(concurring). There is no serious argument that the decision of this Court in Chambers v General Motors Corp, a companion case to Franks v White Pine Copper Div,1 incorrectly interpreted the intent of the Legislature. In indicating that I would grant the motion for reconsideration, which was supported by, among others, former Governor William Milliken, I observed that, given the “harsh and unforeseen consequences” of the decision, inclinations to support the finality of litigation should yield to the question whether we had correctly determined the intent of the Legislature, 424 Mich 1202 (1985). Because we would compound the error committed by the denial of reconsideration and further penalize employees who pursued their rights, it would be unconscionable not to recognize a public-policy exception to res judicata in these circumstances.
The crucial issue in this case is whether the doctrine of res judicata as construed in Michigan applies to bar plaintiff from again litigating whether his worker’s compensation award should be subjected to coordination with other sources. The doctrine of res judicata
applies not only to issues of fact and law which were actually litigated and decided, but also to any issue which might *98have been litigated at that time. . . . Therefore, if during the adjudication of a dispute a pertinent issue of law or fact is raised and decided, or properly should have been raised, res judicata will bar the relitigation of that issue in a subsequent action. [Pike v City of Wyoming, 431 Mich 589, 612-613; 433 NW2d 768 (1988) (Boyle, J., dissenting).]
In other words, under the doctrine of res judicata, claims that were or could have been reduced to final judgment are barred from being brought a second time.
All members of the Court have recognized that res judicata is a judicially created doctrine. Riley v Northland Geriatric Center (After Remand), 431 Mich 632; 433 NW2d 787 (1988). In Pike, a majority of this Court held that the doctrine of res judicata, while applicable in worker’s compensation proceedings, is not always a bar to modifications of worker’s compensation awards where there has been a subsequent change in the law. 431 Mich 598-599 (opinion of Griffin, J.); 431 Mich 608 (Brickley, J., concurring).2 In my dissent in Pike, I advocated a stricter application of res judicata to worker’s compensation proceedings and contended the doctrine applied both to rulings regarding eligibility and to rulings regarding the amount of benefits. 431 Mich 620. I also acknowledged, however, that, in some cases, “[t]here may be matters of public policy so extraordinary as to justify a departure from res judicata principles.” 431 Mich *99630. In my view, this is an extraordinary circumstance.
1 Restatement Judgments, 2d, recognizes an exception to the general rule of claim preclusion in § 26(l)(d), p 234, when “[t]he judgment in the first action was plainly inconsistent with the fair and equitable implementation of a statutory or constitutional scheme . . . .’’In such a situation, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to extinguish the claim. Comment e to § 26, p 239, states that res judicata should not be applied where it would be inequitable to do so,
especially when there is a change of law after the initial decision. When such inequities involve important ongoing social or political relationships, a second action should be allowed even if the claim set forth is not viewed as different from that presented in the initial proceeding.
A rigid interpretation of res judicata would perpetuate the harsh consequences this Court declined to revisit in Chambers and hinder implementation of the Legislature’s intent.
Given the importance of the principle that litigation should come to an end, exceptions should be employed sparingly. However, as Professor Moore has observed:
A good case can be made for the proposition that frank recognition of some limited power to temper rules along equitable lines results in their more faithful application. Justice is like a balloon full of water; squeeze it at one point and it bulges at another. [IB Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed), ¶ 0.405(12), p 111-77.]
Although I agree with the lead opinion to the extent that there are diminished reliance interests in worker’s compensation determinations, ante at 90-91 *100(Levin, J.), I would not “squeeze the balloon” to conclude that a worker’s compensation award is not a final judgment per se. Id. at 91-92. Such a construction would encourage separation of powers confrontations and invite a future Legislature to reopen final and unappealed determinations. Rather, I would frankly acknowledge that this Court has the authority to remedy the inequitable results in this case by declining to enforce the judge-made rule of res judicata under these extraordinary circumstances.
On the merits of plaintiff’s renewed claim, I agree with Justice Levin’s lead opinion that separation of powers is not violated by this result. The Legislature may not constitutionally command this Court to reopen judgments, Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 US 211; 115 S Ct 1447; 131 L Ed 2d 328 (1995), and it has not done so. It is a different question whether the judiciary has that authority in extraordinary circumstances, id. at 236.3 I agree with Justice Cavanagh that the equities in this case compel awarding uncoordinated benefits.
Mallett, J., concurred with Boyle, J.422 Mich 636; 375 NW2d 715 (1985).
Both the lead opinion and the concurring opinion in Pike intimated that when there is a change in the law through a statutory amendment, res judicata principles are set aside, and this Court’s task is to effect the intent of the Legislature. 431 Mich 596 (opinion of Griffin, J.); 431 Mich 607, n 5 (Brickley, J., concurring). The language of 1987 PA 28 unequivocally indicates that the Legislature intended not to coordinate the benefits of persons who, like plaintiff, were injured before March 31, 1982.
As the Court noted in Plaut, FR Civ P 60(b), and the tradition it embodies, would be relevant refutation of a claim that reopening a first judgment is always a denial of property without due process. Plaut at 236. Moreover, as the dissent fails to note, defendant does not contend that due process precludes the relief sought.