concurring, joined by Judge BEA:
Border searches of persons or property entering or exiting the United States are per se reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004). The search of Seljan’s FedEx package was reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that it occurred at the border. Accordingly, the only question that remains is whether Seljan has shown that the search of his FedEx package was conducted in a “particularly offensive manner” or was so destructive as to require some level of suspicion. Id. at 154-56, 124 S.Ct. 1582. Because the majority agrees that he has not, the Constitution does not demand we go any further. I write separately because the majority takes the unwarranted step of examining the reasonableness of the “scanning” methodology and whether precedents involving the plain view doctrine support such an analysis. This approach has no place in Fourth Amendment border search jurisprudence.
I.
The border search exception to the Fourth Amendment has enjoyed an “impressive historical pedigree.” United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 585, 103 S.Ct. 2573, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983) (discussing the lineage of 19 U.S.C. § 1581). Since the birth of our nation, Congress — acting pursuant to its constitutional authority under Article I, § 8, cl. 3 “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” — has granted the Executive plenary *1009authority to conduct routine searches at the border to protect our territorial integrity. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985). The earliest customs statute enacted by the First Federal Congress — even before its proposal of the Fourth Amendment — granted officials the “ ‘full power and authority’ to enter and search ‘any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed....”’ United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1977) (quoting Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29). It is because this same Congress proposed for adoption the original amendments to the Constitution two months later, that the Supreme Court has stated “it is clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as ‘unreasonable,’ and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), overruled on other grounds, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). Most recently, the Supreme Court has explained that “ ‘searches made at the border ... are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.’ ” Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152-53, 124 S.Ct. 1582 (quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616, 97 S.Ct. 1972). The Court has “faithfully adhered” to this position that “border searches [are] not subject to the warrant provisions of the Fourth Amendment and [are]’reasonable’ within the meaning of that Amendment.” Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 617, 97 S.Ct. 1972 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)). For this reason, the Court has stated that:
Routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant, and first-class mail may be opened without a warrant on less than probable cause. Automotive travelers may be stopped at fixed checkpoints near the border without individualized suspicion ..., and boats on inland waters with ready access to the sea may be hailed and boarded with no suspicion whatever.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538, 105 S.Ct. 3304 (internal citations omitted). Based on this authority, we have recognized that “there can be no constitutional violation for the border search of ... international mail by a customs inspector.” United States v. Ani, 138 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir.1998). The rationale behind the border search exception has its origins in national self-protection, and it is a necessary instrument to protect our sovereignty. “The Government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border.” Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152, 124 S.Ct. 1582. Historically, such broad powers have been necessary to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country and to regulate the collection of duties. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539, 105 S.Ct. 3304.1 At perhaps no other time in our nation’s history are border searches as vital to maintaining national security. Although our founders could not have anticipated the threats we face as a nation some two centuries later, they saw fit to provide border officers with unique tools, not seen with domestic appli*1010cations, to protect our nation’s territorial integrity.
While searches at the border are generally per se reasonable, the Supreme Court has left “open the question ‘whether, and under what circumstances, a border search might be deemed “unreasonable” because of the particularly offensive manner in which it was carried out.’ ” Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155 n. 2, 124 S.Ct. 1582 (quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n. 13, 97 S.Ct. 1972). Although the contours of what constitutes a search conducted in an “offensive manner” may not be well defined, Fourth Amendment considerations of the manner in which a search is conducted differ depending on whether the search is of a person or property.
When it comes to searches of persons, law enforcement may need some level of suspicion for a highly intrusive search (i.e., strip, body cavity, involuntary x-ray searches). In Montoya de Hernandez, the Court held that reasonable suspicion was required to detain a traveler, who was suspected of smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal, in a manner “beyond the scope of a routine customs search and inspection.” 473 U.S. at 541, 105 S.Ct. 3304 (detention of suspected smuggler for almost sixteen hours before seeking a warrant). The Court expressly declined to decide “what level of suspicion, if any, is required for nonroutine border searches such as strip, body cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches.” Id. at 541 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 3304.
