(dissenting)—I dissent. Bereft of the idyllic background created for it by the majority (and not substantiated in the record), Guemes2 is just across the channel from Fidalgo3—both islands a part of Skagit County and subject to zoning and rezoning like any other part of that county.
I, too, have examined the extensive record prepared by the planning commission and presented to the county commissioners. It comes to this court by way of the Skagit County Superior Court from whose judgment this appeal is taken. From this examination, I would present the following as the facts pertinent to the present controversy.
The Skagit County Planning Commission recommended the rezoning of roughly 490 acres. The Skagit Board of County Commissioners, in whom the final authority rested, amended the Interim Zoning Ordinance in accordance with the recommendation.
The rezoning was challenged in the Skagit County Superior Court by property owners on Guemes Island (a peti*747tion for a writ of certiorari, or an alternative writ of prohibition) .
The senior Superior Court Judge of Washington State, the Honorable William J. Wilkins, presided at the trial, and in an 11-page memorandum opinion answered each of the objections made by the opponents of the rezoning and upheld the action of the planning commission and the Skagit Board of County Commissioners in authorizing the rezoning.
The judgment of the superior court was appealed to this court, and, after a hearing and a rehearing, I would affirm the action of the superior court in refusing to interfere with the action of the county commissioners in authorizing the rezoning.
My reasons are well expressed in the following portions of the comprehensive memorandum opinion of Judge Wilkins.
“At the outset, I should make it clear that it is not my province to substitute my views for that of the Planning Commission and County Commissioners of Skagit County. My job is merely to review the action taken by them and determine whether their action in rezoning these 400 plus acres on Guemes Island last November was arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, invalid. As was so ably and tersely stated by Mr. Justice Ott in the Myhre case, 70 Wn.2d Dec. 203, at Page 206 [70 Wn.2d 207, 210 (1967)], ‘Zoning is a discretionary exercise of police power by a legislative authority. Courts will not review, except for manifest abuse, the exercise of legislative discretion . . . manifest abuse of discretion involves arbitrary and capricious conduct. Such conduct is defined to be without consideration and in disregard of the facts . . . one who asserts that a public authority has abused its discretion and is guilty of arbitrary, capricious and unreasoning conduct has the burden of proof ... If the validity of the legislative authority’s classification for zoning purposes is fairly debatable, it will be sustained.’
“On April 4, 1966, after at least 3 years’ study, the Skagit County Planning Commission recommended to the Board *748of County Commissioners for adoption a comprehensive plan for Skagit County which said plan was adopted by the Board the following day, the Board stating, ‘The Board deems it necessary for the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, and general welfare, to adopt the comprehensive plan.’
“On April 12, 1966, the Board of County Commissioners adopted an Interim Zoning Ordinance, including the zoning map.
“Prior to the adoption of the comprehensive plan, the Planning Commission held public hearings, due and timely notices of the times and purposes of such meetings, having been given in accordance with the statutes.
“All of Guemes Island which comprises an area of about 8 miles[4] and is separated from the City of Anacortes by roughly a mile of water was zoned for residential use under the comprehensive zoning plan. Why the entire island was zoned residential is not disclosed by the record, but one may conclude that it was the intention of the Commission to continue the study of such zoning with the view of rezoning a portion of the island later on. Under the title of Plan Development and Revision, the Commission stated, ‘This plan shall be periodically reviewed by the Planning Commission and said Board. In addition to adding more detailed plans, it may be necessary from time to time to change basic features of the Plan, as economic, social or technological changes indicate a better basic pattern of land use or a need for re-evaluation of planning principles and objectives.’
“In the early part of September, 1966, an application was filed with the Board of County Commissioners and the Planning Commission for the rezoning of roughly 700 acres on Guemes Island for industrial uses by Intervenor Northwest Aluminum Company and others. Thereafter, on October 10, 1966, the Planning Commission initiated proceedings for the rezoning of a larger portion of Guemes Island for commercial uses and for adoption of certain amendments to- the Interim Zoning Ordinance.
