(dissenting). I disagree with the majority for three reasons. First, as Mr. Wadsworth correctly points out, the plain language of SCR 40.05(lm)(a) supports his position. The rule does not require that Indiana bar admission of Wisconsin lawyers on the basis of Wisconsin practice be unconditional, permanent or vested.
Second, the objectives of the reciprocity rules support Mr. Wadsworth's position. The underlying rationale of the reciprocity rules is to treat out-of-state lawyers seeking admission to Wisconsin without bar examination in the same manner as their home jurisdictions treat Wisconsin lawyers seeking admission without examination. Such treatment is designed to stimulate lawyers in other jurisdictions to encourage their home states to admit Wisconsin lawyers without examination.
As a result of today's decision, Wisconsin now requires all Indiana lawyers (or all lawyers from states with similar provisions) to take an examination. If *584Indiana is willing to admit Wisconsin lawyers only on the same basis that Wisconsin is willing to admit Indiana lawyers, our decision today rules out the possibility of Wisconsin lawyers being admitted in Indiana without examination. Thus the court has, contrary to the purpose of the reciprocal rules and the legislative history, made it more difficult for Wisconsin lawyers to gain admission to practice in another state.
Third, the opinion contravenes our decision in In re Saretsky, 179 Wis. 2d 92, 506 N.W.2d 151 (1993). In Saretsky the court upheld the Wisconsin Board of Bar Examiners' position that a Michigan lawyer must file a statement required of Wisconsin applicants to the Michigan bar, declaring the applicant's good faith intention to maintain an office in the admitting state for the practice of law. Although Indiana allows Wisconsin lawyers to gain admission by fulfilling a five-year conditional practice requirement, this court now refuses to extend the same opportunity to Indiana lawyers seeking admission in Wisconsin. I recognize that Indiana's rule may be more cumbersome to apply than Michigan's, but our rules do not distinguish among other jurisdictions on the basis of the burden of their requirements. Saretsky should control this case.
Because the court's interpretation violates the plain language of the rules, the purpose of the reciprocal rules, and our decision in Saretsky, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice JANINE P. Geske joins this dissent.