Defendant appeals from a judgment and sentence entered against him following a jury conviction on two counts each of auto theft and robbery. For appeal purposes he concedes the sufficiency of the admitted evidence to support the verdict. He questions, however, the legal admissibility of certain statements and confessions made by him, introduced by the state, admitted by the court over objections, and considered by the jury.
Following his apprehension as an escapee from the Washington State Reformatory at Monroe, defendant was taken to Seattle, placed in a police lineup and identified by sev*650eral witnesses as the person who committed a number of robberies in King and Snohomish counties. After being so identified he was returned to Monroe.
Later that day, two detectives from the King County Sheriff’s office went to Monroe and, in the confines of that institution, prepared to interrogate the defendant. It had been decided that he would be charged with at least one of the robberies about which he was to be questioned.
Before making inquiry of the defendant regarding the crimes, however, the detectives handed to him a written statement reading as follows:
I have the following rights: (1) to remain silent and anything I say could be used against me in court; (2) to talk to any attorney before making any statement and to have him present at the time of making a statement; (3) if I have no resources by which I can obtain 'an attorney, I have a right to wait and if I am charged the court will provide me with an attorney. After reading the above and with full knowledge of these rights I have decided of my own free will to make and sign the following statement.
(Italics ours.) Defendant then signed that advisory statement under date of September 28, 1966.
One of the detectives verbally advised the defendant “that if he was without resources if he was charged, an attorney would be furnished for him by the State.” (Italics ours.) And the other detective told him that “if he does not have resources to obtain an attorney that one would be supplied by the court when he is taken before the court.” (Italics ours.)
The fact that the defendant was indigent is without contest. He testified that his total resources were in the approximate sum of one dollar and the state did not challenge that testimony.
Under this setting, the detectives then proceeded to question the defendant and obtained from him the statements and confessions which were admitted into evidence against him. Defendant argues that the trial court should have sustained his objections to them at the time of the *651pretrial hearing held under CrR 101.20W(a), RCW vol. 0.1 The basis of his argument is that he was not adequately advised of his right to be represented by legal counsel at the time of interrogation. He contends that the advice given him only indicated that he was entitled to free counsel at a later time. He insists that the advice received falls far short of that to which he was constitutionally entitled. We agree.
We hold that, in absence of a legitimate waiver, the right of a known and identified accused to have counsel present at the time of police interrogation is an indispensable part of the protective privilege of the fifth amendment to our federal constitution.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), our highest court dealt at length with the subject of custodial interrogation by officers of the law. It was then made clear that an accused indigent has certain basic constitutional rights that must be honored if an incriminating statement made by him is to be used against him. Included within the enumerated rights is that of legal counsel, free to the indigent at the time of interrogation. The court said at 474:
This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must have a “station house lawyer” present at all times to advise prisoners. It does mean, however, that if police propose to interrogate a person they must make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation.
(Italics ours.) And it was further stated at 479 that:
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right *652to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
(Footnote omitted. Italics ours.)
An examination of the record here makes it clear that this defendant was merely advised that he was entitled to free legal counsel if charged or when brought before a court. That advice was insufficient. He should have been told that he was entitled to free legal counsel at the time of interrogation. He was in legal custody, had been identified as the person who had committed the robberies and it had already been decided that he would be charged with at least one of the robberies. The fact that he had not yet been formally charged makes no difference. This was not the investigatory stage of an unsolved crime. As the known accused he was entitled to legal representation if he was to be questioned about the crimes. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964).
The state then argues that the defendant waived his right to legal representation. We do not agree. While it is certainly true that an accused may waive his right to counsel, it is equally true that such a waiver is effective only if knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made. Nowhere in the record does it appear that the defendant knew that he was entitled to have counsel at the time of interrogation. Inasmuch as he was not adequately advised, and because it is not shown that he had actual knowledge of his right to counsel, it cannot therefore be said that he waived the right. One cannot effectively waive such a constitutional right without knowledge of its existence.
The judgment and sentence of the trial court is reversed and the matter remanded for new trial.
*653Hill and Rosellini, JJ., and Donworth, J. Pro Tem., concur.
CrR 101.20W(a) provides:
“In every criminal case in which a confession or confessions of the accused are to be offered in evidence, the judge, either at the time of the trial or prior thereto, shall hold a hearing, in the absence of the jury for the purpose of determining whether, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, the confession was voluntary, and, therefore admissible. A court reporter shall record the evidence adduced at this hearing.”