dissenting.
I vote for a new trial for failure of the trial court to submit the defense of entrapment to the jury. The legal definition of entrapment is correctly stated in the majority opinion. Defendant’s evidence makes out a classic entrapment defense under this definition. It shows, or provides bases for reasonable inferences, that the crimes charged were induced by the actions of law enforcement officials, that the 1976 sales to James Lewis, an undercover agent with the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), originated with agents of the state and not the defendant, and that these sales were a product of overtures by Lewis and other officials to defendant rather than defendant’s criminal inclinations.
The evidence is undisputed that defendant sold heroin to Lewis while Lewis was an undercover agent for the SBI in March and April, 1975. Defendant had also made other sales in 1975 to which he pleaded guilty and for which he was sentenced to two years imprisonment. Immediately prior to the inception of his prison term he made the sales to Lewis. He was not indicted for these 1975 sales to Lewis until February, 1976. He was arrested therefor in February or March, 1976, and immediately acquired counsel to represent him. While defendant was required to post a $10,000 appearance bond on the charges being tried here, he was released on his own recognizance on the charges arising out of the 1975 sales to Lewis. These charges were pending when defendant dealt with Lewis in August and September, 1976. So far as the record reveals they had not been disposed of at the time of defendant’s trial on the instant charges in November, 1976.
Defendant testified that he understood these indictments for the 1975 sales to Lewis would be dropped if he continued to cooperate with the SBI in its undercover drug operations. The attorney representing him on these charges, Mr. Douglas DeBank, corroborated his testimony. Mr. DeBank testified that the Attorney General agreed to recommend to the Wake County District Attorney that these charges be dropped in return for defendant’s help. Defendant said he became aware in November, *5171975, that the state knew of these 1975 sales to Lewis. He testified:
“I met with Mr. Freeman [Special Agent and Assistant Supervisor with the SBI] in the last of November. Well, he made me aware of the two sales and asked me did I remember a Mr. James W. Lewis at the time. Mr. Lewis is that gentleman there. He did not tell me what I was going to be charged with those two sales. I was under the impression that if I continued giving them information that the two charges were supposed to be dropped.
COURT: Did he say that?
A. Yes, sir. He said that he would see what he could do about it.”
Defendant further testified that when Lewis approached him on 17 August 1976 he told Lewis that he had nothing to sell. Lewis then asked, “[W]ould I get something for him and I told him yes I would. I had the impression that that was what I was suppose [sic] to do. When he requested me to get drugs for him I knew that he was an SBI agent. I got it for him because I was under the impression that that was what I was suppose [sic] to do.”
Defendant readily admitted selling heroin to Lewis on 26 August 1976 and 14 September 1976. His entire defense rested on entrapment. He testified that on 14 September 1976 he was in the presence of a drug dealer when Lewis came to make the purchase. He said, “Lewis gave me the money, I gave it to the guy and I gave him the drugs. Lewis gave me the money, I gave it to the dealer and the dealer gave me the drugs and I handed it to him. I felt I was suppose [sic] to help him. The dealer who was at my house on September 14th was ‘Shaky’. I don’t know his last name.” Defendant further said, “But I felt like you were trying to make a bust, but I had no idea that he would bust me with it.”
Defendant’s testimony itself tends to show he was induced to make the 1976 sales to Lewis by agents of the state and that the sales were the product of the creative activity of these agents rather than defendant. Lewis, according to defendant, did more than merely give defendant an opportunity to commit a crime. His words and actions together with defendant’s earlier conversations with other officials made defendant believe he had to comply with Lewis’ request as a part of his earlier agreement to cooperate with the authorities.
*518The majority, however, concludes that the contacts made with defendant by the authorities furnished no reasonable basis for defendant’s belief that he was expected by them to sell heroin to Lewis in August and September, 1976.1 strongly disagree with this assessment of the evidence relating to these contacts. The Attorney General testified that in November or December, 1975, he talked personally with defendant. While making it clear that he made no promises to defendant, the Attorney General did say he agreed to accept information from defendant. He said further, “Mr. Walker gave us certain knowledge, certain information. The information did prove helpful. . . . Q. Did you anticipate further information from Mr. Walker? A. I am sure that I was hoping there would be.”
Freeman testified for the state in rebuttal. He admitted talking with defendant while defendant was in prison in November or December, 1975. He said he requested defendant to cooperate with the SBI in its undercover drug operations and to help it in gathering information. Freeman also admitted that he told defendant “that our agent had purchased heroin from him and that he would be indicted for that.” Freeman denied mentioning Lewis’ name to defendant and said, “I did not know if [defendant] ever knew who James Lewis was.”
It is true that no one, including defendant, testified that any person in an official capacity told defendant expressly that he was to sell drugs to Lewis or to anyone else. Defendant conceded that he had no license to sell heroin generally and that he had avoided doing so since being released from prison. He was, however, supposed to “cooperate” with the state and to assist it in gathering information about illicit drug traffic. Moreover, and most importantly, he says he knew in August and September, 1976, that Lewis was an SBI undercover agent, having been advised of Lewis’ identity by Freeman in November, 1975. Whether Freeman in 1975 expressly advised defendant of Lewis’ identity, it seems reasonable to assume that defendant knew Lewis’ identity at least as early as February or March, 1976, when he was indicted, arrested and acquired counsel in connection with the 1975 sales to Lewis.
These arrangements for defendant’s cooperation together with his knowledge of Lewis’ identity form a reasonable, if not a compelling, basis for defendant’s belief that he was supposed to comply with Lewis’ request to acquire and deliver heroin to Lewis. “Cooperation” can take many forms. Defendant’s realiza*519tion that he had no license to sell heroin generally does not detract from his stated belief that he was supposed to cooperate with Lewis whom he knew to be an undercover agent. If defendant, experienced in illicit drug traffic, knew in August and September, 1976, that Lewis was an undercover SBI agent, it is inconceivable that he would have dealt with him other than under the belief that he was expected to do so by the authorities.
The question, in essence, is not what the Attorney General, Freeman, and Lewis subjectively intended defendant to do or not to do. The question is what their words and actions might have reasonably led him to believe he was supposed to do. Whether defendant in fact knew Lewis’ identity, whether he sold to Lewis believing this was what the authorities intended him to do, and the reasonableness of defendant’s belief under the circumstances, are crucial factual questions which the jury under proper instructions, and not this Court, should resolve.