Lovato v. Beatrice Foods

CALLISTER, Justice:

Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment dismissing his complaint on the ground that defendant was covered by workmen’s compensation insurance at the time plaintiff was injured, Section 35-1-60, U.C.A.1953. The sole issue of this case is whether the decision of the trial court can be sustained that defendant qualified as a self-insurer as of June 14, 1968.

Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to bring this action under Section 35-1-57, U.C.A.1953, for defendant’s failure to comply with the provisions of Section 35-1-46, U.C.A.1953. Specifically plaintiff rtrges that defendant is not within the protection of the act for its failure to furnish annually to the Commission proof of financial ability to pay direct compensation, Section 35-1-46(3), U.C.A.1953.

*372We cannot agree with plaintiff’s technical and strained interpretation of the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act relating to self-insurers.

In the first place, it should be noted that Utah’s Act is compulsory and not permissive or elective.1 All employers who are not specifically excepted must comply with the Act. Compliance may be accomplished in one of three ways as provided in Section 35-1-46, U.C.A.1953, i. e., (1) by being insured with the State Insurance Fund, (2) by being insured with a qualified insurance carrier, or (3) by qualifying as a self-insurer.

Failure of an employer to insure in one of these three ways constitutes a violation of the Act and subjects him to an injunction proceeding. The last two paragraphs of Section 35-1-46 provides:

The commission is hereby authorized and empowered to maintain a suit in any court of the state to enjoin any employer, within the provisions of this act, from further operation of the employer’s business, where the employer has failed to insure or to keep insured in one of the three ways in this section provided, the payment of compensation to injured employees, and upon a showing of such failure to insure the court shall enjoin the further operation of such business until such time as such insurance has been obtained by the employer. The court may enjoin the employer without requiring bond from the commission.
If the commission has reason to believe that an employer of one or more employees is conducting a business without securing the payment of compensation in one of the three ways provided in this section, the commission may give such employer five days written notice by registered mail of such non-compliance and if the employer within said period does not remedy such default, the commission may file suit as in this section above provided and the court is empowered, ex parte to issue without bond a temporary injunction restraining the further operation of the employer’s business. [Emphasis added.]

The plaintiff argues that the failure of the defendant employer to “file an annual proof of financial ability” 2 disqualified it as a self-insurer, thus giving the plaintiff employee the right to maintain a civil action as provided in Section 35-1-57. This latter section states:

Employers who shall fail to comply with the provisions of section 35-1-46 shall not be entitled to the benefits of *373this title during the period of noncompliance, but shall be liable in a civil action * * *. [Emphasis added.]

It is of significance that the foregoing section refers to 35 — 1—46, as a whole, rather than to only subsection (3) thereof. It is thus apparent that the legislature was referring to a failure to be insured in one of the three enumerated ways, rather than to any one specific clause contained in the section.

The defendant employer herein applied for, and on January 26, 1963, received, a certificate from the Industrial Commission qualifying it as a self-insurer. Pursuant to an application by defendant, the Commission in February, 1966, included Utah By-Products Company as a self-insurer along with defendant. Since that time, defendant has been considered by the Commission as a qualified self-insurer. Its certification, as such, has never been revoked or questioned by the Commission; nor did the Commission ever request a financial statement until September of 1968. The plaintiff employee was injured June 14, 1968.

Since its original certification, defendant has fully complied with the provisions of Section 3S-1-53, U.C.A.1953, by filing annual payroll reports and paying annually to the Tax Commission the special tax imposed on self-insurers.

The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the decision of the South Dakota Supreme Court in Utah Idaho Sugar Co. v. Temmey;3 the facts and reasoning of that case are not applicable to the case before us for at least two reasons.

First of all, the South Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Act was a permissive or elective one — not compulsory as is Utah’s. The employers could choose or not whether to be subject to the act. If they did not so choose, they were liable to civil actions by injured employees, but they were not subject to being enjoined from conducting their business for noncompliance (as is the case in Utah).

Secondly, the Industrial Commission of South Dakota adopted a rule and regulation, which required the filing of a statement of financial condition on or before the first day of August of each year. It further provided that the certificate of exemption must be renewed each year by the filing of an application and financial statement, otherwise it would expire.

The Utah Commission has not adopted a similar rule or regulation. Subsection (3) of 35 — 1—46 which provides that “satisfactory proof of financial ability” must be furnished annually does not designate any date upon which the proof must be submitted. Thus, one might legitimately inquire as to when the period of noncompliance com-*374menees; nor does the statute delineate the type of proof which would he considered satisfactory. The vagueness of the statute, absent the adoption of a definite rule by the Commission, makes adherence thereto a practical impossibility.

Furthermore, the statute does not provide for the issuance of a certificate or its automatic expiration for failure to furnish the annual “satisfactory proof of financial ability.” On the contrary, the last sentence of subsection (3) reads: “The commission may in proper cases revoke any employer’s privilege as a self-insurer.” This the Commission did not do.

For the foregoing reasons the decision of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are awarded to defendant.

CROCKETT, C. J., and TUCKETT, J., concur.

. Ind. Comm. of Utah v. Daly Min. Co., 51 Utah 602, 172 P. 301 (1918).

. The statute provides only that the employer furnish “annually to the commission satisfactory proof of financial ability.” Nothing is said about filing annual financial statements.

. 68 S.D. 623, 5 N.W.2d 486 (1942).