*749“Due and timely notices were given by the Planning Commission of public hearings to be held for consideration of the proposed changed zoning for said portion of Guemes Island, which public meetings were held on October 24, 1966, and on November 18, 1966.[5]. . .
“Thereafter, at a public hearing on November 29, 1966, the Board of County Commissioners adopted the rezoning recommended by the Planning Commission, amended the comprehensive zoning plan, and interim zoning map and Ordinance and approved the findings and reasons therefor.[6]
“These actions have been commenced by certain residents of Guemes Island against Skagit County challenging the validity of the said proceedings for the rezoning of this portion of Guemes Island consisting of roughly 490 acres and for amending the Interim Zoning Ordinance and zoning map.
“The plaintiffs in these cases consolidated for the purpose of trial urge in support of their claim that the proceedings for the rezone was invalid for the following reasons:
“(1) The industrial rezoning was invalid because it violates the stated purposes and objects of the Skagit County Comprehensive Plan.
“(2) The Board of County Commissioners lacked jurisdiction to adopt the industrial amendment to the com*750prehensive plan map because there was no evidence of a ‘change of conditions’ or ‘need,’ as those terms are judicially defined in land-use cases.
“(3) The industrial rezone is invalid because it is a ‘spot-zone.’
“(4) Because Ordinance 4081 is a valid interim zoning ordinance, the county lacked capacity to amend it on an ad hoc basis.
“(5) The industrial rezoning is invalid because during its adoptive process, the plaintiffs were denied due process of law; private hearings were held, of which they had no statutory notice and from which they were excluded. The Board of County Commissioners denied adequate time for presentation and abitrarily discriminated at its public hearing.
“(6) The industrial rezoning is invalid because it was not recommended by a majority of the membership of the Planning Commission as required by RCW 36.70.400 and 36.70.600.
“(7) The Planning Commission lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition for rezoning or initiate the proposal. Exclusive jurisdiction lies in the Board of Adjustment.
“It should be noted that during these proceedings we have been concerned only with reviewing the records accumulated by the Planning Commission. These are voluminous, but during the time permitted, I have endeavored to read all of these records so as to be certain that I have reviewed everything, both pro and con, presented to the Planning Commission and the Board of County Commissioners.
“Realizing as I do the importance of this decision to the people of Skagit County and bearing in mind that I have no right to substitute my views for that of a legislative body, I have decided that in fairness to these dedicated and devoted men serving on this Planning Commission and the duly elected representatives of Skagit County, the Board of County Commissioners, I must on the basis of the entire record hold that the plaintiffs have not met their burden *751and proved to my satisfaction that this rezoning of a portion of Guemes Island was invalid. Although, as Mr. Justice Hale commented in the case of Pierce v. King County, 62 Wn.2d 324, ‘Scarcely a generation has passed since the adoption of the first zoning statute in this state in the year 1936,’ the fact is that county planning has made its greatest strides since the close of World War II, and especially, county-wise, in this state during the past decade. Today throughout the various counties in this state we have civic minded citizens devoting their time and energies to future planning for their communities. This augurs well for our state and the future welfare of our citizens.
“Answers to the first four issues raised by Plaintiffs which I have just enumerated will be found in the findings and reasons thereof of the Planning Commission which were adopted by the Board of County Commissioners and for convenience and reference are attached hereto.
“From the entire record before the Planning Commission, the said Commission was justified in concluding:
“(1)' That the industrial rezoning was valid because it further promoted the stated purposes and objects of the comprehensive plan and that what was done was in support of that plan; that the said rezoning was in conformity with one of the objectives; i.e., the highest and best use in the public interest of the land in Skagit County. The Commission were entitled to accept the statement of Mr. McKee, the Port Commissioner, ‘We do think that the classification of the Guemes property in question here today as industrial would, for all the reasons I have touched on this morning, result in the highest and best use for this land, without harm to neighboring areas.’ . . .
