dissenting.
The “substantial right” test for appealability of interlocutory orders is more easily stated than applied. See Blackwelder v. Dept. of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d 777 (1983). It is usually necessary to resolve the question of whether an appeal is premature in each case by considering the particular facts of that case and the procedural context in which the order from which appeal is sought was entered. Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 293 S.E.2d 405 (1982).
Under the peculiar circumstances presented in this case, I am not convinced that the trial court’s disqualification of co-counsel Hogan was a decision which would tend to be particularly injurious to plaintiff if not heard on appeal before final judgment. From the beginning, plaintiff has been represented by three North Carolina attorneys whom the trial court found to.be fully competent to try her case. In his order dated 5 April 1989, Judge Manning found that plaintiff’s North Carolina counsel were “competent, capable lawyers well able to proceed to trial in complicated litigation of this type without Hogan. This finding is based on the Court’s personal observation of plaintiff’s North Carolina counsel.” Plaintiff’s local counsel encouraged plaintiff to retain Hogan, a member *729of the Alabama bar, as additional counsel to be admitted pro hac vice. This change of strategy did not take place until more than two years after the filing of plaintiff’s complaint.
The United States Supreme Court and a number of state courts of last resort have held that orders disqualifying counsel are not immediately appealable as a matter of right. The United States Supreme Court has addressed the appealability of orders granting disqualification on at least two separate occasions. In Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263-64, 79 L. Ed. 2d 288, 291 (1984), the Court held that orders granting disqualification of criminal defense counsel were not immediately appealable since meaningful appellate review would be available after final judgment. In Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-41, 86 L. Ed. 2d 340, 346-53 (1985), the Court held that orders granting disqualification in civil proceedings are likewise not immediately appealable.
In Richardson-Merrell, the Court noted, first, that “[w]hen an appellate court accepts jurisdiction of an order disqualifying counsel, the practical effect is to delay proceedings on the merits until the appeal is decided.” Id. at 434, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 348. Second, the Court noted that to the extent motions to disqualify are interposed for otherwise improper purposes, it is the trial court which has the “primary responsibility to police the prejudgment tactics of litigants ...[;] the district judge can better exercise that responsibility if the appellate courts do not repeatedly intervene to second-guess prejudgment rulings.” Id. at 436, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 350.
Numerous state courts have applied the same rule that orders granting disqualification are not immediately appealable. See, e.g., Burger and Burger v. Murren, 202 Conn. 660, 522 A.2d 812 (1987) (overruling State v. Rapuano, 192 Conn. 228, 471 A.2d 240 (1984)); Jenkins v. U.S., 548 A.2d 102 (D.C. App. 1988); Chuck v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 61 Haw. 552, 606 P.2d 1320 (1980); National Wrecking v. Midwest Terminal, 164 Ill. App. 3d 621, 518 N.E.2d 193 (1987); Harris v. Harris, 310 Md. 310, 529 A.2d 356 (1987); Maddocks v. Ricker, 403 Mass. 592, 531 N.E.2d 583 (1988).
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court and these other state appellate courts are not dispositive of the issue before this Court, and I would not favor such a rule to be applied to a party’s primary counsel, whether counsel be regularly admitted in North Carolina or admitted pro hac vice. I would, however, apply the rule to disqualification of secondary pro hac vice counsel.
*730I do not take issue with the majority’s statement of the general principle that a party has a fundamental right to her counsel of choice. I would not hesitate for a moment to join in the result reached by the majority if it were the plaintiff’s primary North Carolina counsel who had been disqualified. Here, however, plaintiff has three competent primary North Carolina counsel continuing to represent her. It is only a secondary, out-of-state co-counsel, who was admitted pro hac vice and who joined the case two years after it was filed, who has been disqualified. Plaintiff does not have an unqualified right to additional out-of-state counsel admitted pro hac vice. Parties do not have a right to be represented in the courts of North Carolina by counsel who are not duly licensed to practice in this state. Although North Carolina law permits attorneys from other states to be admitted on a limited basis to practice in the courts of this state under the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 84-4.1, it is viewed as a privilege which is afforded to litigants and is one which, by statute, is subject to summary revocation within the discretion of the trial court. The purpose of this statute is to afford the courts a means to control out-of-state counsel and to assure compliance with the obligations and responsibilities of attorneys practicing in the courts of this state. Specifically, N.C.G.S. § 84-4.2 provides in part as follows:
Permission granted under the preceding section [allowing pro hac vice admission] may be summarily revoked by the General Court of Justice ... on its own motion and in its discretion.
