(concurring in part and dissenting in *618part). I join the memorandum opinion insofar as it finds the statute1 at issue not unconstitutionally vague as applied, affirms Lino’s conviction, and finds Brashier’s conduct prohibited by the gross indecency statute. I respectfully dissent, however, because I believe gross indecency is defined by the common sense of the community, i.e., it is a question for the trier of fact.
i
A
MCL 750.338; MSA 28.570 mandates:
Any male person who, in public or in private, commits or is a party to the commission of ,or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male person of any act of gross indecency with another male person shall be guilty of a felony
"When construing statutory provisions, the task of this Court is to discover and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Legislative intent is to be derived from the actual language of the statute, and when the language is clear and unambiguous, no further interpretation is necessary.” Storey v Meijer, Inc, 431 Mich 368, 376; 429 NW2d 169 (1988) (citations omitted). If judicial construction is necessary, the Court must discern the Legislature’s intent by examining "the object of the statute, the harm which it is designed to remedy, and apply a reasonable construction which best accomplishes the statute’s purpose.” In re Forfeiture of $5,264, 432 Mich 242, 248; 439 NW2d 246 (1989).
*619B
At issue in the instant case is the definition of "gross indecency.” While a majority rejects a definition formed by a common sense of the community, no majority definition emerges. Two justices2 refuse to define the term. Justice Levin would define gross indecency under the People v Howell3 test and extend the scope of "manual sexual act[s] . . . 'with a person under the age of consent’ ” to include manual sexual acts, e.g., masturbation, in the presence of persons under the age of consent, even though this act was not done to or by persons under the age of consent. Ante at 580, n 4. Justice Boyle, joined by Justice Brickley, would limit gross indecency to oral-genital contact. I believe all three approaches are flawed. In fact, this Court has long held that the phrase gross indecency constitutes behavior offensive to the common sense of the community:4
" 'Indecent and improper liberties with the person of such child’ means such liberties as the common sense of society would regard as indecent and improper. In this case, as in State v Millard, 18 Vt [571] 577 [1846], it may be said that 'no particular definition is given by the statute of what constitutes this crime. The indelicacy of the subject forbids it, and does not require of the court to state what particular conduct will constitute the offense. The common sense of the community, as well as the sense of decency, propriety, and morality which most people entertain, is sufficient to apply the statute to each particular case, and point out what particular conduct is rendered criminal by it.’ ” [People v Carey, 217 Mich 601, *620602-603; 187 NW 261 (1922), quoting People v Hicks, 98 Mich 86, 90; 56 NW 1102 (1893).][5]
Hence, contrary to the approach that refuses to define "gross indecency,” the approach adopting and extending Howell, and the approach limited to oral-genital contact, gross indecency is determined by reference to the common sense of the community, i.e., it is a question for the trier of fact.
Certainly many gross indecency cases refer to or deal with oral sexual acts; however, no Michigan court has ever held that gross indecency is limited solely to such acts. Similarly, while this Court has held that sodomy does not constitute gross indecency, see, e.g., People v Schmitt, 275 Mich 575; 267 NW 741 (1936), that finding has not limited the definition of gross indecency. In fact, we simply held that the crime of sodomy (then termed " 'the abominable and detestable crime against nature’ ”) did not include penetration per os,6 but did not hold that gross indecency included only penetration per os. Id. Likewise, the Court in People v Dexter, 6 Mich App 247; 148 NW2d 915 (1967), held only that fellatio is prohibited by the gross indecency statute, not by the sodomy statute. The Court did not hold that gross indecency is limited simply to oral sexual acts. Id. at 250-251.
The purpose of the gross indecency act is to prohibit sexual conduct that is offensive to the community. "The word 'indecent’ is a common and general one. As ordinarily understood, it includes anything which is lewd or lascivious, obscene or grossly vulgar, unbecoming, unseemly, unfit to be *621seen or heard, or which violates the proprieties of language or behavior.” 50 Am Jur 2d, Lewdness, Indecency, and Obscenity, § 2, pp 451-452.
Statutes generally confer authority upon municipalities to preserve and protect the public morals, and to provide for the punishment of persons conducting themselves indecently in the streets and other public places, to the annoyance of the citizens. It has been observed that the decency which is protected by a statute is that which the predominant majority of minds agree upon. [Id. at 452.]
