266 (154 SE2d 605). "[Enumerations of error relating to judgments rendered after hearings where evidence was presented (each judgment so stating) and no transcript of such evidence having been included in the record before this court, under the decisions in Brown v. State, 223 Ga. 540 (156 SE2d 454); and Reid v. Wilkerson, 223 Ga. 751 [158 SE2d 241], the judgments complained of must be affirmed.” Smith v. Smith, 223 Ga. 795 (2) (158 SE2d 679). Accord: Delta Corp v. Aiken, 224 Ga. 241 (161 SE2d 293); Avery v. Avery, 224 Ga. 516 (162 SE2d 718); Jones v. Jones, 224 Ga. 571 (163 SE2d 692); Terry v. Warner Robins Supply Co., 225 Ga. 5 (2) (165 SE2d 731); Chipley v. Beeler, 225 *394Ga. 7 (165 SE2d 732); Lankford v. Lankford, 225 Ga. 147 (166 SE2d 354); Shaw v. Jones, 226 Ga. 291 (1) (174 SE2d 444); Stark v. Haney, 227 Ga. 104 (179 SE2d 67). The rule applies where no transcript of the evidence is sent up and "reo stipulation showing the facts necessary for rulings by this court has been entered into and filed.” O’Gorman v. O’Gorman, 227 Ga. 468 (181 SE2d 490).
While there is a stipulation here, it does not include the facts necessary for a ruling on the issue of whether the change of name is in the best interest of the children. "[W]e must presume, from failure of appellant to bring any of these for our consideration, that there was evidence before the judge of a nature ample to support his finding and judgment.” Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Gause, 116 Ga. App. 216, 225 (156 SE2d 476). The burden is on the party alleging error to show it, and this he must do by the record. In the absence of any showing in the record to the contrary, it must be assumed that order and judgment of the trial judge were correct. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 225 Ga. 455, 456 (169 SE2d 314).
The stipulation shows that the parties agree that there have been no violations of an agreement of the parents of these children which was incorporated into the divorce decree. But even if it be contended that the mother has done so by some vicarious encouragement of this proceeding, this record fails to show that she has done that, and furthermore she is not a party to this proceeding, nor were the children parties to the agreement.
While the idea of changing the names of the children may be repugnant to many people—perhaps even to judges on this court—yet, this consideration cannot afford us a basis for failing to follow the well-established principles of law which are controlling.
I would affirm.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Bell and Judge Clark join in this dissent.