N.C.G.S. § 84-4.2 (1985).
I note that the Ohio Supreme Court has granted review of the decision by the Court of Appeals of Wood County which vacated the permanent injunction granted by the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio in AMC’s favor against Rahn Huffstutler, the former AMC engineer (also an attorney) who sought to utilize the protected documents he had acquired upon departing AMC in his capacity as an expert witness for plaintiff. Hogan met with Huffstutler on numerous occasions to discuss these documents and to determine the most effective way of utilizing Huffstutler’s testimony at this and other pending trials involving AMC Jeeps across the country.
I also note that AMC has obtained orders of disqualification in each of the Jeep cases in both state and federal courts in which Hogan was involved. See Order in Matthews v. Jeep Eagle Corp., *731No. 88-6120-CA-01 (Cir. Ct. Fla. Oct. 30, 1989); Order in Hull v. Jeep Eagle Corp., No. 3:89-161-16 (D.S.C. Sept. 13, 1989); Order in Perry v. Jeep Eagle Corp., No. IP 88-685-C (S.D. Ind. Aug. 24, 1989, amended Sept. 7, 1989) (copies before the trial court and before this Court); see also Jacobs v. American Motors Corp., No. 89-0518-CV-W-5 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 20, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allfeds library, 1989 WL 200920).
The trial judge here disqualified Hogan as counsel in this case because his participation obviously posed a serious threat that the proceedings would be tainted by the misuse of privileged and confidential information. Judge Manning conducted a series of extensive hearings in which he examined the elements for disqualification and probed in detail Hogan’s contacts with Huffstutler. It is obvious from the record before this Court that after a series of hearings on the matter of disqualifying Hogan, Judge Manning was uncertain that all of Hogan’s contacts with Huffstutler had been disclosed to the court. In the exercise of an abundance of caution, Judge Manning denied defendants’ disqualification motion on 5 April 1989 but only conditionally, upon the express condition that Hogan file an affidavit verifying that his contacts with Huffstutler were limited to those admitted by him in open court and which occurred prior to 1 October 1988. The reason the October 1988 date was chosen as the closing date of the record for the purposes of the disqualification hearing is not apparent to me from the record. It may have been chosen because it was the approximate date plaintiff withdrew Huffstutler as a possible expert witness in the cáse. Judge Manning ruled that Huffstutler was privy to confidential information and that defendants had not proved that information had passed to plaintiff, but that Hogan would be disqualified for giving an appearance of impropriety if he had “contact” with Huffstutler not previously disclosed to the court or occurring after 1 October 1988. Specifically, Judge Manning ordered that “[i]n the event that Hogan files an affidavit and certificate admitting contacts other than the two on record here, then and in such event, the presumption of an appearance of impropriety has been met and the conditional denial of the motion to disqualify is withdrawn and the motion to disqualify is allowed.”
Hogan’s subsequently filed affidavit disclosed substantially greater contacts with Huffstutler than he had previously admitted, including some after 1 October 1988. Consequently, defendants’ motion to disqualify Hogan was granted by Judge Robert L. Farmer *732at the conclusion of a final hearing held on 19 April 1989. In drafting his order, Judge Farmer reviewed Judge Manning’s original order and incorporated it into his own ruling.
When faced with similar circumstances, courts in other jurisdictions have held that disqualification is mandated when a lawyer gains access to protected information of his opponent through his communication with another lawyer or other person who previously represented or had some relationship with the other side and who was privy to confidential information which is substantially related to the issue in the pending matter. See, e.g., Lackow v. Walter E. Heller & Co. Southeast, 466 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
At the very least, I find that Hogan’s actions violated Canon IX of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the North Carolina State Bar in that they failed to avoid the appearance of impropriety. That Canon provides: “A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.” N.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Canon IX (1985). Our courts have held that it is within the discretion of the trial court to disqualify an attorney for violation of these ethical rules, but this discretion must be exercised within the parameters of the applicable canon(s). Lowder v. Mills, Inc., 60 N.C. App. 275, 300 S.E.2d 230, aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 309 N.C. 695, 309 S.E.2d 193 (1983). Parties have no right to be represented by counsel who is tainted in the particular matter being adjudicated, whether home-grown or pro hac vice. In this case, Judge Farmer’s decision was made solely within his discretion. He acted wisely and properly to ensure compliance with Canon IX. For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.