When it comes to searches of property, the Court has also left open the possibility that a border search conducted in a “particularly offensive manner” may violate the Fourth Amendment. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155 n. 2, 124 S.Ct. 1582 (quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n. 13, 97 S.Ct. 1972). However, the Court in Flores-Montano noted that “the reasons that might support a requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person — dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched' — simply do not carry over to vehicles.” Id. at 152, 124 S.Ct. 1582. The Court did not foreclose the possibility that certain searches of property may be so destructive that they require some level of suspicion. Id. at 155-56, 124 S.Ct. 1582 (holding that the removal, disassembly, and reassembly of a fuel tank did not require particularized suspicion). We have applied Flores-Montano to suspicionless border searches of vehicles and found that a search resulting in damage to the interi- or quarter panel of a vehicle, see United States v. Cortez-Rivera, 454 F.3d 1038, 1042-43 (9th Cir.2006), the slashing of a vehicle’s spare tire to search for contraband, see United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d 1115, 1125 (9th Cir.2005), the removal of the interior door panels of a vehicle, see United States v. Hernandez, 424 F.3d 1056, 1059-60 (9th Cir.2005), and the exploratory drilling of a single 5/16— inch hole in the bed of a truck, see United States v. Chaudhry, 424 F.3d 1051, 1053-54 (9th Cir.2005), do not violate the Fourth Amendment.
A defendant seeking suppression of evidence based on the highly destructive manner in which the search was conducted bears the burden of proving the extent of the damage and its effect on the safety and operability of a vehicle. See Cortez-Rivera, 454 F.3d at 1041-42. As we explained in Cortez-Rivera, while the government typically bears the burden of justifying a warrantless search, the fact that the search of a vehicle is conducted at the border ipso facto determines the reasonableness of the search as long as there is not excessive damage to the defendant’s vehicle. Id. at 1041. The defendant is in the best position to know the extent of damage done to his own vehicle and must demonstrate the nature and extent of this damage by a preponderance of the evi*1011dence. Id. at 1042. I see no reason why this same burden should not be placed on Seljan to demonstrate that the search here damaged or destroyed his FedEx package. He does not assert, for example, that customs shredded any of his letters or destroyed any of his pornographic pictures. Like the majority, I conclude that Seljan is unable to satisfy the narrow exceptions to the border search doctrine.
Seljan instead contends that the search of his FedEx package was unreasonably intrusive in scope because customs inspectors read his personal correspondence contained in a letter-sized envelope within the package. As the majority points out, the Supreme Court in Ramsey held that for Fourth Amendment purposes, letters mailed internationally are treated the same as if carried by an entering traveler in his luggage or on his person. Maj. Op. at 1000-01 (citing Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620, 97 S.Ct. 1972). It is the fact that the mailed envelope crosses the border that makes a search of that envelope reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620, 97 S.Ct. 1972. The Supreme Court and this circuit have upheld a variety of suspicionless searches of property at the border: the search of a laptop computer and other personal electronic storage devices including a hard drive and computer memory stick, see United States v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941, 946 (9th Cir.2008); a United Parcel Service package containing a sealed envelope with two social security cards, two permanent resident alien cards, handwritten notes, and an identification booklet written in Arabic, see United States v. Abbouchi, 502 F.3d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir.2007); the contents of a traveler’s briefcase and luggage, see United States v. Tsai, 282 F.3d 690, 696 (9th Cir.2002); papers in a traveler’s shirt pocket, see United States v. Grayson, 597 F.2d 1225, 1228-29 (9th Cir.1979); a traveler’s purse and wallet, see Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir.1967); and graphic photographs deemed to be obscene by customs agents, see United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971). I see no reason to treat the search of Seljan’s international FedEx package any differently.
We have also foreclosed the argument that there is a First Amendment exception to the border search doctrine for expressive material. In United States v. Arnold, the defendant argued that a suspicionless border search of his laptop computer violated the Fourth Amendment because First Amendment principles require a higher level of suspicion when it comes to expressive material. 523 F.3d at 944. We found this unpersuasive and adopted the Fourth Circuit’s position in United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir.2005). See Arnold, 523 F.3d at 948 (stating that the court would “follow the reasoning of Ickes ”). Rejecting the creation of a First Amendment exception to the border search doctrine, the Fourth Circuit in Ickes reasoned, “[particularly in today’s world, national security interests may require uncovering terrorist communications, which are inherently ‘expressive.’ Following [the defendant’s] logic would create a sanctuary at the border for all expressive material — even for terrorist plans. This would undermine the compelling reasons that lie at the very heart of the border search doctrine.” 393 F.3d at 506. The Fourth Circuit also noted the significant hardships that border inspectors would face if there was a First Amendment exception, which would require them to engage in the sort of decision-making process that the Supreme Court wished to avoid in sanctioning expansive border searches.2 *1012Id. (citing Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152-54, 124 S.Ct. 1582).
