concurring in the result.
I agree with the majority that the trial court gave an incomplete instruction as to whether or not Dr. Jones complied with the appropriate standard of care. However, I disagree with the majority’s analysis of whether or not expert testimony was required to show that Dr. Jones failed to exercise reasonable care and diligence in his treatment of plaintiff. The majority states that “expert testimony was required” and cites Jackson v. Moun*389tain Sanitarium & Asheville Agr. Sch., 234 N.C. 222, 67 S.E.2d 57 (1951), because “[t]his is a matter involving ‘highly specialized knowledge with respect to which a layman can have no reliable information.’ ” The majority seems to cite Jackson for the proposition that expert testimony is always required on the issue of reasonable care and diligence and to that extent, I believe that the majority misconstrues Jackson.
The full sentence from which the majority quotes provides “[u]sually, what is the standard of care required of a physician or surgeon is one concerning highly specialized knowledge with respect to which a layman can have no reliable information.” Id. at 226-27, 67 S.E.2d at 61. This does not say that expert testimony is always required, only that it is usually required. In fact, in Jackson the Supreme Court went on to state that “[t]here are others, however, where non-expert jurors of ordinary intelligence may draw their own inferences from the facts and circumstances shown in evidence.” Id. at 227, 67 S.E.2d at 61-62. Actually, in the discussion which precedes the language which the majority quotes, the Supreme Court specifically disavowed the notion that expert testimony would always be required:
It is true it has been said that no verdict affirming malpractice can be rendered in any case without the support of medical opinion. If this doctrine is to be interpreted to mean that in no case can the failure of a physician or surgeon to exercise ordinary care in the treatment of his patient, or proximate cause, be established except by the testimony of expert witnesses, then it has been expressly rejected in this jurisdiction.
Id. at 226, 67 S.E.2d at 61. Thus it is clear that Jackson falls under the “common knowledge” exception to the requirement of expert testimony in medical malpractice cases. Although the majority accurately describes the “common knowledge” exception, I fear that future courts may seize upon the majority’s citation to Jackson as standing for the proposition that expert testimony is always required on the issue of reasonable care and diligence and for this reason I write separately.