Defendant, Dean Nilles, appeals the circuit court’s denial of a writ of error coram nobis. We affirm.
In 1980, at the age of 14, defendant committed petty theft and burglary. These offenses resulted in a CHIN adjudication and defendant’s placement in McCrossan’s Boy’s Ranch. In December, 1980, defendant made several runaways from McCros-san’s. These runaways were marked by theft, burglary, and check forgery.
Defendant made several runaways in March, 1981, and in that same month, at the age of 15, defendant was adjudicated delinquent for burglary in the second degree. In May, 1981, while a runaway from McCrossan’s, defendant committed grand theft auto, and he was again adjudged a delinquent child.
Defendant was placed with the Youth Forestry Camp in June, 1981. He was a runaway several times and was terminated there following charges of grand theft. Thereafter, defendant was committed to the South Dakota State Training School in October, 1981.
In March 1983, defendant was charged with grand theft. At that time, defendant was still a minor as defined by South Dakota law. The State, however, moved to transfer the proceedings to adult court for criminal prosecution. The circuit court granted the State’s motion to transfer on April 1, 1983, stating:
The above entitled matter having duly come on for hearing on the 18th day of March 1983.... and the court having made inquiry into the matter, testimony having been received, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby
ORDERED that the aforesaid alleged delinquent, Dean Nilles, be and hereby is •transferred to adult court_
Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with the State and was sentenced to two years in the South Dakota State Penitentiary.
Defendant petitioned the circuit court for a writ of error coram nobis on March 28, 1986, noting the order transferring his juvenile case to adult court does not contain findings of fact as required by SDCL 26-11-4. Consequently, he claims the transfer order was not a valid transfer to circuit court and as a result the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over him when it accepted his guilty plea. Defendant further claims since no official transcript of a transfer hearing can be found there is no recitation by the court for the reasons for the transfer. We have held a recitation in ,the transcript is sufficient. Interest of D.M.L., 254 N.W.2d 457 (S.D.1977).
Judge Connelly presided over defendant’s hearing for a writ of coram nobis. He found all evidence showed the court conducted a transfer hearing. We agree.
Testimony at the writ hearing shows Judge Tapken, presiding judge in the original proceedings, and Steve Pier (Pier), defendant’s court-appointed defense counsel, both made notes of a transfer hearing. Pier, as well as Dave Bergendahl, the court reporter, Doug Kettering, the prosecuting attorney, and Guy McNeeley, the court services worker, all testified they remembered a transfer hearing was held on March 18, 1983. In addition, the juvenile court file contains Pier’s voucher for compensation, which shows Pier spent one-half hour at a transfer hearing on March 18, 1983. As previously noted, the language in Judge Tapken’s transfer order stated a transfer hearing was held.
Although the transcript of the transfer hearing may have been misplaced or inadvertently destroyed, Pier testified that Judge Tapken stated his reasons for the transfer. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of Judge Tapken’s grounds for transferring the case. Instead, the issue is whether the Court had jurisdiction to try him as an adult since findings of fact were not set forth in the transfer order as directed in SDCL 26-11-4, or recited in the transcript.
Judge Connelly held the filing of a valid and sufficient information in adult court conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the circuit court, and by appearing for the purpose of arraignment on the information and *118by failing to move for dismissal of the information under SDCL 23A-8-2, defendant submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the circuit court and waived any jurisdictional defect in connection with the transfer order. The court further held the purpose of requiring findings of fact in a transfer order is not to confer jurisdiction but is to delineate the reasons for transfer with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful judicial review, and by pleading guilty to the crime charged, defendant waived any nonjurisdictional defect in the transfer order. We agree.
Under SDCL 26-11-4, if a circuit court finds that a child should be held for criminal proceedings, the court shall enter an order certifying to that effect, and the order “shall contain findings of fact upon which the court’s decision is based.” The purpose for these findings of fact is to allow this court meaningful review of the merits of the transfer. People In Interest of D.M.L., 254 N.W.2d 457 (S.D.1977); People In Interest of L.V.A., 248 N.W.2d 864 (S.D.1976). Courts can meet this purpose by reciting on the record the reasons for transfer. See Interest of D.M.L., supra.
We hold these findings of fact are not a prerequisite necessary to confer jurisdiction in the adult court. Any error connected with the omission of formal findings as to the reasons for transfer, whether they are missing from the order itself or anywhere else in the record, is nonjurisdic-tional. By pleading guilty, defendant waived all nonjurisdictional defects in the prior proceedings against him. State v. Grosh, 387 N.W.2d 503 (S.D.1986); State v. Culton, 273 N.W.2d 200 (S.D.1979).
Coram nobis will rarely be recognized as an appropriate remedy, except where its application is necessary to remedy a profound injustice. Petition of Brockmueller, 374 N.W.2d 135 (S.D.1985). We find no jurisdictional defect in this case, and no profound injustice warranting the issuance of coram nobis. We affirm.
MORGAN and MILLER, JJ., concur. HENDERSON, J., specially concurs. SABERS, J., concurs in result.