Plaintiff Larry G. Smith brought a claim for personal injury against defendant Tommy Roberts Trucking Company (TRTC) and its driver, defendant Rhoades. Plaintiff’s injuries allegedly arose out of a collision between his automobile and a dump truck owned by TRTC and driven by Rhoades. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages and plaintiff appeals.
According to plaintiff, on the morning of January 25, 1990 he was first in a line of vehicles stopped at a school crossing in LaGrange, where two crossing guards were posted. He did not notice a crossing guard give a “go” signal and did not know the dump truck was behind him until his vehicle had been hit and “knocked up the road.” He turned around to see what had hit him and was hit again. Plaintiff deposed: “This time [the truck driver] was pushing me, and I actually thought that it was somebody that was crazy . . . because . . . things *827like that don’t happen . . . somebody don’t hit you and hit you again, and keep on pushing you down the road. I put my car in gear and gunned it off the side of the road.. . .” According to plaintiff, defendant Rhoades stopped his truck, got out and said “he thought they should have a traffic light there” and “he really didn’t need all of this because he was waiting for some tickets to drop off his record.” Rhoades testified at deposition that he hit plaintiff only once, stating both that he didn’t see plaintiff and didn’t realize he was there and also that he “thought [plaintiff] was moving with other traffic.” Rhoades was charged with following too closely.
In addition to compensatory damages, plaintiff asserts a claim for punitive damages against Rhoades and against TRTC as respondeat superior, which capacity TRTC concedes. Plaintiff also asserts claims for punitive damages against TRTC for negligent entrustment, negligent hiring and negligent retention of Rhoades. These claims are based on the allegation that TRTC knew or should have known of Rhoades’ driving record which, according to plaintiff, shows him to be habitually reckless. Evidence was presented that Rhoades’ driving record for the three years prior to the accident included a DUI in his personal vehicle and two speeding tickets and a violation of a traffic control device while driving a tractor-trailer. Further, while driving a TRTC truck, Rhoades was given a citation in August 1988 for improper lane change when he “clipped” another vehicle and was given a citation for speeding in December 1988. Evidence was also presented that less than a month after the collision(s) with plaintiff in January 1990, Rhoades pled guilty to another charge of following too closely.
Plaintiff contends Rhoades was not qualified to drive the truck in question as a matter of law because TRTC violated federal regulations adopted by the Georgia Public Service Commission for regulating motor carriers (see OCGA §§ 46-7-68.1 and 40-8-2), by which TRTC was to require Rhoades to take a physical test, a written driving test and a road test, and furnish TRTC with a list of his violations and an application for employment. Defendants contend no causal relationship exists between the collision(s) in this case and either Rhoades’ driving record or any violation lay TRTC of hiring regulations. Moreover, TRTC argues it cannot be liable for punitive damages for negligent entrustment, hiring or retention because it had no actual knowledge of Rhoades’ driving record.
1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. A grant of partial summary judgment is subject to direct appeal. “An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9-11-56 (h). See also Cohen v. Garland, 119 Ga. App. 333, 334 (167 SE2d 599) (1969).
*8282. As to plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against defendant Rhoades, the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence of record shows at most gross negligence which is insufficient to support an award of punitive damages. Punitive damages may be recovered when “it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.” OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b). The plaintiff deposed that the driver of the truck struck his car not just once but twice, and the second time the truck kept pushing him down the road. Statements the driver allegedly made at the scene indicate he was in a hurry to deliver his load. The record contains evidence from which a jury could conclude that the system by which TRTC pays its drivers for hauling loads rewards fast driving and quick deliveries. Construing the evidence most favorably for the plaintiff, the jury would be entitled to find defendant acted wilfully, wantonly and with such a want of care as to entitle the jury to presume defendant acted with conscious indifference to the consequences of his acts. This evidence thus raises an issue for jury determination concerning punitive damages and the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment to defendant Rhoades.
3. As to plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages against defendant TRTC, issues of fact are raised which must be resolved by a jury. Plaintiff presented evidence that the employer had knowledge that its driver had received tickets for two traffic violations while driving a company vehicle. Plaintiff also presented evidence that the employer failed to follow federal rules and regulations requiring it to check into the driver’s driving record along with evidence that had the employer made such a check, the record would have shown that the driver had several other traffic violations on his record, including a DUI. We cannot hold as a matter of law that the driver’s record would not support a finding that the driver was habitually negligent.