The customs officer’s search of Seljan’s FedEx package was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment simply because it occurred at the functional equivalent of the border. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152-58, 124 S.Ct. 1582; Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616, 97 S.Ct. 1972. Seljan has failed to demonstrate that the search of his FedEx package was conducted in a “particularly offensive manner” or was so destructive as to require some level of suspicion. The fact that Seljan’s correspondence contained expressive material does not alter this analysis. Accordingly, I would find that this border, search was per se reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
II.
I must part ways with the majority because the Fourth Amendment’s border search exception does not require us to examine the reasonableness of the “scanning” methodology or whether precedents involving the plain view doctrine support this approach. See Maj. Op. at 1004-06. The search of Seljan’s FedEx package was per se reasonable simply because it occurred at the functional equivalent of the border. The majority’s approach endorses an ad hoc review of the reasonableness of the method of conducting a border search of property that has no place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The fact that Seljan has not demonstrated that the search of his FedEx package was conducted in a “particularly offensive manner” or was so destructive as to require some level of suspicion — a conclusion with which the majority agrees — ends the Fourth Amendment inquiry.
Congress may place statutory restrictions on the manner in which law enforcement conducts border searches. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1583 (placing restrictions on searches of international mail sent via the U.S. Postal Service). U.S. Customs and Border Protection may promulgate regulations setting forth procedures by which border searches are conducted. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 145.3(b)-(e) (prohibiting inspectors from opening or reading sealed international letter class mail without a valid search warrant or consent from the sender). The Constitution, however, does not require that we analyze the reasonableness of these methods or procedures unless they allow for particularly offensive or highly destructive border searches. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154-56, 124 S.Ct. 1582. Examining the border search methods used by Customs and Border Protection for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment invites the application of complex balancing tests and ad hoc *1013reviews of search procedures that have no place under the Constitution. The Supreme Court has already warned us not to create complex balancing tests when it comes to searches of property, see id. at 152, 124 S.Ct. 1582 (stating that “[cjomplex balancing tests to determine what is a ‘routine’ search of a vehicle ... have no place in border searches of vehicles”),3 and we should heed that warning by confining our analysis to whether the search was conducted in a “particularly offensive manner” or was excessively destructive.
I share the majority’s sentiment that we must not “impose an unworkable and unreasonable constraint on the nation’s customs officials[.]” Maj. Op. at 1005. Unfortunately, while recognizing the “disastrous consequences” that may result by placing “imprudent constraint^]” on customs inspectors, see id. at n. 8, the majority’s opinion now requires our border patrol officers engage in the sort of decision-making process that the Supreme Court wished to avoid in sanctioning expansive border searches.4
III.
Although the majority relies on the customs inspector’s statutory authority to conduct the currency interdiction operation under 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b), I share the district court’s conclusion that the search of Seljan’s FedEx package to an address abroad was also statutorily authorized under 19 U.S.C. § 1582. Section 1582 authorizes general border searches of packages at the border and is applicable to searches of international mail. See United States v. Taghizadeh, 41 F.3d 1263, 1265 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc). On its face, section 1582 does not require any particularized suspicion to conduct border searches of international mail.5 See 19 U.S.C. § 1582.
While the Constitution prescribes the floor below which protections may not fall, rather than a ceiling, Congress can provide *1014greater statutory protection. Congress has done so in 19 U.S.C. § 1583 when it comes to international letter mail sent via the United States Postal Service. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1583(d), customs inspectors may not search international mail sent via the U.S. Postal Service weighing 16 ounces or less. Congress has made a deliberate choice to provide greater statutory protection for international correspondence sent via the U.S. Postal Service. If Seljan wished to maintain an expectation of privacy in the contents of his correspondence, he could have availed himself of the statutory protections contained in 19 U.S.C. § 1583 and mailed his correspondence through the U.S. Postal Service.
