(dissenting in part):
¶ 17 I concur in Part I of the court’s opinion but, because I believe the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff only the salvage value of the equipment, I must dissent from Part II.
¶ 18 In its commendably detailed. findings, the trial court, relying on the testimony offered by plaintiffs expert, accepted the expert’s opinion that there were two ways to value the equipment defendants tortiously took from plaintiff: first, the equipment could be given an in-place value and, second, the equipment could be valued as if it had been removed from the restaurant. The court expressly found a value for the equip*450ment measured each way, and each sum as found by the court has adequate evidentiary basis in the record. Thus, which measure should actually be used in this case is essentially a legal question, not a factual one on which we owe the trial court a high degree of deference. See generally State v. Peng, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) (“Legal determinations ... are essentially [determinations] of rules or principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar circumstances.”).
¶ 19 I believe the trial court erred in selecting the lower “salvage” value — as though the equipment had been removed— because in fact it remained in place at the restaurant. Presumptively, the measure corresponding to reality is the one that should be used. As we have previously noted, “the desired objective of damages is ‘to evaluate any loss suffered by the most direct, practical and accurate method that can be employed.’ ”1 Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (quoting Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 22 Utah 2d 49, 448 P.2d 709, 711 (1968)).
¶ 20 Using reality as the frame of reference is especially appropriate in this case because the very reason the equipment remained in the restaurant is because defendants wrongfully barred plaintiff from removing it. See Jenkins v. Equipment Ctr., Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Utah Ct.App.) (“‘[R]ules relating to the measure of damages are flexible, and “can be modified in the interest of fairness.” ’ ”) (emphasis added; citations omitted), cert. denied, 879 P.2d 266 (Utah 1994). While the majority is concerned that plaintiff not reap a windfall by being awarded the in-place value of the property, our concern instead should be to make sure the tortfeasor does not benefit from his wrongful conduct. See generally Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1291 (Utah 1993) (noting “the law allows a plaintiff to maximize recovery and thus prevent a converter from profiting from wrongful acts”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 926, at 538 (1979)(“an intentional converter should not have the prospect of profiting from his wrong”); Restatement of Restitution § 151 cmt. f (1937) (“A person who tortiously has acquired, retained or disposed of another’s property with knowledge that such conduct is wrongful is entitled to no profits therefrom.”); Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 5.15, at 414 (1973) (“[T]o prevent [unjust enrichment of the converter], the law allows the plaintiff to recover not merely compensation for his loss, but all of the defendant’s gain as well.”).
¶21 In essence, because defendants are responsible for plaintiffs equipment remaining at the restaurant, they simply should not be heard to contend that any value, other than the in-place value, is the value that matters in this case. Accordingly, I would increase the judgment to reflect the actual value of the equipment converted by defendants.
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¶ 22 Another aspect of this case, not touched upon in the main opinion, troubles me. The equipment owned by plaintiff was transferred, as the main opinion says, to Curtis Loosli, and ultimately was returned to plaintiff. What the main opinion does not say is that, in the meanwhile, plaintiff filed for and received a discharge in bankruptcy. The upshot of the transfer to and from Loosli seems to be that plaintiffs general creditors were deprived of an asset that should have been available to satisfy their claims, namely, the value of the equipment insofar as it exceeded the amount of the secured creditor’s interest therein.
¶ 23 Perhaps my concern is not well-founded because all of this was duly disclosed on the debtor’s schedules and statements and *451was approved by the bankruptcy court, or in some way was properly beyond the purview of the bankruptcy court. But, on the surface, it is troubling enough that I will forward a copy of the decisions in this case to the clerk of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, with the request that copies be forwarded to the judge who presided over plaintiffs bankruptcy case, plaintiffs bankruptcy counsel, and plaintiffs bankruptcy trustee. Whatever the amount of plaintiffs judgment in this case, if it properly belongs to his creditors rather than to him, I believe we would be remiss if we did not take steps to alert those with some responsibility over the matter so that any appropriate action can be taken. .
. Because defendants converted the property in place — not after it had been removed from the restaurant — and benefited from the in-place value when they entered into a new lease, the actual value of the property converted was the in-place value. See Jenkins v. Equipment Ctr., Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Utah Ct.App.) (noting that damages for conversion should provide the injured " 'party full compensation for actual losses’ ”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 879 P.2d 266 (Utah 1994). See also W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 15, at 89-90 (5th ed.l984)(stating that measure of damages for conversion has historically been "full value of the chattel at the time and place of conversion").