“ (2) That a ‘change of conditions’ and ‘need’ did exist warranting the reclassification. Reference is made to the minutes of the regular meeting of the Planning Commission dated October 10, 1966, on Pages 6 and 7 thereof, ‘As the next order of business, a statement was made by Wayne Kite to the effect that at the time of the adoption of the comprehensive plan, the Guemes Island area was *752used principally for residential purposes in addition to some ranching and grazing. There was at this time no indication that industry would be concerned with locating there. Since that time, we have seen increased industrial activity throughout the entire Puget Sound area as well as in our own county. We have learned that a major industry has given study to this vicinity as a possible site for their processing plant and have indicated that Guemes Island is well suited for their particular industry. Because of the deep water harbor, they state that it is the only satisfactory site in the area. Mr. Kite stated that it is among the objectives of the comprehensive plan to recognize the need for industrial development, to recognize the needs of the county in terms of economic growth, tax base, employment demands on a year-around basis and also the necessity to protect the public interest in terms of public health and general welfare from possible detrimental effects from air and water pollutants. In view of these changed and changing conditions since the adoption of the comprehensive plan and interim zoning ordinance, we have made studies and further studies will be made. Also in view of these changing conditions, it seems to be in order that we should recognize the changing conditions and the studies that have been made and hold a public hearing to consider amending the comprehensive plan and land use map.’
“See also the comments of Mr. Justice Rosellini in his dissent on Page 15, Myhre v. Spokane, supra [70 Wn.2d at 219].
“The Planning Commission were entitled to conclude as they did at their meeting of October 24th that they looked upon their original zoning of Guemes Island as of a temporary nature and that there was now a need not previously considered to provide for water-bourne industry not needing rail or highway facilities.
“(3) That this was not spot zoning, and therefore arbitrary and capricious, but was a plan in support of the highest and best use and was directly related to the public health, safety and morals and the general welfare *753of the people of Skagit County. Support for this proposition will be found in Anderson vs. Seattle, 64 Wn.2d 198, and McNaughton vs. Boeing, 68 Wn. Dec. 655 [68 Wn.2d 659 (1966)].
“(4) That under the Interim Zoning Ordinance, the county did not amend it on an ad hoc basis, but rather on the basis that there was a large acreage, the rezoning of which would lead to further planning of buffer zones and other changes in zoning, all of which would, lead to further industrial development and toward establishing a more healthy basis from the standpoint of the economy and human resources. Obviously it was not the intention of the Commission in the first instance to ‘freeze’ the zoning of Guemes Island as residential. Such zoning was of an interhn or temporary basis, the Commission having in mind an early change to more realistic zoning of the entire island. Early amendment was contemplated and especially was called for upon receipt of the information regarding industrial needs.
“(5) I must decide on the basis of this record that Plaintiffs were not denied due process. The times and purposes of public meetings were timely made known at which meetings full opportunity was given for discussion of the proposed rezoning by citizens favoring and opposing the rezoning. Citizens representing both sides were afforded full opportunity to meet separately with the Planning Commission and to submit written material outside of the public hearings in support of their positions.
“I am satisfied that the requirements of our statutes regarding public hearings were fully complied with. In addition, the Commission were entitled to hold executive sessions, meet separately with proponents and opponents in the progress of their studies for legislative action. The question, I think, is were the public timely notified of the meetings and the purpose of such meetings and afforded an opportunity to present their views. The record demonstrates that the Commission was fully aware of the views of the citizens of Skagit County on the question *754of rezoning Guemes Island and exhibited patience and understanding throughout those public meetings.
“ (6) The 6th point raised by Plaintiffs is that the industrial zoning is invalid because it was not recommended by a majority of the Commission.