IY.
I write separately because the majority fails to appreciate that the Executive Branch has been given plenary authority to conduct border searches to protect our territorial integrity. The Supreme Court recognizes that these searches are per se reasonable. Absent a border search being conducted in a “particularly offensive manner” or in such a manner as to be so destructive as to require some level of suspicion — which the majority agrees this search was not — there is no place for assessing whether the scanning of correspondence was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when it comes to border searches. The search of Seljan’s FedEx package was reasonable “simply by virtue of the fact that[it] occur[red] at the border.” Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152-53, 124 S.Ct. 1582 (quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616, 97 S.Ct. 1972). The Constitution does not require more. Finally, I note that in the absence of any constitutional prohibition, Congress has made the deliberate choice to provide greater statutory protection for international mail sent via the U.S. Postal Service. If Congress wants to increase the protection for correspondence sent via couriers other than the U.S. Postal Service, that is a decision that should be made by Congress, not the courts.
. The border search doctrine, however, “is not limited to cases where the searching officers have reason to suspect the entrant may be carrying foreign contraband.” United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying Flores-Montano to uphold the search of the defendant's laptop at the border while assuming, for the sake of argument, the defendant "ha[d] no opportunity to obtain foreign contraband”).
. The Fourth Circuit also noted that even though the Supreme Court in Ramsey did not reach the question of whether the First *1012Amendment exempts expressive material from border searches, subsequent authority suggests that it is unlikely. Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507. The court in Ickes noted that in New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868, 106 S.Ct. 1610, 89 L.Ed.2d 871 (1986), the Supreme Court refused to require a higher standard of probable cause for warrant applications when expressive material is involved than that used in other areas of Fourth Amendment law. Id. at 874, 106 S.Ct. 1610. Our circuit has also recognized that the Supreme Court in P.J. Video rejected the proposition that a stricter probable cause standard should apply when First Amendment values are implicated. United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1342 n. 6 (9th Cir.1991). The Supreme Court in P.J. Video commented that "an application for a warrant authorizing the seizure of materials presumptively protected by the First Amendment should be evaluated under the same standard of probable cause used to review warrant applications generally.” 475 U.S. Id. at 875, 106 S.Ct. 1610. With this in mind, the Fourth Circuit commented that "[g]iven the Court’s reluctance to create a First Amendment exception to the general principles governing warrant applications, we find it unlikely that it would favor a similar exception to the border search doctrine.” Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507.
. We have previously recognized the danger of creating new balancing tests when it comes to border searches of property. See, e.g., Arnold, 523 F.3d at 946 (stating that "Flores-Montano rejected our prior approach of using an intrusiveness analysis to determine the reasonableness of property searches at the international border”); Chaudhry, 424 F.3d at 1054 (rejecting as a result of Flores-Montano a distinction between "routine” and “nonrou-tine” searches of property); Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d at 1122 (declining as a result of Flores-Montano to "formulate a new balancing test for determining when a border procedure is so destructive or so damaging as to ' invade the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment”).
. Although evidence of pedophilia may have been obvious from a scan of Seljan’s letter, those who protect our borders and are charged with preventing another 9/11 attack are faced with threats from individuals much more sophisticated than Seljan. It is unlikely that terrorists would be as bold as Seljan and "unabashedly announcef]” in the first paragraph of a letter to coconspirators: "The bomb we have prepared and placed at LAX will go off at 10:30 a.m. on Monday.”
.In United States v. Ani, we examined the fact that Customs and Border Protection, acting pursuant to its authority to interpret section 1582, has promulgated regulations (19 C.F.R. § 145.3) that prohibit its inspectors from opening or reading sealed letter class mail without a valid search warrant or consent from the sender. 138 F.3d at 392. In Ani we stated that "there can be no constitutional violation for the border search of incoming international mail by a customs inspector[.]” 138 F.3d at 392. The court assumed, without deciding, that the customs inspector violated 19 C.F.R. § 145.3 and stated that "[ajbsent a constitutional violation or a congressionally created remedy, violation of an agency regulation does not require suppression of evidence.” Id. (citations omitted). This regulation that customs has chosen to enact reflects nothing more than the agency’s voluntary decision to police itself above and beyond anything that the Constitution or Congress requires.