Pursuant to the facts and circumstances of this case, the fact that the record does not show TRTC had “actual knowledge” that the driver was incompetent or habitually reckless does not entitle TRTC to summary judgment. It is true that generally, liability of a party under the doctrine of negligent entrustment of an automobile must be based upon the party’s actual knowledge that the person to whom the automobile has been entrusted is incompetent and liability cannot be premised on the party’s failure to inquire about the driver’s competence. See generally Worthen v. Whitehead, 196 Ga. App. 678 (396 SE2d 595) (1990). Pursuant to the general rule, Georgia law does not impose a duty upon the owner of an automobile to make an investigation of the competency of one who drives the automobile to discover his driving record. Bonney Motor Express v. Yates, 171 Ga. App. 754 *829(2) (320 SE2d 844) (1984). “[Y]et the situation is different where the driver is in fact incompetent and the owner is in law bound to check [the driver’s] qualifications. . . .” Jones v. Dixie Drive It Yourself &c., 97 Ga. App. 669, 674 (104 SE2d 497) (1958). Where the owner has a statutory duty to check on the driver’s qualifications, “the defendant would be precluded from the defense that it did not have actual knowledge of such incompetence on the part of the driver.” Id.
Evidence was presented in this case that the employer had a legal duty to make certain inquiries into the driver’s qualifications and driving record and failed to do so. Thus, the employer’s lack of actual knowledge of defendant’s incompetency, if such is shown, is not a defense to plaintiff’s claim. To hold that the employer is entitled to summary judgment on the negligent entrustment claim because of its failure to discover the driver’s record is to reward the employer for remaining ignorant despite its legal duty to discover the facts. Such a holding is contrary to commonsense and public policy. Moreover, the record shows the employer had actual knowledge of two traffic violations committed by the driver after he commenced working for the employer. It is for the jury to decide whether these facts show the driver’s incompetency, the employer’s knowledge of the incompetency and that the employer’s negligence, if any, concurred with that of the driver to cause the plaintiff’s injuries.
In any event, the case at hand involves a claim for negligent hiring and retaining, in addition to the claim for negligent entrustment. In cases involving a claim for negligent hiring and retaining, this court has held it is necessary to show the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s dangerous propensities. See, e.g., Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co. v. Sharara, 167 Ga. App. 665 (307 SE2d 129) (1983). Even where a defendant is entitled to summary judgment on a claim for negligent entrustment because of plaintiff’s failure to show defendant’s actual knowledge of the driver’s incompetency, this does not mean he is entitled to summary judgment on a claim of negligent hiring because the standard of care in such cases is whether defendant, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the driver’s incompetency. Cherry v. Kelly Svcs., 171 Ga. App. 235 (319 SE2d 463) (1984).
In this case, as in Chupp v. Henderson, 134 Ga. App. 808 (216 SE2d 366) (1975), evidence of the employer’s knowledge of the employee’s driving record is relevant and essential because the plaintiff asserted a claim for punitive damages for negligent entrustment. Of course, evidence of a driver’s past driving record is irrelevant to the issue of his negligence in a particular instance and is prejudicial and inadmissible. See Thomason v. Harper, 162 Ga. App. 441 (1) (289 SE2d 773) (1982). The proper “solution to this problem is a separate trial of the negligent entrustment issue.” Id. at 442. See also Chupp v. *830Henderson, 134 Ga. App. at (2).
As to the issue of proximate cause, an employer’s negligence in entrusting a vehicle to a driver must concur, as part of the proximate cause, with the negligent conduct of the driver. Collins v. Everidge, 161 Ga. App. 708 (2) (289 SE2d 804) (1982). If the jury finds the employer knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care or exercise of the duty imposed upon it by law, should have known of the driver’s unfavorable driving record we cannot say as a matter of law that the jury could not find such negligence concurred with the negligence of the driver as a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. If the jury finds the employer should have known the driver was an unsafe driver, then the jury could also find that the employer’s permitting him to drive the company-owned truck was a proximate cause of the collision. Thus, neither defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages.
Judgment reversed.
McMurray, P. J., Beasley, P. J., Cooper, Blackburn and Smith, JJ., concur. Birdsong, P. J., and Andrews, J., dissent. Johnson, J., not participating.