“The record discloses that Clyde Shrauger was first appointed to a one-year term on the Planning Commission effective September 1, 1961. Upon the expiration of his one-year term he was re-appointed on September 1, 1962, to a four-year term which of course would terminate September 1, 1966. Through inadvertence, this termination of his term was overlooked, and he was not reappointed until the issue was raised by Plaintiffs during this past week. Meantime, he has participated in all activities of the Commission regarding the rezoning of a portion of Guemes Island for industrial uses, and with four other members of the Commission voted for said rezoning, two members of the Commission voting against said rezoning. The issue is now raised for the first time that Mr. Shrauger’s vote was void, thus leaving only 4 votes of the Commission in favor of the rezoning, 4 votes not being a majority of the Commission of 9. As stated ’above, Mr. Shrauger has been a member of the Planning Commission since its inception in 1960, and is knowledgeable on all matters and studies relating to the adoption of the comprehensive plan as well as the studies relating to the rezoning. Mr. Shrauger was not aware that his term had expired and, in good faith, participated as a member of the Board at its meetings and in its discussions. The law does not favor the disqualification of a member on such technicalities and declares him to be a de facto officer of the Planning Commission. 15 Wn.2d 345; 71 A.L.R. 848.
“ (7) The claim is made that the Planning Commission lacked jurisdiction to initiate the rezoning of Guemes Island; that such authority so to do rests with the Board of Adjustment. With this proposition, I cannot agree. The Planning Commission had full authority to pursue *755its studies and to initiate such proceedings. Reference should be made to R.C.W. 36.70.550; 560; 570; 580; 590; and 600.
“We may now assume that the Planning Commission is now prepared to move ahead with its studies on proper further rezoning of Guemes Island creating buffer zones where needed for this industrial area to the end that the residents there may continue to enjoy the type of suburban living they have there and which type of living we all enjoy. It goes without saying that the Planning Commission are fully alerted to the responsibility which is theirs to lay down stringent guidelines for the control of any industrial activity that may be placed there. ...”
I have little to add to Judge Wilkins’ very adequate discussion of the facts and the law. The issues discussed under (3), i.e., spot zoning, and (5), i.e., the failure to accord due process to the opponents of the rezoning—represent the principal points of disagreement within this court and are the only issues on which I deem it necessary to expand Judge Wilkins’ opinion. We will consider the latter first. The executive session of the planning commission, referred to in footnote 2, seems to be regarded as particularly reprehensible. As Judge Wilkins has pointed out, neither the planning commission nor the board of county commissioners is limited to a consideration of the testimony presented in public hearings when determining what action will be taken.
I recognize fully the desirability and value of public hearings with reference to zoning and rezoning. The purpose of such hearings is to provide forums that are easily accessible to the community at large to make known their views and air their grievances on matters before a planning commission. Such hearings can be very helpful to a planning commission in discharging its responsibility when determining whether the granting of an exception or variance is consistent with the community interests and general welfare. (See 2 E. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice .(3d ed.), § 13-9 (1965)).
*756Such importance is attached to the information and arguments presented at public hearings, that a member of a zoning board not present at such a public hearing will not be permitted to have his vote taken and counted at a subsequent. executive session called to consider action after such public hearing. Koslow v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 19 Conn. Supp. 303, 112 A.2d 513 (1955); Sesnovich v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 313 Mass. 393, 47 N.E.2d 943 (1943).
The law required that public hearings be held, and they were. There is no contention that any member of the public had anything to say that had not been said in the two lengthy public hearings. The objection is that executive sessions were also held, and the., contention seems to be that no information can be considered that does not come through a public hearing.
