(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s decision to *106award plaintiff costs and attorney fees. MCL 500.3148(1); MSA 24.13148(1).
Our Supreme Court has ruled that an insurer’s refusal to pay is reasonable under § 3148(1) when caused by a legitimate question of statutory construction, constitutional law or bona fide factual uncertainty. Gobler v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 428 Mich 51, 66; 404 NW2d 199 (1987). However, our Court has also concluded that we will not reverse on appeal a trial court’s finding of unreasonable refusal unless it is clearly erroneous. MCR 2.613(C); United Southern Assurance Co v Aetna Life & Casualty Ins Co, 189 Mich App 485; 474 NW2d 131 (1991).
A finding of fact is not clearly erroneous unless there is no evidence to support it or the reviewing court on the entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Townsend v Brown Corp of Ionia, Inc, 206 Mich App 257, 263; 521 NW2d 16 (1994). In conducting a review under this standard, our Court affords great deference to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it. Id., p 264.
Before 1991, when faced with the question of whether a factual dispute permitted an insurance defendant to avoid paying for medical care, various panels of our Court reached different results. Thomson v DAIIE,1 cited in the majority opinion, represents a possible outcome of such disputes. It is not controlling authority, although the majority treats it as such. Moreover, I would postulate that, in Thomson, the Court engaged in de novo review rather than review under the clearly erroneous standard. The analysis ignores the proper degree of deference which should have been given to the trial judge’s determination.
*107Other cases from the same period more accurately represent review under the clearly erroneous standard. For example, in Liddell v DAIIE,2 one physician concluded that the plaintiff was fit to return to work while two others indicated he could not. Testimony of a claims adjustor indicated that the defendant did not attempt to ascertain the true situation in the face of contradictory reports. Our Court concluded that the trial court’s finding that defendant’s conduct was unreasonable was not "clearly erroneous” and upheld the award of attorney fees.
In a second case, decided after Thomson, our Court again decided that the trial court’s determination that plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees was not "clearly erroneous.” Nelson v DAIIE, 137 Mich App 226, 232-233; 359 NW2d 536 (1984). There, the insurer stopped payment for medical treatment when the plaintiff changed physicians. When the former learned that the latter planned to change physicians, but before the change occurred, it asked her to make a final visit to the first physician. She made a final appointment. The physician summarized her condition but did not comment on the reasonableness of further treatment. The insurer made no further inquiries in this regard. Our Court concluded that the trial court’s finding that the delay was unreasonable was supported by evidence on the record and not clearly erroneous. It upheld the award of attorney fees. Id., p 233.
In the case before us, it was uncontested that plaintiff received serious facial injuries in an auto accident. They required approximately fifty stitches. Two physicians, plaintiff’s regular plastic surgeon and a plastic surgeon whom plaintiff con-*108suited, held differing views on whether further plastic surgery would improve her appearance. Defendant did not seek a second medical opinion but adopted the one more favorable to it. Defendant then asserted that a question of fact existed which legitimized its refusal to pay.
I believe, that defendant’s decision to deny payment for medical benefits without ascertaining the true situation, given contradictory reports, makes this case similar to Nelson, supra, and Liddell, supra. Defendant’s assertion that a legitimate factual dispute made its refusal to pay reasonable simply is not persuasive. Under the majority’s holding, whenever one of several physicians concludes that additional treatment is not required, the insurer will be entitled to refuse further payment and await the courts’ resolution. Such a result is contrary to the underlying purpose and policy of no-fault auto insurance.
Moreover, I am unable to conclude that there was no evidence in the record to support the trial judge’s decision to award attorney fees. The judge was better able to view plaintiffs injuries and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. Such evaluations should and must play a critical role in determining whether an insurer’s refusal to pay legitimate medical expenses is reasonable. I believe MCR 2.613(C) and the definition of the clearly erroneous standard of review set out above require us to defer to his decision.
I would affirm the award of attorney fees and costs.
Thomson v DAIIE, 133 Mich App 375; 350 NW2d 261 (1984).
Liddell v DAIIE, 102 Mich App 636; 302 NW2d 260 (1981).