dissenting.
McLarty was properly charged, tried and convicted of a misdemeanor. The following specific written sentence was imposed and signed by the trial judge:
"The defendant being before the Bar of the Court and showing no reason why the sentence of the Court should not be pronounced;
"It is, thereupon, considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that the said Lawrence Scott McLarty be, and hereby is, sentenced to confinement in (the Clarke County Public Works Camp) (such institution under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Corrections as the Director of Corrections may direct), where the said defendant shall be confined at labor for a term of 12 months, to be computed according to law.
"It is further ordered that the said defendant be committed to the common jail of said County, there to be kept in close custody until demanded by the proper authorities.
"The court having examined the cause, it is further ordered that the above sentence may be served on probation provided said defendant does not violate the criminal laws of any governmental unit during said period and be of general good behavior; and, further provided, that said defendant complies with the following special conditions herein imposed by the Court as a part of this sentence.
"1 thru 7 (customary probation requirements).
"8. Pay the Fine of $500.00 herein ordered.
"It is further ordered by the Court that the defendant be required to be evaluated and treated at the nearest Georgia Regional Mental Health Facility.
"It is further ordered by the court that the defendant pay a fine of $500.00.
"Further ordered C. Anderson is hereby appointed Probation Officer of said defendant, as provided by law.
"It is further order of the Court and the defendant is *449hereby advised that the Court may at any time amend, alter, revoke or modify any conditions of this probation or change the period of probation and may discharge the defendant from probation. The probationer shall be subject to arrest for violation of any condition of probation herein granted. If such probation is revoked, the Court may order the execution of the sentence which was originally imposed, or any portion thereof, in the manner provided by law.”
Following conviction, McLarty appealed his sentence to the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia, and his conviction was unanimously affirmed. McLarty v. State, 231 Ga. 444 (202 SE2d 37).
Upon filing notice of that appeal, a supersedeas bond was set at $1,000. The defendant has been free since that time until arrested under a bench warrant to begin serving his sentence.
Following the affirmance of his conviction by the Supreme Court of Georgia, he additionally filed an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States which was denied.
He never surrendered his person to the sheriff or to his probation officer, until after a bench warrant had been issued for his arrest at which time he turned himself in. He then brought a petition for habeas corpus and was again released under special bond approved by the court in that proceeding on March 20,1975. At all times he has been represented by counsel, and his counsel was notified of the actions of both appellate courts.
The majority opinion says that after his appeal was denied by the United States Supreme Court he "presented” himself in turn to the county solicitor and to the trial judge. His own testimony in respect to each "presentation,” shows only an effort on his part to have the sentence modified or reduced and there is no evidence that he offered himself for the purpose of commencing to serve the sentence imposed. Both contracts were made out of court at the private law offices of each court officer. The solicitor told him in regard to his appeals,"... in any event that whenever the time runs out, his attorney will let him know when the time is out and he will have to report.” (Emphasis supplied.) The solicitor then referred him to the *450trial judge. The judge’s testimony does not support any offer on defendant’s part to begin his probation. The probation officer testified affirmatively that the defendant made no contact with his office until after the bench warrant was issued for his arrest. The defendant’s testimony in his own behalf shows no offer of surrender but merely covers contacts with the judge to get his sentence modified.
Any reasonable construction of the written sentence given to the defendant would conclude that he was given a straight sentence of twelve months’ confinement and a $500 fine. "Every fine imposed by the court under authority of this Code shall be paid immediately or within such reasonable time as the court may direct.” (Emphasis supplied.) Code Ann. § 27-2901.
The alternate sentence granted him permission to serve the straight sentence on probation. It "further provided, that said defendant complies with the following special conditions herein imposed by the Court as a part of this sentence”: therein naming other requirements to be carried out during the probation period, and a specific requirement that the fine of $500 otherwise imposed on the defendant is paid. These plain words and the mandate of Code Ann. § 27-2901 mean that the probation sentence was permissive upon the fine being paid immediately.
Irrespective of our differences in the interpretation of words having ordinary significance and meaning, the defendant has neither served the twelve months’ confinement sentence nor has he served any probationary sentence. When allowed freedom under supersedeas bond, he was required to surrender himself to abide the final judgment in the case. There is no duty required by law that the state otherwise notify him, or arrest him though it may be permissible for the state to do so. The supersedeas bond is his solemn agreement to present himself to abide the final judgment of the court. Until he has done so he has not complied with the law. It is my view that he cannot complain about not knowing the terms of his probation sentence until he surrenders himself for the purpose. There is no guarantee under the Constitution nor any statute that requires the speedy serving of a sentence. The delay has been occasioned by the convicted *451party’s appeal and his own choice to remain free. The conclusion of the majority opinion that he "stood ready to begin his sentence” is pure surmise. After trial, term and appeal, the trial judge has very little authority over the sentence. Code Ann. §§ 27-2502 and 27-2709. Indeed had the judge after sentence issued a specific order releasing him from confinement it could not be credited on his sentence and the time of release under it would not count. Aldredge v. Potts, 187 Ga. 290 (200 SE 113) (1938); Brown v. Clark, 172 Ga. 524 (158 SE 3) (1931) and cits.
Code Ann. § 27-2505 quoted in the majority opinion provides that the sentence shall be computed from the date the remittitur of the appellate court is made the judgment of the court in which the conviction is had, provided the defendant is not at liberty under bond but is incarcerated or in custody of the sheriff of the county where convicted.
The fallacy of the majority holding is that the sentence began to run when "McLarty presented himself to the county authorities.” Out-of-court efforts to compromise or modify his sentence is not presenting himself to serve an imposed sentence, probation or otherwise.
Even then if the probation period of one year began June, 1974, it was not completed on March 20,1975, when he was arrested and again released on bond at his own request.
The conclusion of the majority that the defendant must now pay the original $500 fine appears to be an apology to the people of this state in allowing a convicted person to otherwise escape most of his responsibility.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Nichols and Justice Marshall join in this dissent.