(dissenting) — The majority opinion accurately sets out the facts of this case. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment because American *117Suzuki Motor Corporation and Suzuki Motor Company, Ltd. (Suzuki) was not the proximate cause of James McCoy’s injuries and the imminent danger element of the rescue doctrine was not met. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
When a defendant’s negligence creates a situation that immediately endangers the life of another, then the "peril invites rescue.” French v. Chase, 48 Wn.2d 825, 829, 297 P.2d 235 (1956) (citing Highland v. Wilsonian Inv. Co., 171 Wash. 34, 17 P.2d 631 (1932)). The rescue doctrine encourages individuals to render aid to those in danger, despite the rescuer’s voluntary exposure to danger. Ballou v. Nelson, 67 Wn. App. 67, 70, 834 P.2d 97 (1992).
Under the rescue doctrine, the first inquiry should be whether Suzuki’s negligence was the proximate cause of Mr. McCoy’s injuries. In re Estate of Keck, 71 Wn. App. 105, 110, 856 P.2d 740 (1993). Proximate cause requires a showing of cause in fact and legal causation. Christen v. Lee, 113 Wn.2d 479, 507, 780 P.2d 1307 (1989). A cause in fact is cause but for which the accident would not have happened. Channel v. Mills, 77 Wn. App. 268, 272, 890 P.2d 535 (1995). Cause in fact is generally a question of fact. Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 778, 698 P.2d 77 (1985).
Legal causation involves " 'policy considerations of how far the consequences of a defendant’s acts should extend,’ ” Keck, 71 Wn. App. at 111 (quoting Christen, 113 Wn.2d at 508), and is a question of law. Id. Determining whether legal causation exists requires consideration of causation, intervening events, duty, foreseeability, reliance, remoteness and privity. Hartley, 103 Wn.2d at 780. Further, the application of the rescue doctrine is limited to situations where the plaintiff can establish his injury was attributable to a cause which was reasonably foreseeable given the danger created by the defendant’s original act of negligence. Maltman v. Sauer, 84 Wn.2d 975, 981, 530 P.2d 254 (1975).
Suzuki’s alleged design defect was not the legal cause of *118the injuries suffered by Mr. McCoy due to the hit-and-run driver. Injury caused by any alleged design defect was limited to the driver and passenger in the Suzuki under the facts of this case. To go beyond those immediately injured, Mr. McCoy has to rely on the rescue doctrine. But that doctrine is not applicable here. The alleged negligence is too remote and insubstantial to impose liability. See Hartley, 103 Wn.2d at 784 (state and county’s failure to revoke defendant’s driver’s license was too remote and insubstantial to impose liability for wrongful death action); Klein v. City of Seattle, 41 Wn. App. 636, 639, 705 P.2d 806 (design defect in road was too remote to impose liability for accident caused by driver who had been drinking and was speeding), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1025 (1985). Suzuki is not liable for Mr. McCoy’s injuries because, as a matter of law, proximate cause cannot be established. In addition, Mr. McCoy’s injuries are not attributable to a reasonably foreseeable event given the design defect. Even if Suzuki designed the Samurai defectively and because of that design should foresee injury, it could not possibly foresee that Mr. McCoy would have been victimized by a hit-and-run driver in these circumstances. Thus, not only was Suzuki’s alleged negligence not the proximate cause of Mr. McCoy’s injuries, the injuries he suffered were not within the reasonably foreseeable consequences of Suzuki’s defective design of the Samurai.
The language of the rescue doctrine makes it clear that one element is the emergency nature of the situation that presents itself to the rescuer. Here, the required imminent danger to the driver and passenger did not exist when Mr. McCoy suffered his injuries. French, 48 Wn.2d at 830. Mr. McCoy suffered his injuries approximately two hours after the initial rescue. The element of urgency and need for immediate action had long since passed. Both victims and the vehicle had already been removed from the scene when the pickup hit Mr. McCoy. The peril was not im*119minent. The court did not err by granting Suzuki’s motion for summary judgment.
Review granted at 133 Wn.2d 1027 (1997).