However, no such limitation is placed on planning commissions or boards of county commissioners by our statute. They are not judicial bodies, confined to the record, but administrative and legislative bodies with certain quasi-judicial functions; and the fact that a public hearing is required does not mean that a planning commission may not act on facts which are known to it, even though not produced at the public hearing. Gerstenfeld v. Jett, 374 F.2d 333 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Parsons v. Board of Zoning Appeals of New Haven, 140 Conn. 290, 99 A.2d 149 (1953); Tuite v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Woonsocket, 96 R.I. 307, 191 A.2d 155 (1963). The Supreme Court of Arizona has an interesting comment in Hart v. Bayless Inv. & Trading Co., 86 Ariz. 379, 389, 346 P.2d 1101, 1108 (1960), where it says:
4. Intervening unnoticed hearings. Plaintiff contends, in regard to the 1951 ordinance, that both the Commission and the Board violated the Zoning Act by holding unnoticed héarings subsequent to the héarings for which notice was published and prior to the adoption of the zoning ordinance. We find no support in the statute for this contention. The requirement is for a public hearing, to be held after due notice, but the Act does not state that either the Commission or the Board must act immediately upon the matters' presented at the hearing; nor does it specifically preclude a further indepehdént in*757vestigation by either body into those sources of information which may be helpful.
We turn our attention now to the “spot-zoning” issue. The majority’s attack on this rezoning of 490 acres as spot zoning seems to be stretching that concept to the limits of elasticity.
There are very few communities in the United States where an industry that requires three-quarters of a section of land and extensive deep water frontage for its operations is going to be able to locate without extensive rezoning being necessary. The majority labels such rezoning as “spot zoning.” We have heretofore said, “[zjoning cannot be a straight jacket to halt the burgeoning business and industrial life of a community.” McNaughton v. Boeing, 68 Wn.2d 659, 661, 414 P.2d 778.
If we accept the majority’s definition that “[s]pot zoning is a zoning for private gain designed to favor or benefit a particular individual or group and not the welfare of the community as a whole”; and if we concede that the present rezoning was designed to favor and benefit a particular industry, it does not follow that it is not also for the welfare of the community as a whole.
Opinions may differ as to whether this rezoning was for the welfare of the community as a whole. The appointive and elective official whose responsibility it was to make that decision have acted.
It is well to remember, too, that only the Skagit Board of County Commissioners had authority to amend the Interim Zoning Ordinance, and that it was not bound by recommendations of the planning commission. It was not a rubber stamp; it was a legislative body acting on the recommendation of an administrative body, which also had been acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. The board made its own decision in accord with what it regarded as the best interests of Skagit County when it amended the Interim Zoning Ordinance to make some 490 acres of Guemes Island available for industrial use.
It is my view that the Superior Court for Skagit County decided this matter properly when it refused to interfere *758with the action taken by the Skagit Board of County Commissioners, elected to adopt and amend zoning ordinances.
Hunter, C. J., Weaver and Neill, JJ., concur with Hill, J.
The majority’s placing Guemes in the San Juan archipelago may cause surprise in some quarters as Rosario Strait has been decided to be the eastern boundary of the San Juan archipelago. See Decision on Geographic Names in the United States by the United States Board on Geographic Names, Decision List 6401. The accuracy of the designation is, of course, not material to the determination of the legal issue confronting the court. “Save the San Juans” was merely the rallying cry of one of the embattled groups of citizens in the- emotion-packed controversy which wracked Skagit County preceding the rezoning, which is the reason for this litigation.
The city of Anacortes is on this island as is a considerable area zoned.for industrial use.
8 square miles.
This should be November 7, 1966. The public hearings were extensive; from 10 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. on October 24; and from 10 a.m. to 6:40 p.m. on November 7.
The planning commission met in executive session on November 14, 1966, and conferred with representatives of the Bonneville Power Administration and the Northwest Aluminum Company on special problems particularly involving air pollution. The planning commission held a public meeting on November 18 and took action recommending the rezoning of a tract on Guemes Island for industrial use. At the same time the planning commission adopted findings and set forth reasons in support of its recommendation.
This paragraph of Judge Wilkins’ opinion requires some amplification. The county commissioners did have a public hearing at their morning session on November 29, 1966.
In the afternoon session, they took action immediately upon reconvening—adopting the rezoning as recommended by the planning commission. The chairman of the county commissioners pointed out that the afternoon session was a “public meeting” but not a “public hearing.”