Indeed, even the lead opinion in People v Howell, 396 Mich 16; 238 NW2d 148 (1976), which would have redefined and narrowly construed the statute, would have encompassed more than merely oral sexual acts. It would have redefined gross indecency to include:
oral and manual sexual acts committed without consent or with a person under the age of consent or any ultimate sexual act committed in public. [Howell, supra at 24 (Levin, J.).][7]
Thus, I agree with the memorandum opinion that the statute includes more than just oral-genital acts. The purpose and history of the statute reveal that while oral sexual conduct may constitute gross indecency, other acts may also violate the statute. However, unlike the memorandum opinion, I leave this latter determination to the trier of fact, i.e., whether gross indecency is con*622duct violative of the common sense of the community.
ii
Lino’s conduct could very well be considered gross indecency by a jury. Under the Carey standard, a reasonable jury should be permitted to find that fellatio in a well-lit parking lot next to an open restaurant that is visible by the naked eye offends the common sense of society. Fellatio, as noted by the memorandum opinion, has long been deemed gross indecency by Michigan courts. See, e.g., Howell, supra at 22 (finding forced fellatio and fellatio performed on a nine-year-old boy gross indecency); People v Myers, 161 Mich App 215, 220; 409 NW2d 787 (1987).8 Indeed, even under the Howell standard, fellatio should be understood as an "ultimate” sex act. See, e.g., Howell, supra at 22.
Because Lino’s actions constituted gross indecency, I join the memorandum opinion affirming his conviction.
hi
Similarly, Brashier’s conduct could be found by a jury to constitute gross indecency. Brashier on four separate occasions approached fourteen- or fifteen-year-old boys and offered them money if they would accompany him to "beat up a queer.” Brashier would approach the boys, feed them *623lunch, and take them to a hotel where codefendant Goike would be waiting. Brashier would direct the boys to abuse Goike while Goike masturbated. The boys would, inter alia, hit Goike with a stick, urinate and vomit and pour syrup on him, and force him to eat combinations of these materials. Brashier mostly directed the behavior, but also would partake at times. At no time did either the boys or defendant engage in any sexual touching or acts. At the completion of these "occasions,” Brashier would pay the boys and threaten them with serious harm if they revealed what occurred.
A jury certainly would be entitled to find that this behavior constituted gross indecency although it did not constitute oral sex. The common sense of the community is clearly offended by these acts. The exact purpose for enacting the gross indecency statute was to combat such aberrant behavior. The appropriateness of maintaining a purposefully vague statute is also clearly revealed by the circumstances of this case. No legislature can be expected to delineate with laser-like precision all possible offensive sexual predilections. Finding that this conduct could not constitute gross indecency simply would be inconsistent with the common law and the purpose of the statute at issue.9
IV
. Accordingly, I join the memorandum opinion except insofar as it rejects the common sense of the community definition of gross indecency.
Griffin, J., concurred with Riley, J._MCL 750.338; MSA 28.570.
Cavanagh, C.J., and Mallett, J.
396 Mich 16, 24; 238 NW2d 148 (1976).
Contrary to Justice Boyle’s limited interpretation of the statute, the Legislature never intended only to prohibit cunnilingus and fellatio.
While the purpose of the statute interpreted by Hicks was to punish male persons who take "indecent and improper liberties with the” persons of female children, the definition eventually defined the gross indecency statute at issue. See, e.g., People v Dexter, 6 Mich App 247, 253; 148 NW2d 915 (1967).
Id. at 576.
I reject Justice Levin’s formulation, however, because it is fashioned from whole cloth. Justice Levin’s standard, although creating a principled rule, is unprincipled: it is not derived from history, jurisprudence, legislative intent, or the text of the statute. Indeed, the statute prohibits gross indecency "in public or private,” but Justice Levin has bifurcated the statute to mandate a "public” element in some cases.
In fact, a number of courts have approved instructions which, as a matter of law, instructed that fellatio is gross indecency. People v Edwards, 396 Mich 825, 826; 238 NW2d 536 (1976) ("The instruction that an assault with intent to perform fellatio upon the victim would constitute an assault with intent to commit gross indecency was not erroneous”); People v McCaleb, 37 Mich App 502, 507; 195 NW2d 17 (1972); People v Ferguson, 45 Mich App 697, 699; 206 NW2d 812 (1973) .
Furthermore, Brashier, while not actually fondling the victims, aided and abetted his partner’s gross indecency. As such, he may be found guilty of gross indecency. People v Loveday, 390 Mich 711; 212 NW2d 708 (1973).